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1. Political change in Russia’s 
republics 
The Russian state developed a quite peculiar sort of federalism in the 1990s. 
The system evolved as relics from the Soviet territorial make-up changed 
their nature when the central state power was seriously weakened after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. The result was a federal system moving ever 
closer to a confederation. Not only were federal laws contradictory and 
incomplete, the laws adopted by the federal subjects also frequently contra-
dicted federal laws or filled in gaps where federal laws were still missing. 
The result was that the 89 federal subjects developed political regimes rang-
ing from democratic systems to strongly authoritarian one-man rule.  
Such a federal system calls for an investigation of the factors determining 
why some federal subjects turn democratic, while others develop a strongly 
authoritarian system. And, indeed, as the federal subjects gained increasing 
leverage on the political development in the Russian Federation, studies foc-
using on the internal developments in Russian federal subjects emerged as a 
popular field of study among scholars both in Russia and in the West.  
While many of these studies have been descriptive and idiosyncratic,1 a 
few scholars have tried to generalise and create typologies and new theories 
on the basis of Russian regional developments. Among these are attempts to 
adapt existing theories on regime transition and consolidation to the post-
Soviet regional context (Stoner-Weiss 1997; Gel’man et al. 2000). So far 
these theories have been applied only to territorially defined federal sub-
jects,2 presumably under the assumption that when the population in a 
federal subject is multiethnic this complicates matters to such an extent that 
the theories need to be further adapted. This assumption is inherited from the 
early transitologists, who claimed that a democratic transition is unlikely to 
succeed in severely divided multiethnic societies (Rustow 1970).  
In my thesis I will investigate whether it is reasonable to assume that tra-
ditional transition and consolidation theory is ill suited when applied to the 
ethnically defined Russian federal subjects. In order to explore this matter 
two cases will be scrutinised, the Republics of Buryatia and Kalmykia. After 
a discussion of my theoretical framework and methodology in Chapters 2 
and 3, I will assess the extent to which transition and consolidation theory as 
it is applied to territorially defined regions also suits to describe the develop-
ment in ethnically defined regions. The theories will be applied to the cases 
in four analytical chapters (Chapters 4–7): one chapter on regime transition 
and one on regime consolidation in both of the cases.  
                                                     
1  See, for instance, Mikhailovskaia 1995; Orttung 1995; McAuley 1997; McFaul and 
Petrov 1998; Melvin 1998. 
2  In this thesis I will separate between ethnically defined and territorially defined federal 
subjects, where the former type of federal subjects is characterised by a non-Russian titu-
lar group, whereas the latter type has no such titular group. 
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My assumption is that traditional transition and consolidation theory pro-
vides a useful framework for explaining the political development in these 
republics, but that the ethnic factor makes the political processes in ethni-
cally defined regions somewhat different from those in other federal sub-
jects. This is because ethnicity potentially will strengthen the polarisation 
between groups in society. This becomes salient for the political develop-
ment when political dividing lines follow ethnic lines. Thus, in Chapter 8 I 
will estimate to what extent intra- and inter-ethnic polarisation adds to the 
explanation of the regime development in Buryatia and Kalmykia. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a short description of the fede-
ral context before I turn to arguing for my choice of cases and independent 
variables.  
1.1. The federal state in Russia 
The Soviet federal structure could be likened with a matrioshka doll. Its 
administrative make-up was based on a territorial as well as an ethnic prin-
ciple, and contained units with various levels of de jure autonomy. The 
ethnically defined union republics were endowed with most rights and the 
largest among these was the Russi-an Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR), the predecessor of the Russian Fed-eration. This entity was again 
hierarchically divided according to the national prin-ciple into 16 autonom-
ous republics (ASSRs), five autonomous oblast’s and ten natio-nal okrugs. 
Alongside with these were territorially defined units49 oblast’s and six 
kraiswith a number of rights that placed them between the autonomous 
republics and the autonomous oblast’s in the federal hierarchy (Stoner-Weiss 
1997: 62). The titular nations of the ethnically defined subjects de jure pos-
sessed more rights than the other ethnic groups inhabiting the territory, but 
Russian culture and language were everywhere predominant and put the 
Russians in a privileged position. It can easily be claimed that the Soviet 
Union was a “federation in form, but a unitary state in content”3 because of 
the strongly centralised manner in which the Soviet state was organised. 
Still, the administrative units were, as pointed out by Rogers Brubaker 
(1996), “nation-states in embryo”, with experienced political administrations 
and national attributes such as languages with official status. This led to the 
fear that when the Soviet state broke up, not only would the union republics 
seize the opportunity to become independent, but “matrioshka nationalism” 
would lead to the break-up also of the successor states (Bremmer 1997: 11–
12). This happened in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, and many politici-
ans and scholars feared that some of the 89 units of the Russian Federation 
soon would follow suit.  
Russian president Boris Yeltsin exploited the hopes many sub-units of 
RSFSR had of greater autonomy in the power struggle with Mikhail 
Gorbachev from 1990. The Russian declaration of sovereignty from the 
Soviet Union in June 1990 was followed by a speech in Kazan’ in August 
where Yeltsin encouraged the regions to “take as much sovereignty as they 
could swallow”. These events are thought to have sparked the so-called 
                                                     
3  The Soviet nationalities policy was based on the slogan “national in form, socialist in con-
tent”.  
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“Parade of Sovereignties”, where 24 of the federal units declared their sover-
eignty (Khan 2001: 377). The Russian Federation preserved the Soviet 
period territorial make-up but the autonomous republics changed their status 
to republics. From 1991 a heated debate between the federal centre and the 
regions concerned whether the federal subjects all were to have an equal sta-
tus or whether the asymmetric division between republics and territorially 
defined units was to be preserved. A new Federation Treaty was signed in 
March 1992, favouring decentralisation and an asymmetric federation.  
The outcome of the centre–periphery battle was much shaped by the 
ensuing power battle between the executive and legislative powers in Mos-
cow. Both actors in this struggle found it important to win the support of the 
federal subjects and gave them more and more wide-ranging concessions 
(Shlapentokh et al. 1997: 92–101). This soon came to an end after the shel-
ling of the Russian parliament in October 1993. The republican and regional 
heads that had been supporting the parliament fell in disfavour with the Rus-
sian president; Supreme Soviets and local soviets were disbanded every-
where; and a more unitary line was pursued towards the federal units. When 
the Russian Constitution was adopted in December 1993 it demoted the 
Federation Treaty from a constitutional to a sub-constitutional document. 
Moreover, the constitution showed unitarian trends among other things by 
removing the rights the republics had to sovereignty and a separate citizen-
ship. The republics did, however, keep their right to have a republican con-
stitution, president, official language and flag (Sharlet 1994: 123). 
Nevertheless, the development in the years after 1993 implied that the 
federal units evolved in diverging ways, and with divergent political sys-
tems. One reason for this was the fact that the Russian Constitution in itself 
was purposefully ambiguous on the issues of power sharing between the 
centre and the regions. The centre–periphery relations were further compli-
cated by the signing of bilateral power-sharing treaties between the federal 
executive power and many regional executives, starting with the treaty with 
Tatarstan in February 1994. Finally, the federal centre did not try to prevent 
the regions from adopting a great number of constitutional clauses and laws 
that violated the federal legal framework (Khan 2001: 380). 
A turning point in this development was the appointment of Vladimir 
Putin as new Russian president on 31 December 1999. Putin embarked upon 
a policy of strengthening the Russian central power and improving the fede-
ral legal framework (Nicholson 2001). One of his first steps was to start a 
“war” against the regional leaders, among others by attempting to weaken 
the Federation Council that had been the power base of the regional gover-
nors and presidents, and appointing seven presidential representatives to 
supervise the federal subjects within their districts. Furthermore, he started a 
campaign to bring regional laws and constitutions in line with federal laws 
(Russian Federation Report, 9 February; 17 and 24 May 2000). This policy 
has undoubtedly reduced the leverage the federal subjects have over politics 
at the federal centre and weakened their opportunity to act independently.  
In the cases of Buryatia and Kalmykia, the demands from the federal 
centre to bring the republican constitution and laws in line with federal laws 
have also had a significant impact on political life here. Particularly in 
Kalmykia this has had the effect of deconsolidating the power of the presi-
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dent to a certain degree. At the time of writing, the end result of Putin’s 
reforms is still not evident. I have therefore chosen to limit my analysis to 
the Yeltsin period, i.e. until the end of 1999. The analysis will start with the 
power struggle ensuing at the regional level with the dissolution of the Com-
munist Party after August 1991. When necessary in order to achieve an 
understanding of certain processes also earlier events will be included. 
1.2. Justifying my choice of cases 
Dependent variable: Regime type 
The investigation of regime change calls for a definition of political regime. 
Safire’s Political Dictionary (1978: 7) points out that regime can be defined 
either as “the power-span of an individual (‘the Brezhnev regime’) or a 
mode of government (l’ancien régime)”. I will here restrict my use of the 
term “regime” to the latter meaning of the word, while to designate the for-
mer meaning of the word I will use the term “administration” or “govern-
ment”.  
Since the aim of this thesis is to explain the development of different 
political regimes in Russian republics, I have selected two republics with 
fairly different political regimes. Along the lines of Dahl’s definition of a 
polyarchy (1971: 1–9), I will define democracy as a regime with broad rights 
to political participation and with a high degree of contestation for political 
positions. At the other extreme are totalitarian regimes such as the Stalinist 
regime or Hitler Germany. In the contemporary Russian context, however, 
one can safely exclude the totalitarian alternative and rather speak of authori-
tarian regimes.  
Ideally, my analysis would have been based on the study of political 
regimes that vary as much as possible on the dependent variable, for instance 
a clearly democratic regime and a highly authoritarian one. In Russian 
regions, however, most regimes are situated somewhere in the middle on the 
democratic–authoritarian scale, and purely democratic regimes are hard to 
come across. Alla Chirikova and Natalya Lapina (2001: 396) use the term 
“guided democracy” to describe the kind of democracy that is commonly 
found in Russian regions: one where alternative centres of power formally 
exist but have existed for such a brief time that they are yet too feeble to 
constitute a real counter power to the executive power. Among these guided 
democracies I have chosen Buryatia. Here political mobilisation started late 
and the first presidential election took place only in 1994. The winner was 
Leonid Potapov an old apparatchik faithful to socialist principles. He was 
re-elected for a second term in 1998. Buryatia is among the more democratic 
Russian republics. For instance, in a survey called “Measuring Freedom of 
Speech”, published in the autumn of in 1999, it rated highest on the total 
index of freedom of mass media.4 
The political regime in Kalmykia, on the other hand, has drawn much 
attention for its non-democratic character. The young businessman Kirsan 
Iliumzhinov was elected president in 1993. In March 1994 he renounced the 
republican sovereignty and replaced the constitution with a so-called Steppe 
                                                     
4  The survey results are published at www.freepress.ru/win/I.htm.  
1. Political change in Russia’s republics 
Nupi novembear 02 
9 
Code. This also had the conse-quence of strengthening the executive powers 
in the republic. Through extraordinary elections in 1995, Iliumzhinov was 
re-elected for a prolonged second term—without facing any opposing candi-
dates. In 2000 Kalmykia together with Bashkortostan were ranked as the two 
federal subjects with the poorest human rights conditions in the Russian 
Federation (Russian Federation Report, 11 October 2000). In fact, the nature 
of Iliumzhinov’s regime most of all resembles what Juan Linz (2000: 151–
155) calls a sultanistic regime, which is somewhere between an authoritarian 
and a totalitarian regime. The sultanistic regime blurs the borders between 
private and public by allowing the rewards from power to benefit only the 
“sultan” and his collaborators, consisting of his family and friends. A mix-
ture of fear and rewards keeps people loyal, but there is no attempt to legiti-
mise this ideologically or to mobilise the masses the way totalitarian regimes 
do. The “sultan” is neither restricted by laws nor the conventions of traditio-
nal rule, and thus rules in a largely arbitrary fashion. 
Control variables: Factors of similarity 
My choice of case studies furthermore depended on whether the republics 
have many similar conditions that can be kept constant in the analysis. The 
design of the analysis is a most similar systems design, where the ideal is to 
use cases that are as similar as possible on the control variables but that vary 
on the operative variables. This variation can then explain the variation on 
the dependent variable. The control achieved from using this method is a 
partial compensation for the problem of lack of statistical or experimental 
control in the comparative method (Tranøy 1993: 24–25). 
Judging by a map of the Russian Federation it is hard to believe that the 
two republics that are the subjects of my study have much in common. 
Buryatia is situated in Eastern Siberia, and borders Mongolia to the south. 
Kalmykia, on the other hand, is a steppe republic squeezed in between the 
Caspian Sea, Volga and the North Caucasian Republic of Dagestan. Despite 
the vast distance that separates them, however, their titular populations, the 
Kalmyks and Buryats, have an affinity by being the only Mongol peoples in 
the Russian Federation. Tribal wars forced the Kalmyks to abandon the terri-
tories they inhabited in Western Mongolia at the end of the 16th century and 
migrate westwards. From 1609 their new territory at the Caspian Sea gradu-
ally became incorporated in the Russian state, whereas the Buryat lands in 
Siberia were gradually conquered during the 17th century (Guchinova 1997: 
57–63; Forsyth 1992: 87–100). The Kalmyks and the Buryats have preserved 
similar languages, cultures and the Buddhist religion. 
One way in which such ethnic similarities could be assumed to affect 
political development is by their influence on political culture in the region. 
Along arguments made among others by Samuel Huntington (1991) about 
the linkage between religious tradition and democratic development, some 
would argue that the fact that Kalmykia and Buryatia are Buddhist republics 
has a bearing on their regime type, influencing the population to become 
more subservient toward authorities. This has been used by local Kalmyk 
scholars to explain the choice of Iliumzhinov as a leader (Guchinova and 
Tavanets 1994). If this is so, how then do we explain the fact that the repub-
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lics, despite both being Buddhist, nevertheless have two different regime 
types? One could imagine that the Buryats and the Kalmyks, having lived 
separately for hundreds of years, have developed different political cultures 
despite their cultural affinities. Buryats, for instance, claim that the Kalmyks 
are more “Europeanised” than the Buryats but then go on to using this as an 
explanation of why the Kalmyks would elect Iliumzhinov as their president!5 
On the whole, such cultural arguments are often regarded with suspicion by 
experts on the Russian Federation.6 Not only has most of the Russian 
territory been a part of Russia for several hundred years; the difference 
between authoritarian and non-authoritarian does also not seem to follow 
ethnic lines, since many territorially defined federal subjects, such as 
Primorskii krai, are as authoritarian as the most extreme ethnically defined 
cases. Preliminary results from a study by Neil Melvin actually show that 
statistically there are more authoritarian krais than republics (Melvin 2000). 
Furthermore, it is impossible for me to assess the nature of political culture 
in my two cases, as unbiased statistics on the attitude to government are 
lacking in Kalmykia. 
Apart from ethnic affinity another similarity between Buryatia and 
Kalmykia is the fact that they both are among the less prosperous Russian 
federal subjects. When comparing the economic situation in the two repub-
lics, I find that Buryatia does better on most indicators than Kalmykia but 
nevertheless is far below the Russian average. For instance, Buryatia has a 
considerably higher GDP per capita than Kalmykia477,500 roubles versus 
280,000 roubles in Kalmykia in 1996but the Russian average was 821,800 
roubles. None of the republics have a strong industrial sector or rich natural 
resources, which characterises the so-called donor regions (the net contribu-
tors to the federal budget) in the Russian Federation. On the contrary, they 
are both heavily dependent on federal transfers. In Buryatia 35% of the 
republican budget in 1995 was made up by federal transfers, whereas in 
Kalmykia this share was as much as 2/3 of the republican budget (McFaul 
and Petrov 1998: 99, 146). This fact influences the relationship these regions 
have had with the federal centre in the 1990s. Several scholars (e.g. 
Treisman 1997) have argued that donor regions possess a stronger card in 
their relationship with the federal centre than do other regions, which pro-
vides them with more concessions. In the case of Buryatia and Kalmykia 
there is no reason to believe that the relationship these republics have with 
the federal centre is widely different. This is even more so as both presidents 
made themselves unpopular with Yeltsin during the executive–legislative 
conflict in Moscow in the autumn of 1993. Since then they have mainly kept 
a low and loyal profile towards the federal centre. 
Independent variables: Factors of difference 
One variable I believe does have an important impact on regime transitions 
and consolidations in Russian regions is elite struggles. I agree with Anton 
                                                     
5  Interview with Buryat political scientist Erdem Dagbaev, Buryat State University, Ulan-
Ude, January 2001. 
6  Personal communication with among others Pål Kolstø, Richard Sakwa and Grigorii 
Golosov. 
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Steen that elites can be defined as those who are “influential in setting the 
political agenda, in proposing solutions, and who influence policy decisions 
and their implementation” (Steen 1997: 15). I also agree that for practical 
reasons it is easier to assume that institutional position goes together with 
elite influence. Thus, the political elite is the members of the executive and 
legislative power and leading members of political parties. Enterprise direc-
tors, heads of the judicial power, leaders of organisations, interest groups, 
mass media and research institutions make up other elite groups. 
When the regime transition was initiated from the Russian federal centre, 
various elite and counter-elite groups filled up the space of action in the regi-
ons. Furthermore, elite calculations and informal networks did not cease 
being important in the consolidation period but could on the contrary over-
shadow the processes that went through formal institutions. One of my vari-
ables in the analysis of the consolidation period will therefore be the role of 
political processes.  
I do believe, however, that the actors did not act in a void: it was not so 
that in the transition period the existing political-economic structures sud-
denly became irrelevant. Therefore my analysis will also to some extent 
draw upon the functionalist branch of transition theory. I have already exclu-
ded the level of economic development as an explanatory factor, but will 
here focus on the fact that the two republics have different economic struc-
tures. I believe that this mainly had an indirect impact on what kind of 
regimes emerged, by influencing what actors could emerge in the elite 
struggle, what resources they could draw upon and whom they would even-
tually ally with. Furthermore, formal political institutions have an impact on 
the consolidation period: The institutions and legal framework both give 
opportunities to and put constraints on the actors in their dealings with other 
political actors.  
Finally, as my task is to look at what is different in ethnic republics com-
pared to Russian populated regions, I will include an ethnic factor in the ana-
lysis. Ethnicity in terms of political culture has been excluded from the ana-
lysis, but there is more to ethnicity than this in my regions. Both Buryats and 
Kalmyks have preserved elements of their traditional reliance on the family 
and the clan. This is, however, not only clan in the strict meaning of the 
word (rod), but also a mixture of direct kinship and relations with unrelated 
people from the same region, determined by territorial divisions. In Buryatia 
this latter type of identity is related to the zemliachestva organisations pro-
tecting the interests of Buryats from the same region. In Kalmykia this 
phenomenon is called ulusizm, referring to the tsarist period administrative 
divisions in Kalmykia, the uluses. The sub-ethnic identity remains important, 
for instance when employers choose whom to employ, when asking relatives 
and clan members for help, and, in many cases, when deciding whom to vote 
for at elections (Humphrey 1998; Guchinova and Tavanets 1994). Its effect 
on regime development is different in the two republics, though, depending 
on inter-group relationships. 
Furthermore, both the Kalmyks and the Buryats are minorities in their 
own republics, although the Kalmyks made up 45.4% of the population in 
Kalmykia in 1989 and thereby was the largest ethnic group (Guchinova 
1997: 16). The Buryats are in clear minority in Buryatia with 24% of the 
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population versus 69.9% Russians (Abaeva and Tsyrenov 1999: 15). The 
republics therefore also have to deal with inter-ethnic cleavages in addition 
to the intra-ethnic ones, but the effect of the inter-ethnic issue is likely to be 
different due to the numerical difference. 
To sum this up, the analyses of the regime transitions and consolidations 
will both contain one structural and one dynamic element. The structural ele-
ment will be the existing economic structures in the transition part and the 
role of formal institutions in the consolidation part, whereas the dynamic ele-
ment both places will focus on the interaction between elite and non-elite 
actors. Finally I will investigate how political actors use ethnic affiliations 
and the degree of inter- and intra-ethnic polarisation to obtain and consoli-
date their power and how this may in its turn increase the political polarisa-
tion in the republic. This will again have repercussions on how easy it is to 
consolidate the political regime. 
2. Theories of regime change 
2.1. Transition and consolidation theory 
When analysing the emergence of political regimes it is necessary to speak 
about two distinct time periods, in which two different processes take place: 
getting to power and holding on to power. In other words, I will look at 
regime transition and regime consolidation.  
To delineate when one period ends and the other begins, I will define 
regime transition as the period between when one regime is dissolved and a 
new one installed. This is a period when the political rules are in flux and 
contested (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 6). Transition to democracy is 
considered to be over when an agreement on democratic rules is reached, 
implying for instance that a new constitution is adopted and the first free 
elections held (Kopecký and Mudde 2000: 319). In my analysis—which is 
not about transition to democracy—I will consider the transition to be over 
once the new president has been elected. In Kalmykia the new constitution is 
adopted only after this and I consider this to be part of the regime consolida-
tion—in many ways one can actually claim that this is what makes the 
regime consolidated.  
Concerning regime consolidation, this is the period when rules and prac-
tices imposed in the transition period are transformed into more fixed pat-
terns, creating routine and predictability (Kopecký and Mudde 2000: 320). 
Thus, in this second part I will look at how the presidents later used their 
position to strengthen their power in the republics, thereby creating the poli-
tical regimes of today. For a definition of when I consider the regimes to be 
consolidated I will use a modified version of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s 
definition of a consolidated democracy: A regime is consolidated when there 
are no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors 
interested in changing the regime or working to achieve this goal (Linz and 
Stepan 1996: 5–6).  
2.2. Entering the transition 
Transition theory as well as consolidation theory has sprung out of the theo-
ries of democratisation. Transition studies became particularly popular dur-
ing the third wave of democratisation in Southern Europe and Latin America 
in the 1970s, and when the turn came to Eastern Europe at the end of the 
1980s, scholars were eager to test their theories on a new part of the world. 
The studies are almost exclusively concerned with what factors facilitate a 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, and they hold 
the underlying normative position of democratisation and modernisation 
theory that democracy is the most preferred regime type. 
In the case of the former Soviet Union the democratisation success stories 
are few, and, as mentioned above, neither of the two republics I have chosen 
to look at fit the definition of democracy. I nevertheless find it useful to 
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employ transition theory in my analysis, since this can help me identifying 
what factors in the regime transition facilitated the emergence of non-demo-
cratic regimes.  
It is common to distinguish between two separate branches of transition 
theory. The original variant of transition theory is the functionalist model, 
which emphasises the role of institutions and structures. Important contribu-
tors to the development of these theories have been Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Robert Dahl, Barrington Moore and Larry Diamond. The other model arose 
as a criticism of the functionalist model in the 1970s, by suggesting a shift of 
attention from structures and institutions to actors. This position is among 
others held by scholars like Dankwart Rustow, Guillermo O’Donnell, Terry 
Lynn Karl, Phillippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Adam 
Przeworski. Here I will argue that both looking at structures without actors 
and actors without structures makes explanations incomplete, and show how 
transition theory can be adapted to fit better with the post-communist Rus-
sian development. 
Functionalist theory: Focusing on the structures  
“Democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well 
to do a nation the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. This 
statement made by Seymour Martin Lipset in his classical study Political 
Man: The Social Bases of Politics from 1959, captures the essence of this 
branch of transition theory (Lipset [1959] 1981: 31). In his quantitative study 
of countries in Latin America, Europe and the English-speaking democra-
cies, Lipset found a strong correlation between a group of indicators on 
socio-economic development, such as urbanisation, education, income, indu-
strialisation and communications, as independent variables, and the level of 
democracy as the dependent variable (Lipset 1981: 31–41). Later his theory 
was corroborated and expanded by among others Robert Dahl (1971), 
Samuel Huntington (1991) and Larry Diamond (1992).  
This link between socio-economic development and democracy has been 
explained in various ways. For instance, already Aristotle was concerned 
with the need for a society to have relatively few really poor people in order 
to make people engage in politics in a democratic manner (Lipset 1981: 28). 
In his historical studies Barrington Moore has followed up this point by pro-
claiming “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore 1967: 418). In modern 
times the middle class has become this bearer of values that facilitate politi-
cal moderation and the development of democracy (Lipset 1981: 90–116). 
Among others, this is due to the fact that middle class people tend to be bet-
ter educateda factor that is supposed to make people more tolerant and 
broaden their outlook and ability to make rational choices (Lipset 1981: 39–
40). Furthermore, middle class people are better represented in civil society 
movements. Civil society prevents a monopoly on political power and 
fosters co-operation and political participation—both elements of a democra-
tic political culture. Civil society is also seen as a prerequisite for the emerg-
ence of political parties (Dahl 1971: 71; Lipset 1981: 50).  
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Functionalist theory: Criticism and modifications 
From the 1970s functionalist theory has been subject to heavy criticism. 
Space limitations force me here to focus only on the criticism pertinent to the 
use of functionalist theory to explain post-Soviet transitions.  
Already before the break-up of the Soviet Union it was pointed out that 
the Soviet Union and other Communist states in Eastern Europe fit poorly 
with Lipset’s 1959 model, since they scored high on socio-economic indica-
tors without being democratic (Diamond 1992: 103). And, in many ways the 
Soviet state was organised in such a radically different way that many schol-
ars have questioned the utility of using the transition theories developed for 
the third wave of democratisation on the post-Soviet area. In many respects 
the transitions the post-Soviet societies had to go through were much more 
complex than they had been in Latin America and in Southern Europe 
(Bunce 1995). In the Soviet Union economic and political power was fused, 
making it necessary to transform both the political and the economic system 
once the system collapsed. Whereas in Latin America an independent capi-
talist class often served as an agent for political change, no such agent 
existed in the Soviet Union. Instead the concentration of political and econo-
mic power brought a heritage of nepotism and patron–client dependencies 
that made the fight for economic assets in the transition period even fiercer 
(Bova 1992: 129, 133–134).  
If an independent capitalist class was absent in the early political transi-
tion in the Soviet Union, the privatisation process in Russia from 1992 
enabled economic interests to gain a central place in the transition that later 
took place in the Russian regions. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss even argues that 
since civil society was weak the owners of large enterprises had a strong 
influence over the voters through their continued dependency on the enter-
prises for income and social services (1997: 37–44). However, whereas in 
other transitions the independent economic actors often have been viewed as 
agents for democratic change, in the Russian context such economic interests 
have often been agents for continued authoritarianism.  
Some scholars consider that a factor determining whether the interplay 
between economic and political actors benefits a democratic development or 
not is the economic structure inherited from the Soviet period. Kathryn 
Stoner-Weiss argues that the crucial structural factor is to what degree the 
regional economy is concentrated within one sector and/or among a few 
large enterprises. Where they are concentrated in such a way the chances of 
effective governance are higher, because the economic and political actors 
enter a mutually beneficial partnershipthe state providing them with mat-
erial benefits, and the enterprises providing the state with a broad consensus 
on issues. One indication of this co-operation is for instance that the political 
actors often have a background from working at the largest industrial plants. 
In regions with a diverse economy, on the other hand, the political conflict 
potential is greater, because diverse interests produce greater competition 
among the economic actors for access to political power (Stoner-Weiss 
1997).  
Since Stoner-Weiss’ focus is on governmental rather than on democratic 
performance, her argument does not give direct clues as to whether econo-
mic concentration promotes democracy or not. It is safe to assume that in 
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many cases the result of such a union between the major political and econo-
mic actors has been oligarchy rather than democracy.  
A study that focuses directly on the prospects for democracy following 
from different economic structures in Russian regions is Vladimir Gel’man, 
Sergei Ryzhenkov and Michael Brie’s study of six Russian regions. Their 
argument is that the decentralisation of parts of the Soviet economy after 
Stalin created two kinds of economic structures in the Russian regions. The 
way these structures interacted with political structuresby Brie called poli-
tical-economic structures of governance (Gel’man et al. 2000: 63–
65)again influenced the political transitions in these regions after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. 
The central difference is between regions where the economy was domi-
nated by heavy industry versus regions dominated by agriculture and light 
industry. The political elite in the latter group of regions was controlling the 
homogeneous and hierarchically organised agricultural sector, and in the 
transition period it was easy to transfer this control to the new political lead-
ers. On the other hand, where the region was dominated by large military or 
heavy industry enterprises these had been under the direct control of Soviet 
ministries in Moscow. The directors in this way achieved autonomy in their 
relationship both to other enterprises and to the regional political leadership. 
As a result of the privatisation these enterprises, as also shown by Stoner-
Weiss, bolstered their position, and could either choose to co-operate with 
the political actors or to constitute an opposition. In the cases where they 
chose to co-operate this would most often imply political concessions to eco-
nomic interests.  
Brie concludes that in regions where agriculture and light industry domi-
nated the regional economy, this facilitated the emergence of a monocentric, 
hierarchical regime, whereas if heavy industry was most important a poly-
centric and more democratic regime was more likely to emerge. A combina-
tion of the two structures in one region can lead to a bicentric political 
regime, whereas in regions where one economic sector is all dominant politi-
cal and economic power tend to enter a symbiotic relationship (Gel’man et 
al. 2000: 93–95).  
The functionalists emphasise the role of modernisation, and specialists on 
the post-Soviet development point out that modernisation in the Soviet 
Union after all meant something different than it did in other transitional 
societies. It must also be mentioned, though, that in many ways the moder-
nised elements of the state from the Soviet period ceased to exist during the 
transition period and that this also influenced the outcome of the transitions. 
Diamond (1992) and Przeworski (1991) have argued that if modernisation is 
to be required for a democratic transition, it must not lead to too grave in-
come inequalities. Furthermore, the material conditions of all groups must 
improve at least in absolute terms in order for the democratic development to 
be sustainable (Diamond 1992: 479; Przeworski 1991: 95). 
The traumatic economic effects of the transition in Russia made many 
people turn away from the democratic alternative, being both disillusioned 
with the effects of economic liberalism and having a traditional faith in the 
need of a strong leader in times of crisis (Hughes 2000: 25). Under such con-
ditions it becomes easier for a candidate who claims to stand above narrow 
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party interests to be elected, and also to concentrate the power with one 
leader who is believed to be able to solve the crisis more effectively 
(O’Donnell 1994: 65). I find this point an important one since at the regional 
level in Russia the political transition took place a couple of years after the 
economic transition at the central level had started. This implies that the 
effects of the economic transition affected which political leaders were elec-
ted. In other words, among the structural factors I believe were important for 
the transition in my republics were both effects of the Soviet modernisation 
and of the post-Soviet de-modernisation.  
Genetic theory: Focusing on the actors 
Stoner-Weiss and Gel’man use structural inheritances from the Soviet period 
to explain variations in post-Soviet transitions. This structural element, how-
ever, is just a background variable in their analyses, which otherwise are 
founded on the genetic perspective of transition theory. The starting-point of 
this perspective was Dankwart Rustow’s Transitions to Democracy: Toward 
a Dynamic Model in 1970, which was a critique of the transition perspec-
tives presented by authors like Lipset and Dahl. The genetic branch has 
among other things criticised the functionalists for being too deterministic in 
claiming that certain socio-economic figures or a political culture conducive 
to democracy are necessary for democracy to develop. Later, several other 
scholars have expanded Rustow’s theory, drawing on experiences from the 
third wave of democratisation. Here I will look at some of the most 
acclaimed theories within the approach written by O’Donnell (1986), 
Przeworski (1991) and Karl and Schmitter (1991), before I argue for ways of 
modifying these theories to fit with the post-Soviet cases. 
Where the functionalist approach emphasises more or less static socio-
economic factors, the genetic model puts the spotlight on contingency and 
the dynamic aspects of the transition process: the actors, their goals, strate-
gies and alliances (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 271). These scholars do not 
necessarily reject the validity of speaking about structural factors, but claim 
it is inevitable also to take the actors’ actions into account. 
Let us start with the keyword of the genetic approach: the actors. Who 
make the decision to start the transition process and what moves them to 
this? In his groundbreaking study Dankwart Rustow claimed the regime 
transition is initiated as a result of a prolonged political struggle between 
well-entrenched forces in society, which leads to polarisation. Weary of con-
flict, or realising that they will lose all power unless they make concessions, 
the political leaders make a deliberate decision to institutionalise elements of 
democracy. The result is a compromise that each of the participants only 
sees as a second-best alternative. The precondition for this outcome is that 
no single group is strong enough to dominate political decision-making 
(Rustow 1970: 352–357).  
Like Rustow, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and later Przeworski 
(1991: 57), emphasise that the conscious decision by the political leaders to 
start democratisation is most likely to be made in periods of severe regime 
crisis. However, whereas Rustow’s focus was on the elites, these scholars 
also include the grass root level. They claim that the intention behind the 
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liberalisation will be to broaden the social basis of the regime, in order to 
calm down social unrest. Rustow failed to identify what kinds of actors and 
alliances between actors are necessary for the transition to be democratic but 
this was attempted among others by O’Donnell and Schmitter in their study 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in 1986.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter, and also Przeworski, identify two groups of 
actors in the regime that participate in the transition struggle: hardliners, 
who are the regime members seeking a continuation of the authoritarian 
regime, and softliners, who gradually become supporters of electoral legiti-
mation of the regime. These regime actors are facing the grass root regime 
opposition, which also is divided into moderates and radicals, depending on 
the nature of their goals and the instruments they are willing to use to 
achieve them.  
It is, however, not the actors per se that count, but their actions. In the 
transition process they enter alliances and choose strategies according to 
what goals they want to achieve. Depending on the circumstances, either the 
ruling regime or the opposition gets to dominate the transition. Regimes nor-
mally initiate political transitionsso-called self-induced transitionsin 
order to bring a successful authoritarian regime more legitimacy through 
democratic elections. In the other case, when the transition is opposition-
induced, socio-economic crisis and resulting regime crisis is normally the 
setting (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
Przeworski has elaborated on the alliances between actors in transitions 
by using game theory. He argues that self-induced transition (which he calls 
regime extrication) is dependent on a coalition between the regime reformers 
(softliners) and the moderates in the opposition. In order for this coalition to 
work, they must not only agree among themselves, but also be able to con-
trol the regime hardliners and the radicals in the opposition. Przeworski 
emphasises that ruling elites go for regime transition either in order to pro-
tect themselves from arbitrary rule or in order to improve their own material 
welfare, which has been important in the zero-sum game of the post-commu-
nist transitions. Therefore the reformers may agree to a coalition with the 
moderates, since this alternative gives them guarantees that they will keep 
some of their power after the transition. Extrication creates conditions that 
are hard to reverse later, by leaving power for forces connected to the ancien 
régime (Przeworski 1991: 31–32, 67–79). 
Karl and Schmitter have made a more detailed distinction between types 
of transition by also adding a dimension of strategy, distinguishing between 
strategies of force and compromise. This gives four ideal types of regime 
transition: 1) Revolution, which starts from below with the use of force, 2) 
Reform, which is also mass-initiated, but where compromise is the strategy, 
3) Imposition, which is elite-initiated, but by use of force, and finally 4) 
Pact, which is a compromise initiated by the elites (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 
274–282).  
Genetic theory: Criticism and modifications 
O’Donnell, Karl and Schmitter developed their theories based on the impres-
sions of the Latin American and South European experiences. When bring-
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ing the theory down to the level of Russian regions, one obvious problem is 
the fact that the regions are not independent states, but simply sub-units 
within the Russian Federation. Transitions here took place as a result of the 
transition on the state level, and therefore it makes no much sense to speak 
of opposition-induced transitions—even more so as civil society was weak 
and played far from the role of the grass root level mobilisation in Latin 
American countries. Nevertheless, there are reasons to apply the existing 
genetic theories to the sub-state Russian level. As pointed out in the first 
chapter the Russian state has played a quite passive role towards the federal 
subjects throughout the 1990s, and Gel’man argues its role can almost be lik-
ened to the influence of the international community in state level transitions 
(Gel’man et al. 2000: 36–37).  
Taking into account the differences between third wave transitions and 
transitions in the Russian regions, Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie further 
develop the genetic theories to fit the Russian context. They draw upon 
Przeworski (1991: 10–11) when they argue that outcomes of the democratic 
process are determined by actors, the goals they have and the strategies to 
achieve them, their resources and the existing political institutions (including 
rules, norms, and decisions). Thus, the nature of the previous regime (condi-
tioned by the political-economic structure of governance as shown in the 
previous section) and how the elites enter the transition process determine 
the outcome of the transition.  
The actors in the transition process can either be dominant (implying the 
presence of one dominating actora monocentric regime) or non-dominant 
(polycentric regime). A monocentric regime is normally combined with a 
prevalence of informal “institutions”, whereas formal as well as informal 
institutions can dominate in the latter. The strategies of the actors in the tran-
sition process are determined by actor constellations and resources, and by 
the institutions. The strategies can be either force or compromise (Gel’man 
et al. 2000: 8–18). Gel’man and Brie draw particular attention to the role of 
resource bases in the elite strugglea fact much overlooked by the other 
theories I have included. Due to the uncertainties of the transition period 
when political rules and institutions are in fluxwhat resources the actors 
command become crucial in order to determine who wins the struggle for 
power (ibid.: 359–361). 
By combining these factors Gel’man identifies five types of transitions 
adding a fifth compared to Karl and Schmitter’s typology: 1) Forced transi-
tion corresponds to Karl and Schmitter’s imposition, and is a result of con-
frontations inside the elite or between the elite and a counter-elite—without 
the masses being mobilised, 2) Revolution is the forcible counter-elite turn-
over both in this and Karl and Schmitter’s model, 3) Reform from below cor-
responds to Karl and Schmitter’s reform, 2) Pact is in Gel’man’s model a 
result of compromise between elites and counter-elites, and 5) Conservative 
reform, as a result of a compromising transition initiated within the ruling 
elite (ibid.: 22–25).  
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Table 2.1. Modes of transition 
 
Strategies/Agents of change Compromise Force 
Ruling elites Conservative Reform Forced transition 
Ruling elites and counter-elites Pact  
Counter-elites Reform from below Revolution 
 
The major difference between the two models is that Gel’man replaces the 
mass level with counter-elites and further differentiates the model by adding 
the possibility of ruling elites and counter-elites being agents of change 
together. This gives an opportunity to differentiate between pact and conser-
vative reform, which is not done by Karl and Schmitter. Gel’man leaves one 
cell in the matrix open, though, although it would be possible to imagine 
such a transition, which would probably lead to a struggle all against all. 
Gel’man justifies this by saying the model does not aim at being exhaustive, 
but that the options included were those that were relevant in the six regions 
studied.7 
2.3. Entering the consolidation 
Consolidation theory aims at answering the question: When the initial transi-
tion is over, how then to formulate stable rules and practices and establish 
institutions that ensure democracy to continue and to be strengthened? 
(Schedler 1998). Having identified different possible alliances of actors and 
how these affect the mode of transition, my first task here will be to deter-
mine the link between mode of transition and emerging regime type, before I 
look more concretely at how the regime is being consolidated in the post-
transition period.  
Exits from the transition 
Among the different modes of transition, transition theory views the pact as 
being most conducive to a democratic development. Adam Przeworski 
emphasises that democracy is threatened if the opposition opposes the new 
regime both too little and too much. The pact reduces the level of conflict in 
the consolidation phase by dividing government offices among parties from 
a broad political spectrum. This solution has its undemocratic traits, how-
ever, by excluding outsiders and fixing the basic policy orientations 
(Przeworski 1991: 89–90). O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that in the long 
run such lack of political competition and public accountability produces 
corruption and complacency (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 41–42). 
Nevertheless, the advantages of a pacted solution are seen as more important 
than the drawbacks and Karl and Schmitter point out that regime-initiated 
transitions in general are more likely to result in democratic governance than 
other transition types (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 274–282).  
                                                     
7  Personal communication with Vladimir Gel’man in London, 9 November 2001. 
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Political institutions 
The ruling elites and the ways in which they shape new political institutions 
provide the cement to the new political regime by establishing laws and rules 
that later can prove to be hard to change. Institution building links the mode 
of transition to the exit of transition, since many of the institutions will be 
established in the transition periodbefore the first presidential elections 
that according to my definition mark the end of the transition. In the consoli-
dation period these institutions are polished and completed. Matthew Soberg 
Shugart (1997) has developed a theory that explores how political actors 
through lawmaking decide how much authority is delegated to the executive 
and the legislative powers, respectively.  
Of particular interest to my analysis are Shugart’s reflections around the 
presidential power. One can measure the difference in the strength of the 
presidential power by looking at whether the executive is given reactive 
powers (the power to block legislative proposals preferred by the majority), 
or also proactive powers (the power to introduce new laws that would not 
have been adopted by the legislative majority on its own). Proactive powers 
make the president stronger than the reactive ones. The choice, Shugart 
argues, depends on whether the lawmakers are more interested in preserving 
their patron-client linkages or in relying on political parties for their personal 
power. If parties are strong, they will give the president neither of these pow-
ers. At the other extreme the solution making for the strongest presidential 
powersa combination of proactive and reactive powerswill only be 
adopted if the executive branch controls constitutional design (Shugart 
1997).  
Political processes 
Consolidation theory focuses among other things on the implications of 
institutional design for the prospects of democratic consolidation. What is 
important here is not the institutions per se but the ways in which they func-
tion. Focusing solely on formal institutions, though, would give a misleading 
picture of the political reality in Russia’s regions, where the gap between the 
formal and the informal often is wide. Thus, where the first part of my analy-
sis of regime consolidation examines the institutional framework established 
in the two republics, the second part dwells on how the formal institutions 
work in practice and how practices that have not been formalised, such as 
clientelism and elite alliances, influence politics.  
When moving into the more dynamic and actor dominated aspect of poli-
tical consolidation I will start by borrowing some arguments from the debate 
that has been raging over the past years about what constitutional arrange-
ment is most conducive to democratic consolidation: a presidential or a par-
liamentary system. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan are among the foremost 
critics of presidentialism. One of the arguments used against presidential 
systems is their potential for executive–legislative polarisation. Whereas a 
pure parliamentary system has a relationship of mutual dependency between 
the legislative and the executive power, pure presidential systemsas a 
result of direct elections of both legislative and executive powers have a 
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relationship of mutual independence (Stepan and Skach 1993: 3–4). A con-
sequence of the two branches’ independence can be institutional deadlock.  
Linz points out that another “peril of presidentialism” is the fact that 
these systems make it easier for the executive branch to overrule the legisla-
tive branch, at the same time as it is very difficult for the legislative branch 
to remove incompetent presidents beyond the elections (Linz 1996). These 
factors can facilitate authoritarian practices and a system resembling 
Guillermo O’Donnell’s delegative democracy.  
With the term delegative democracy O’Donnell wants to draw attention 
to the fact that while formal rules and practices in a regime may be compa-
tible with democratic standards, the informal rules and practices can work in 
the opposite direction. What he particularly has in mind is the case of so-
called electoral democracies that have free and fair elections but where 
democracy in other respects is poorly institutionalised, or, rather, the institu-
tionalisation is informal, relying on practices such as clientelism, nepotism 
and corruption. One typical result of this is a lack of horizontal accountabil-
ity, because “Congress, the judiciary, and various state agencies of control 
are seen as hindrances placed in the way of the proper discharge of the tasks 
that the voters have delegated to the executive” (O’Donnell 1996: 44).  
Criticism from horizontal government and non-government agencies does 
occur but this is generally ignored as the executive considers himself to 
stand above factional interests and to embody the nation (O’Donnell 1994; 
1996).  
Criticism and modifications 
To some authors, the lack of a gradual and pacted transition in the Russian 
case has made this transition flawed (Bova 1991). Gel’man also considers 
the pact to be the mode of transition most conducive to democracy in Rus-
sian regions (Gel’man et al. 2000: 25–36). However, in the post-Soviet con-
text there is reason to question the assumption that transitions from above 
necessarily are more conducive to democracy, even when one has in mind a 
pacted solution between ruling elites and counter-elites. The reproduction of 
communist era elites in politics, administration and the economy is accept-
able only as long as these elites comply with the institutional rules of the 
game and in the long run promote democracy (Hughes 2000: 43). This 
becomes even more important in societies where civil society is weak. Evi-
dence shows that Russian elites cling to communist era values such as patri-
monialism, economic monopoly and restriction of organisational, judicial 
and press freedoms (Lane 1997).  
Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie’s study—unlike most studies within tran-
sition theory—not only creates a model for the modes of transition, but also 
a complete model of the regime types resulting from the transition. Four 
such exits are possible: 1) War all against all, where there is no dominant 
actor, but the actors nevertheless use strategies of force. The result can be an 
a centric regime, 2) The winner takes all, when there is a dominant actor 
using strategies of force, which turns the struggle into a zero-sum game, 3) 
Elite association, where there is a dominant actor using a strategy of com-
promise. When it comes to resource distribution, though, the dominant actor 
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sets the conditions, and the actors agree to preserve the status quo, and 4) 
Struggle according to the rules, which is the situation when there is no 
dominant actor and all the actors use a strategy of compromise. They agree 
on the institutions that are the least unacceptable to all the actors. 
 
Table 2.2. Exits from transition 
 
Strategies/Actors  Compromise Force 
Dominating actor Elite association The winner takes it all 
No dominant actor Struggle according to the rules War all against all 
 
The “missing link” in Gel’man, Ryzhenkov and Brie’s theory, however, is 
the connection between the modes of transition and the exits from transition. 
With five modes of transition and four exit types there is no one-to-one rela-
tionship. Also the categories are different: A dominant actor can originally 
be part of the ruling elite or the counter-elite. A pact results in struggle 
according to the rules and elite association will most likely be the result of 
conservative reform. The “winner-takes-all” exit, on the other hand, can both 
be the result of a forced transition and of a revolution, and the same is the 
case with the “war-all-against-all” exit. With reform from below the result is 
even less evident. One would believe that since the transition takes place 
from below and with adaptation as strategy the result would be that the rul-
ing elites give up and agree to a “struggle-according-to-the-rules” solution—
but one where the counter-elite is allowed to dominate. For instance, this is 
possible in regions where the economy is strongly concentrated around one 
industry. However, it is possible that the ruling elite will put up a partial resi-
stance, in which case an “elite association” will be the outcome. 
Concerning the study of the further consolidation of regimes, the use of 
consolidation theory to study the consolidation of non-democratic regimes 
can be questioned. For example, Kopecký and Mudde consider that consoli-
dation theory should be strictly limited to the study of the consolidation of 
various types of democratic regimes (Kopecký and Mudde 2000: 321–323). 
In my cases it can even be questioned whether even the transitions could be 
labelled democratic. If they were, then we are speaking of democratic 
erosion into façade democracies, or democratic breakdown into openly 
authoritarian regimes. Regardless of this I do find some of the arguments and 
theories that have come up in the consolidation theory debate useful for ana-
lysing my cases. In both democracies and authoritarian regimes some of the 
same factors are important for regime consolidation, such as institution 
building.  
The factors at play when institutions were created in Russian regions 
were somewhat different from those assumed by Shugart’s theory of why 
lawmakers make the president weak or strong. I agree with Shugart that 
whether the executive power took part in writing the constitution or not is an 
important factor in determining the formal strength of presidential power, 
and here it is important whether the constitution was written before or after 
the first presidential election. I still believe, though, that Shugart’s model of 
institution building creates an overly simplified image of reality. Shugart 
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looks only at how the choice of institutions influences the regime consolida-
tion, but as I intend to show in my analysis, informal politics may in many 
cases be more important than laws and constitutions. The result can be a 
nearly almighty president even when the constitution does not provide him 
with both reactive and proactive powers.  
This brings us to O’Donnell’s discussion of the individualistic executive 
power in a system of delegative democracy. It has been contended that the 
concept of delegative democracy treats informal structures as an alternative 
to formal democratic institutions (Gunther et al. 1996: 158). My comment to 
this is that delegative democracies can be labelled as democracies insofar as 
they fulfil the minimalist definition of democracy: free and fair elections, 
and to a limited extent also possess other democratic qualities, but they can-
not be termed polyarchies.  
The same can be said about the political systems that have developed in 
the great majority of Russia’s federal subjects. One factor that weakens the 
“polyarchic” nature of these regimes is the predominance of patrimonial 
political processes. Michael Brie emphasises how the executive power 
senses a need to connect privileged social groups to the regime. This is 
linked to the fact that a governor or president can only gain a monopoly on 
political power if he manages to centralise economic resources and co-opt all 
actors with autonomous resources into a “party of power” (Gel’man et al. 
2000: 103–105). This patrimonial network may extend all the way down to 
the municipality level by exploiting the fact that the municipalities and 
raions most often depend on money transfers (Lankina 2001: 408–410). This 
kind of clientelist practices helps keeping the political processes within a 
circle of interested parties, preventing transparency in public life.  
When informal politics are allowed to dominate it renders some of the 
assumptions of the theoretical debate around the choice of political institu-
tions irrelevant. For instance, Shugart produces a dichotomy between law-
makers preferring to preserve their patron–client networks and lawmakers 
preferring to rely on the reputation their political party can bring them. In the 
Russian federal subjects, however, political parties were seldom strong, and 
the Soviet era heritage of patron–client relationships has been hard to over-
come even in regions with a vibrant civil society in the early 1990s. The fact 
that clientelism extends even to the formally independent judicial power is a 
heritage from the Soviet system. Furthermore, the representatives elected to 
regional parliaments in Russia do in general not feel responsible to political 
parties or the people who elected them, but are mainly interested in promot-
ing personal or sectoral interests. This makes the chances that the legislative 
power will be weak and fragmented and easy to co-opt for the executive 
power even greater (Mc Auley 1997: 258–260, 266–268).  
The formally independent state structures do not necessarily enter an alli-
ance with the executive power, though, and this is connected to the political-
economic structures of governance, as explained above. For instance, the 
local self-government institutions may evolve into an alternative centre of 
political power, particularly around mayors when a large part of the resour-
ces are concentrated in the oblast’ centre. The result is a bicentric political 
regime (Gel’man et al. 2000: 105–106) 
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The second potential buffer against strong executive powers in Russia’s 
regions is non-governmental institutions such as civil society and mass 
media, but only as long as they are based on a real pressure from below or a 
divided resource base (Mc Auley 1997: 312). More often than not the presi-
dents and governors have used their strong executive powers to control or 
silence these institutions. For instance, subsidies or accreditation are granted 
selectively, or the tax police and fire restrictions are used to close down 
media and organisational headquarters. The most extreme cases involve out-
right censorship, physical and psychological harassment, and even murder 
on journalists and civil society activists (Belin 2001: 340–341).  
As potential alternative power centres I shall define the formally indepen-
dent state structures of legislative power, judicial power, and local self-gov-
ernment institutions; and the non-governmental structures of civil society 
and independent mass media. How strong these power centres are influences 
the degree of transparency in the political processes in the republic. From the 
outset the executive power was in a favoured position in the Russian regions, 
and this analysis will therefore revolve around the executive, and view the 
other power centres only through their relationship to the executive power. 
2.4. The “forgotten factor”: Multiethnicity 
As already mentioned, transition theory has often assumed that a precondi-
tion for the emergence of democracy is that the states under consideration 
are not strongly ethnically divided. According to Dankwart Rustow (1970) 
“the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no strong 
reservations as to which political community they belong to”(Rustow 1970: 
350). In a similar vein Robert Dahl argued that the historical record has 
shown that in highly polarised societieswhere a large part of the popula-
tion feels its way of life being threatened by another segment of the popula-
tionthe competitive society is likely to dissolve into civil war or to be 
replaced by a hegemony. Compared to polarisation caused by class differen-
ces, the subdivisions created by language and religion are less changeable 
and more long-lasting, which makes them more dangerous, particularly 
when they are combined with territorial claims (Dahl 1971: 105–109).   
This deterministic denial of the prospects for democracy in ethnically 
divided societies is one of the main criticisms of transition theory, and has 
been particularly criticised after the third wave of democratisation reached 
the multiethnic states of Eastern Europe (Bunce 1995: 92; Schmitter and 
Karl 1994: 178). Nevertheless, some scholars studying post-communist tran-
sitions, such as Vladimir Gel’man (2000) and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (1997), 
have shied away from the “complicating factors” in the ethnically defined 
units of the Russian Federation and chosen to focus on territorially defined 
units with a predominantly Russian population. Gel’man’s comment8 to this 
choice is that “in the republics other factors also come into play”. He avoids 
commenting on what other factors complicate the matters in the republics. 
In my thesis I aim at overcoming the gap between studies rejecting the 
ethnic dimension and studies overestimating the role of ethnicity in Russian 
federal subjects. I will investigate whether adding the aspect of ethnicity in 
                                                     
8  Interview with Vladimir Gel’man, European University at St. Petersburg, 7 May 2001. 
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the analysis can enhance the understanding of regime developments in Rus-
sian republics. The most relevant ethnic dimension that influences political 
processes in non-Russian regions is intra- and inter-ethnic competition, and I 
find it useful to borrow some concepts from Donald Horowitz in order to 
grasp an understanding of these processes. 
Horowitz’ group entitlement theory was developed with the experiences 
of post-colonial societies in Asia and Africa in mind, but I believe it can also 
be applied to inter-ethnic relations in the post-Soviet context. His concept of 
group entitlement requires the existence of unranked ethnic groups; that is, 
two or more ethnic groups that are internally socially stratified and thus 
compete for positions in society especially in the bureaucracy. Each group 
fears the dominance of the other group, suspecting that the share of power 
held by one group will be used exclusively to the benefit of this group’s 
members. Competition becomes particularly fierce during periods of politi-
cal transition, when the power balance between the groups is volatile.  
To Horowitz, group entitlement is a combination of the struggle to 
increase the ethnic group’s worth and the quest to exclude other ethnic 
groups. What kind of demands one ethnic group puts forward depends on 
whether it is backward or advanced9 compared to other groupsreferring to 
dimensions like rate of education, representation in civil service, or degree of 
urbanisation. Most often the indigenous group is backward, creating a strong 
claim to priority in order to become advanced and avoid being “disposses-
sed” in their own country, especially if they feel they have been unjustly 
treated in the past (for instance when immigration was encouraged). The 
struggle to increase the group’s prestige is reflected at the symbolic level, for 
instance the assignment of a special position to the group’s language and the 
creation of state symbols connected to this group. However, some of these 
actions may also have repercussions on the practical level, by excluding non-
speakers of the official language from public positions. Indeed, the aim is 
often to exclude other ethnic groups, and therefore discriminatory recruit-
ment of people to civil service and to important political and economic posi-
tions is commonplace. In severely divided ethnic societies, the political party 
structure reflects the ethnic structure, and politics can be monopolised by 
one ethnic group. If the latter is a minority group, this has to happen at the 
expense of democratic practices.  
Such a process of ethnic rebirth and claims for ethnic priority will most 
likely face opposition among those whose position is being degraded, and 
claims for parity, if not more. Their claims are justified by reference to the 
principle of equality or by their idea that they would deserve it because of 
their contributions to developing the economy of the country. However, the 
claims will be more muted if these excluded groups for some reason accept 
the priority of the other group, or if political disadvantages are outweighed 
by economic advantages (Horowitz 1985:185–228; Horowitz 1993).  
                                                     
9  The concepts are the ones actually used by Horowitz, with the justification that they are 
applied by the participants in the ethnic conflict. 
2. Theories of regime change 
Nupi novembear 02 
27 
Adapting to the context of Russia’s republics 
If theories of ethnic conflict assume that power struggles during political 
transition are more dangerous when ethnic groups are involved, and transi-
tion theory assumes that these transition struggles are likely to turn fiercer in 
post-communist societies because economic and political power is fused, 
this would mean that the combination of transition, communist society and 
ethnic divisions bodes for a particularly tough power battle. And indeed, 
over the past decade a number of studies have focused on inter-ethnic tensi-
ons and the ethnocratic tendencies of many republican governments in the 
Russian Federation,10 which shows that ethnic competition and the prefer-
ence for ethnic exclusion are at play.  
The numerical balance between different ethnic groups in a republic 
naturally influences what role ethnicity has been allowed to play, but it is not 
so that an ethnocratic regime must be based on a group that is in majority. 
However, in a study of four republics inhabited by Turkic peoples, Dmitry 
Gorenburg (1999) has pointed out that only in republics where the titular 
group has a dominant numerical position a political regime with ethnocratic 
tendencies can be combined with an open display of ethnic revival policies 
favouring the titular group. Where ethnocracy is based on a titular minority, 
ethnic revival programmes are adopted, but not advertised by the political 
leadership. Finally, in republics where non-titulars possess the most impor-
tant political positions, the lack of ethnic policies is compensated for by a 
strong public rhetoric of ethnic revival. This can create the deceptive image 
that the latter republic is more ethnically polarised than the former.  
The focus of most analyses of ethnic conflict has been on inter-ethnic 
conflict. In my cases, though, I will argue that intra-ethnic conflict between 
ethnic sub-groups of the titular nation has been of equal importance. A justi-
fication for applying the same theoretical framework to sub-ethnic as to eth-
nic groups is given by Horowitz. He argues that “there are no bright lines to 
be drawn between kinship and ethnicity, especially in societies where the 
range of recognised family relationships is wide and the importance of kin-
ship ties is great”. Typically, there is a tendency for political leaders to rely 
most of all on family members, secondly on members of their own clan and 
then on members of the ethnic group. Thus, the ethnic group is a natural 
extension of the kin-group (Horowitz 1985: 60–61), and the intra-ethnic 
divisions interact with inter-ethnic divisions in influencing regime transition 
and consolidation. 
2.5. A new model of post-communist regime change 
In this discussion I have argued for using a theoretical framework drawing 
upon traditional transition and consolidation theory, but adapted to the Rus-
sian context. While traditional functionalist and genetic approaches to transi-
tion theory in most cases have argued for the applicability of either purely 
                                                     
10  Worth noticing here is a series of case studies of Russian republics applying a so-called 
Model of Ethnological Monitoring to measure the level of inter-ethnic conflict in the 
regions. The studies were conducted by a UNESCO-funded network of researchers, led by 
Valerii Tishkov, and are published by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.  
See http://mirror-us.unesco.org/most/monitor.htm. 
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structural or purely dynamic variables to explain political transition, I agree 
more with analysts of post-Soviet regional developments in the Russian 
Federation who argue for the combination of structural and dynamic ele-
ments. Political actors and their goals and strategies are crucial factors in 
regime transitions, but these actors do not act in a tabula rasa context. Quite 
the contrary, their goals and strategies and the outcomes of these are influ-
enced by the Soviet political and economic heritage—or what Brie calls the 
political-economic structures of governance. The way the economy was 
structured in Soviet times to some extent determines with what ease political 
actors manage to gain power in the political transition. 
Moreover, also when it comes to political regime consolidation I intend 
to show that not only formal institutions count, but also how these institu-
tions work in practice. One of the problems of democratic consolidation is to 
ensure that the institutions actually work: Constitutions and laws may be 
democratic, but when they are ignored by the political actors this does not 
matter much. Thus, both my analysis of the regime transition and of regime 
consolidation will include one structural and one actor-focused element. 
Finally, I believe that some additional factors are at play in the regime 
transition and consolidation in the ethnically defined Russian republics that 
are not present in the territorially defined federal subjects. The keyword here 
is ethnic polarisation, which is related to the degree of competition between 
and within the ethnic groups inhabiting the region. A high level of polarisa-
tion will inhibit the kind of inter-ethnic co-operation deemed necessary to 
produce a democracy but at the same time it can promote alliances with third 
parties, or allow strong third parties to take advantage of the situation by 
using divide-and-rule tactics. Who emerges as the winner among the ethnic 
groups will also depend much on the numerical balance between the groups. 
I will argue that strong ethnic polarisation will make the emergence of a 
narrowly based ethnocracy more likely. The fact that it is based on only 
some ethnic groups or sub-groups who are interested in excluding other 
groups from power strengthens the non-democratic character of the regime. 
At the same time, the fact that the regime is based on such a permanent 
dividing line like ethnicity strengthens the polarisation between those who 
benefit from power and those who do not. This increases the political insta-
bility and makes it necessary for the regime to use ever-harsher measures to 
remain in power. 
3. Operationalisations and Methodology  
3.1. Variables and hypotheses 
To sum up briefly the conclusions of my theoretical discussion, the depen-
dent variable of my analysis is regime type. In explaining regime type I rely 
on the following independent variables: 
 
1. Political-economic structures of governance 
2. Elite struggles in regime transition 
3. Formal political institutions 
4. Political processes in regime consolidation 
5. Intra- and inter-ethnic polarisation 
 
The two first variables are connected to the transition period and create the 
foundation for a regime that further needs to be consolidated. The third and 
fourth variables scrutinise this regime consolidation. Finally, by bringing the 
fifth variable into the analysis I will check whether the explanatory power of 
the model is enhanced when also checking for the variable of ethnic polari-
sation. 
About these five variables I can make five hypotheses that will be the 
starting-point for my test of the theoretical framework against the empirical 
evidence: 
 
I)  A diversified economy makes it more difficult to concentrate economic 
and political power in a region than where the economy is concentrated 
and in the case of a concentrated economy a strong presidential power is 
most likely to emerge in agricultural regions. 
II) Only an alliance between regime reformers and moderates in the opposi-
tion is likely to bring about the pacted transition that has the greatest 
chances of resulting in democracy. The mode of transition that is least 
likely to have a democratic outcome is the revolution.  
III) The way in which political institutions are designed influences the exit 
from the transition. In regions where the constitution is adopted after the 
first presidential election, this allows the executive power to get a more 
dominant formal position than in regions where the constitution is adop-
ted before the election. 
IV) Formal powers combine with informal political practices to create an all-
dominant presidential power in regions where non-governmental struc-
tures and formally independent state structures are too weak to ensure 
transparency in public life. 
V a) The numerical weight of different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups and 
degree of polarisation between them influence what alliances are con-
cluded in the transition period and consequently the outcome of the 
transition. 
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b) The ethnic balance in the transition outcome again influences the level 
of political polarisation in the consolidation period, which has an 
impact on what kind of regime is consolidated.  
 
I do not believe that any of these assumptions alone can provide the full 
explanation as to why a regime emerges. Rather, the explanation is likely to 
be found in a combination of several of them. 
3.2. Transforming theory into practice 
The case study approach 
I have chosen the comparative case study as my methodological tool for 
studying regime change in Buryatia and Kalmykia. Robert K. Yin defines 
the best context for the case study as being when you look at a “contempor-
ary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sour-
ces of evidence are used” (1994: 23). Case studies are best suited for expla-
natory studies, but also exploratory and descriptive analyses are possible 
(Yin 1994: 13). Since my analysis is explanatory and focuses on contempo-
rary events where it is impossible to divide phenomenon from context by 
creating laboratory conditions, the case study seems well suited for my pur-
pose.  
The most common complaint about the case study strategy is the problem 
addressed by Lijphart of “many variables and small N”, which provides a 
poor basis for generalisations. Yin counters this argument by pointing to the 
difference between statistical generalisations, where you generalise to whole 
populations or universes on the basis of randomly chosen units, and analyti-
cal generalisations, where theories are generalised by analysing units chosen 
because they possess particularly interesting characteristics. The former is 
difficult in case studies, whereas the latter can be achieved by replicating the 
case study under various conditions (Yin 1994: 21).  
The complaint about generalisations even holds for comparative case stu-
dies. The low number of units also makes it difficult to exclude the possibil-
ity of spurious connections, and evaluating hypotheses is not as easy as when 
employing statistical or experimental control. One way of compensating for 
this problem is through the most similar and most different systems, as 
explained in the introductory chapter. Besides, the comparative method still 
provides stronger evidence than does the case study, since it gives the oppor-
tunity to compare cases systematically (Tranøy 1993: 19; Collier 1993: 106).  
A way of reducing the many variables, small N problem, is by simply 
increasing the number of cases. When this is impossible or too costly, one 
solution can be to reduce the number of variables by combining them, or to 
choose a theoretical perspective that allows focusing on fewer variables 
(Collier 1993: 111). This latter option is what I have done in my analysis.  
One can also defend small N studies by pointing to the difficulties in sim-
plifying and looking for regularities in social processes the way quantitative 
studies with large Ns do. Instead the comparative studies take into consider-
ation the complexity and historical context of each unit while looking for 
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limited regularity (Tranøy 1993: 22; Ragin 1994). Another problem about 
large N studies is that of conceptual stretching, when concepts that were 
meant to fit a smaller set of units, are stretched to analysing cases that may 
not fit that well. This has been one of the complaints about the use of transi-
tion study concepts in ever-new areas of the world (Bunce 1995). It is also 
pertinent to this analysis where the theoretical concepts are stretched not 
only to a new geographical area but even to the sub-state level.  
Field studies 
My analysis is done on the basis of materials collected mainly during two 
field trips to Russia: to Ulan-Ude in January 2001, and to St. Petersburg, 
Moscow and Elista in May 2001. Yin claims that one of the strengths of case 
studies is the ability to rely on multiple sources of evidence. If different data 
sources and different investigators point to the same conclusions, so-called 
triangulation, this increases the construct validity and reliability of the case 
study (1994: 90–92). This was therefore something I tried to achieve during 
my field studies. The materials collected were mainly written sources: secon-
dary literature produced by scholars and politicians in the two republics, and 
primary literature that includes biographies and political programmes, laws, 
parliamentary debates, statistics and newspaper articles.  
I further conducted qualitative interviews with politicians and scholars in 
the four cities. The interviews were of the unstructured kind, using open-
ended questions. I nevertheless normally posed the same questions to all the 
respondents, with a certain adaptation to the subjects the respondent is a spe-
cialist on. The interviews were conducted partly in order to get a general 
analytical overview of the political processes in the republics. First and fore-
most, however, the aim was to gather more information on informal politics. 
This can not be found in official documents, or—as none of my republics 
can be said to be among the champions of press freedom—even in the repu-
blican mass media. With limited time for my field studies, interviews are 
also a more effective way of gaining information than reading newspapers.  
Relying on interviews also had drawbacks that I will look at in my dis-
cussion of methodological problems. When choosing informants I tried to 
talk to people representing different political factions, and both opposition 
and regime. Since the ethnic aspect also is important I emphasised talking to 
people representing different ethnic groups and sub-groups, although achiev-
ing a balance here was difficult. 
Analysing the transitions 
In my theoretical discussion I identified the political-economic structures of 
governance as being the most relevant structural factor for analysing regime 
change in Russian regions. I will therefore start my analysis by giving a 
short description of the structure of governance in the two republics, defined 
as the main industries and the level of concentration of the republican eco-
nomy. To describe this I will use statistical data and secondary sources on 
the economic structure of the two republics. Structures of governance seem 
to have mainly an indirect influence on regime change via elite resources 
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and alliances. Thus, I find it difficult to evaluate the role of the structures of 
governance and elites separately and will instead analyse the first and second 
assumption simultaneously. 
Concerning the second assumption, the way I operationalise elite 
struggles is determined by the fact that I consider the transition to be over 
when the first presidential elections have taken place. Consequently, the ana-
lysis focuses at the factors leading up to this event. To structure my argu-
ment, I use the five factors Gel’man considers to be important to the nature 
of regime change. First I will present the main actors in the battles for presi-
dency by examining their biographies. Secondly, I will estimate the role of 
formal institutions. Here I have in mind how the actors used existing institu-
tions to position themselves and how new institutions, such as the constitu-
tion, were adopted and whom they favoured. Furthermore, since Gel’man 
speaks of formal and informal institutions I will in a separate subsection take 
a look at the role of informal networks like clientelism and informal political 
alliances. Thirdly, what resources the different candidates possessed will be 
evaluated, being they administrative, economic or informational resources. 
Fourthly, I will look at the goals of the candidates, and here I have chosen to 
consider their goals as they are presented in their election programmes and 
public interviews. Goals defined this way were important in order to deter-
mine why people voted for different candidates. The fifth factor is strategy, 
and this is operationalised as election campaign strategy, thus also influenc-
ing what candidate people voted for.  
Analysing the consolidations 
Above I have argued for operationalising the regime consolidation by 
looking at two factors: the role of political structures and processes. As men-
tioned in Chapter 2, some of the new formal institutions were adopted in the 
transition period leading up to the first election, while others were adopted 
later, and my third assumption suggests that this influenced how strong pow-
ers the executive power was awarded with. On this background I will start 
with a legal analysis of the role of the executive power in the constitutions 
and laws of Kalmykia and Buryatia.  
Next, I will evaluate the role of political processes. O’Donnell has defin-
ed the lack of accountability and strong alternative power centres as impor-
tant elements of delegative democracy, and this will structure my argument. 
I will thus start by asses-sing the evidence of a lack of transparency in public 
life in general, and then look at the role of alternative power centres. As 
alternative power centres I will define the formal and informal interaction 
between the executive power and the legislature, judicial system, mass 
media, local self-government institutions and civil society. 
Analysing ethnicity 
The ethnic factor may be seen as a part of informal political processes. I 
have nevertheless decided to analyse this factor separately, as my task is to 
investigate whether it enhances the explanatory force of my model in ethni-
cally defined federal subjects. In order to measure the role of inter- and intra-
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ethnic relations I will first measure the general level of ethnic polarisation in 
the ten-year period by looking at employment patterns and migration rates 
among various ethnic groups. Subsequently I will look more specifically at 
the role of ethnicity in politics: how ethnicity has been exploited by political 
actors in the regime transition and consolidation in order to gain power. This 
will be reflected in the rhetoric used by political actors, ethnic voting pat-
terns, and what ethnic groups dominate political and administrative posi-
tions. 
3.3. Methodological problems and weaknesses 
In order to make a thorough analysis of such a complex question as why dif-
ferent regimes emerge it would be ideal to spend a considerable amount of 
time in the regions. This is particularly true when the problems are so sensi-
tive as the role of ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions. I only had time to spend 
two months doing field studies in Russia, which for instance meant that I did 
not have time to go through more than one main newspaper from each 
region, and not for the whole time period. Such factors may reduce the vali-
dity of the results of my analysis. However, by collecting different types of 
sources, including a large number of interviews I hope to have reduced this 
problem. 
Concerning my interviews I can see several potential weaknesses that it is 
important to be aware of when analysing the material. In both places the lack 
of openness and objectivity among the respondents is a problem and thus the 
reliability of the data is in jeopardy: The respondents always have certain 
personal interests to serve, either as regime opponents or regime supporters 
or hidden opponents. In Buryatia in particular, it was a problem that many of 
the respondents had not themselves directly been taking part in the political 
processes I was interviewing them about, as it was difficult to get to speak to 
politicians that had been active in politics longer than since the 1998 parlia-
mentary elections. The information these respondents could provide was 
necessarily much based on second-hand rumours.  
A further factor that can have provided me with skewed information in 
Buryatia was the fact that I found it very difficult to find respondents repre-
senting the executive power; most of the respondents represented the legisla-
tive power or political parties. It was also difficult to find ethnic Russian 
respondents, both among the politicians and the researchers, and this makes 
it harder to assess the role of inter-ethnic conflict. I tried to compensate for 
this during my second field trip in Moscow, where I spoke to two Russian, 
Moscow-based researchers with in-depth knowledge of the inter-ethnic pro-
cesses in Buryatia. 
Another problem concerning several of the interviews was short inter-
view time, making it difficult to obtain in-depth information. Some of the 
respondents, though, granted me up to three hours of interview time. In order 
to obtain as sincere information as possible I did not use a tape recorder and 
gave the informants the opportunity to be anonymous. In Kalmykia many of 
the interviews took place at people’s apartments, and this probably increased 
the reliability of the information. 
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The problem of subjective information also concerns the newspapers and 
secondary literature. In Kalmykia the mass media situation is strongly polar-
ised between the regime and opposition newspapers. All official literature 
and political analyses also present skewed information, including statistical 
information. In Buryatia the situation with the mass media is also quite 
polarised, and here local, independent researchers focus to a little extent on 
political issues. Both in Kalmykia and in Buryatia the best political analyses 
I have come across are written by people who themselves are active mem-
bers of one of the opposition parties. In such situations it becomes hard to 
judge what information is most reliable.  
The validity and reliability problems of this analysis could only have 
been overcome through a long stay in the regions studied. Since this was no 
option I chose instead to rely on multiple sources from the regions and from 
Moscow and abroad—hoping that this would reduce the disadvantages to a 
minimum. 
4. Transition in Buryatia: The 
communist and the pragmatist 
4.1. Structures of governance 
In my outline of theoretical approaches I argued for including as a structural 
element the so-called political-economic structures of governance. My 
assumption was that a diversified economy makes it more difficult to con-
centrate economic and political power in a region than where the economy is 
concentrated. I will now take a look at Buryatia and see whether the econo-
mic structure here corresponds with its “guided democracy”. 
The economic base of Buryatia rests on a mixture of mineral resources, 
light industry and agriculture. Of the gross regional product in 1991 37% 
consisted of industrial production, 16.2% was agricultural production and 
13.8% construction work (Respublika Buriatiia 1998: 173). When looking at 
the industrial production in 1990, light industry was the largest sector with 
28.7%, followed by metalworking and mechanical engineering with 22.9% 
and wood industry with 13.2% (ibid.: 193). Considering that metalworking 
and machine industry made up only slightly more than 1/5 of the industrial 
production in Buryatia and the industrial production again made up 1/3 of 
the gross regional product, it cannot be said that heavy industry has a domi-
nating role in Buryatia. Rather the economy is quite mixed between heavy 
and light industry and agriculture. Although diversified, within the industrial 
sector the economy seems fairly concentrated: 11% of the businesses have 
more than 500 employees, and they produce 74% of all the produce in the 
republic (ibid.: 194).  
Consequently, the economic structure of Buryatia does not unequivocally 
signal a pattern of mutually beneficial co-operation between economic and 
political actors. Gel’man argues that a mixed, but weak economic structure 
leads to a weak regime structure where the contact between the political and 
the economical structure is not very strong (Gel’man et al. 2000: 98). Since 
the economy of Buryatia is weak and mixed the result should be something 
like a conflict-ridden and weak regime, where different economic sectors 
and interest groups struggle for a piece of the political cake. This does not 
square with Buryat realities, where the regime is quite firmly in the hands of 
the president.  
4.2. Actors 
When comparing the assumption above about regions with a dispersed eco-
nomy with the transition theory typology of regime outcomes in Chapter 2 it 
seems to fit with the “war-all-against-all” alternative, where there is no 
dominant actor and the strategy is force. In Buryatia, though, the emerging 
regime has rather been somewhere between “elite association” and “the-
winner-takes-it-all”, which supposes the existence of a dominant actor. Over 
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the next pages I will look at whether the elite struggle leading up to the pre-
sidential election in 1994 can shed more light on how a dominant actor has 
been allowed to emerge under such structural preconditions. My first task 
will be to identify the main political actors in this period.  
The two main contenders for presidency in 1994 were two politicians that 
had been in the game for many years. In the power struggle within the repub-
lican Communist Party in the 1980s, its first secretary, Anatolii Beliakov, 
had been able to replace two of the most influential political leaders in 
Buryatia and ensure that they were sent off to positions in far-away places. 
The secretary of the reskom11 in the period 1978–87, Leonid Potapov, was 
sent to Turkmenistan to help promoting national cadres, whereas the leader 
of the Council of Ministers in the period 1977–87, Vladimir Saganov, was 
given a position at the Soviet embassy in the People’s Republic of Korea. An 
opportunity to return from this “exile” arose only in 1990, when Beliakov 
was promoted to a position in Moscow. Saganov was then appointed as 
premier, whereas Potapov went back to the reskom, where he got the first 
secretary position (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 103). The “hardliners” in the 
regime had now been replaced by what can be called the “democrats” or 
regime softliners. These two politicians, Potapov and Saganov, were to 
become the main actors in the power struggle leading up to the presidential 
election in 1994, and themselves leaders of new factions of “hardliners” and 
“softliners”.12  
A third contender for the political top position in Buryatia was Valerii 
Shapovalov, a 36 year-old former KGB officer who had turned to business 
from 1991. He had arrived in Buryatia from Rostov in Southwestern Russia 
in 1979, and was therefore the only one among the candidates who was not 
born in Buryatia (Buriatiia, 8 June 1994). The fourth and last contender was 
the Buryat Sergei Namsaraev, a university teacher who had been Minister of 
Education since 1989. He was encouraged to run for presidency to defend 
the rights of the academics. Namsaraev’s election programme thus focused 
mostly on issues concerning education and research and his election cam-
paign was limited (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 68). The impact he had on the elec-
tion was so insignificant that I have chosen to leave him out of my further 
analysis.  
4.3. Formal institutions 
Since the two main contenders for presidency in Buryatia in 1994 were the 
chairs of the legislative and executive bodies, the main political struggles 
took place within the formal institutions.  
For Potapov and Saganov, who both fought to survive politically during 
the turbulent transition days, the 1990s started with uncertainty concerning 
their future. After the coup in Moscow in 1991 the Communist Party was 
dissolved and Potapov had to look for a new job. Saganov’s position, 
although he was now in practice the most influential person in the republic, 
                                                     
11  Abbreviation of respublikanskii komitet (republican committee), which was the highest 
republican body of the Communist Party. The reskom was chaired by the first secretary. 
12  Interview with political scientist Boris Krianev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, Janu-
ary 2001. 
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was also insecure, since he had supported the August coup. Saganov got 
away with this, which shows his strong position in the republican elite, 
whereas the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Sergei Buldaev, was fired for 
his allegedly positive attitude to the coup. This gave Potapov a chance to re-
emerge in the top elite when he took over Buldaev’s position (ibid.: 47–48; 
Buriatiia, 11 January 1992). 
The need these politicians had to further consolidate their power bases 
was reflected in the fierce power struggle that built up in the republic from 
the autumn of 1993 between the factions around Potapov and Saganov. The 
power struggle at the republican level reflected the executive–legislative 
power struggle in Moscow. During the conflict between the federal Supreme 
Soviet and President Yeltsin, the Buryat Supreme Soviet led by Potapov sup-
ported the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, whereas Saganov’s Council of Min-
isters sided with the president. Potapov and three other members of the 
Supreme Soviet presidium had even participated at a Siberian Congress of 
Local Soviet Presidiums in Novosibirsk on 29 September that had threatened 
to establish a Siberian republic unless President Yeltsin followed the consti-
tution. Later Potapov participated in the group of regional leaders, led by 
Kirsan Illiumzhinov, who tried to mediate in the conflict between the parlia-
ment and the president (Zverev 1998: 4). When the conflict in Moscow was 
over, this became an excuse for the Saganov faction, popularly called the 
“sovmin”13 faction, to purge the Potapov or “parliament” faction. They sug-
gested that the Potapov-led Supreme Soviet Presidium would have to resign, 
and some also wanted the resignation of the whole Supreme Soviet. In the 
end, however, Potapov proved to be stronger: A compromise was reached, 
through which a temporary presidium was elected where both factions were 
represented (Buriatiia, 16, 19 and 20 October 1993).  
This showed that a substantial faction of the Supreme Soviet supported 
Potapov, and in the period leading up to the presidential election in June 
1994 Potapov proved de facto to possess the strongest administrative resour-
ces. I shall define administrative resources as advantages drawn from occu-
pying an important administrative positionrelating to control over the use 
of force (legal apparatus and police) and the power to make or influence 
political decisions. Evidence of Potapov’s control over administrative 
resources was the election for the Federal Assembly in late 1993, when 
Potapov and his faction won all the three seats for Buryatia. This gave 
Potapov the potential advantage of being able to lobby for support at the 
federal level, but his ardent support for the rebellious Russian parliament in 
1993 reduced his leverage here. Saganov, on the other hand, could boast of 
being supported by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sergei 
Shakrai, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Concord (PRES) 
(Mikhailovskaia 1995: 52).  
If Potapov was unpopular at the federal centre, his influence among the 
local elite became evident when it came to shaping new institutions that 
would replace the old system. The Potapov faction was victorious in some of 
the battles around the Republican Constitution, which was discussed by the 
                                                     
13  “Sovmin” is an abbreviation of Soviet Ministrov, i.e. the Council of Ministers. 
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Supreme Soviet in January–February 1994.14 For instance, the Saganov sup-
porters were defeated in their attempt to bar Potapov from running for presi-
dency by imposing an upper age limit of 55 years for the presidential candi-
dates (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 57). As a result of these defeats and a general 
realisation of his own lack of popularity—evidenced in the defeat in the 
federal elections in 1993—Saganov made the tactical mistake to resign. 
Thus, the sovmin faction nominated the young deputy prime minister and 
leader of the republican committee for economy, Aleksander Ivanov, as their 
candidate for presidency. Compared to the two old nomenklatura personali-
ties, Ivanov was relatively little known in the republic and in the regions in 
particular.15  
The third presidential candidate, Shapovalov, was a total outsider to all 
these political processes. He was not himself participating in politics until he 
registered for the election, and consequently he lacked the opportunities the 
other candidates had to position themselves favourably in the power hier-
archy and even to shape institutions to their own advantage. Further placing 
him at a disadvantage was the fact that he joined the presidential campaign 
much later than the other candidates because he was facing legal investi-
gations for economic fraud (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 59).  
4.4. Informal networks 
The outsider status for Shapovalov meant that he also did not have the same 
chances as the other candidates for entering beneficial alliances with impor-
tant interest groups and parties, although he did receive support from some 
enterprise directors.16 As shown by Stoner-Weiss (1997), such alliances with 
interest groups were among others important in this post-Soviet period 
because enterprise managers had a great influence over their employees by 
providing them with salaries and social services. As mentioned before, there 
were reasons to expect that the economic actors in Buryatia would have so 
diverse interests that they would start a fierce fight over the political pirog. 
On the contrary, though, Buryatia was one of the regions where a quite 
powerful and united economic organisation emerged, called the Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. At their conference in October 1993 they 
proclaimed that they looked for a presidential candidate who “had a 
thorough knowledge of economic questions and not only the perspective of 
using the funds of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in a difficult 
and expensive election campaign” (Buriatiia, 3 November 1993). As I will 
show later, Ivanov was the candidate whose programme best served the 
emerging business interests. Thus, he was supported by some directors of 
new businesses, banks and investment funds. The Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, supported Potapov. One important reason 
for this was probably the fact that their de facto leader was Aleksandr 
                                                     
14  Interview with deputy speaker of the Narodnyi Khural, Viktor Izmailov, Ulan-Ude, Janu-
ary 2001.  
15  Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, Febru-
ary 2001. 
16  Personal communication with researcher Ludmila Itigilova, Buryat Research Centre, 
Ulan-Ude, April 2002. 
4. Transition in Buryatia: The communist and the pragmatist 
Nupi novembear 02 
39 
Korenev, the director of the railway repair factory in Ulan-Ude where 
Potapov had been employed for some 20 years.  
Moreover, many businesses in Buryatia feared that they would lose out in 
a competitive market economy.17 Some of the largest industrial companies in 
Buryatia, such as the airplane factory and the wolfram-molybdenum mines, 
have faced serious problems in the post-Soviet period. This made these busi-
nesses support Potapov who promised them more comfortable shock absorb-
ers and it has also made many businesses very dependent on economic sup-
port from the republican authorities. A result of this is that the relationship 
between political and the main economic actors in Buryatia has been charac-
terised more by co-operation than by conflict—but not an equal partnership 
as the one suggested by Stoner-Weiss. Rather it is fair to argue that the eco-
nomic actors are more dependent on the political actors than the other way 
around.18 Such an unequal relationship facilitates the emergence of an “elite 
association” solution, where the dominant actor co-operates with other 
groups but always has the final word.  
Finally, the fact that Potapov seemed like the candidate possessing the 
strongest elite support probably made it easier for interest groups to make up 
their mind about whom to support at the presidential election.19 In this way 
the possession of resources seemed to enable politicians to accumulate even 
more resources. I will now look more specifically at what resources the poli-
ticians possessed.  
4.5. Resources 
By making tactical moves to position themselves in both the republican and 
federal power hierarchy the candidates to various degrees achieved control 
over the most important resources by far if the aim is to win an election in 
Russia: the administrative resources. I have shown that Potapov on a number 
of occasions proved to possess a stronger influence over political decisions 
than Saganov.  
Another important resource to possess in an election campaign is the 
informational resource: the control over mass media. This tends to derive 
from the administrative and political resources, since even in the case of 
non-governmental mass media the authorities can put pressure on them 
through the use of political powers and via the legal apparatus. This fact is 
illustrated by the largest scandal that took place right before the elections to 
the Federal Assembly in 1993. The newspaper Buriatiia was owned by the 
Council of Ministers and started a smear campaign against Potapov and his 
party “Social Justice”. In two articles it accused Potapov and the “Social Jus-
tice” candidate for the State Duma election, Lidiia Nimaeva, of having spent 
money that had been assigned by the federal Supreme Soviet for damages 
caused by flooding on their election campaigns. After the federal elections, 
some members of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet demanded a hearing 
                                                     
17  Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, Febru-
ary 2001. 
18  Interview with political scientist and former editor of the newspaper Buriatiia Erdem 
Dagbaev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, January 2001. 
19  Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, Febru-
ary 2001. 
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about these allegations. Here, Potapov was severely criticised and a special 
commission of deputies was appointed to investigate the accusations 
(Buriatiia, 17 December 1993). The investigators discovered that the money 
had been used as they should, and the newspaper Buriatiia was fined with 
1.5 million roubles for the insult against Potapov. The Potapov faction 
further got their revenge when the procurator in Buryatia found that, 
although both Potapov and Saganov had received funds illegally for their 
election campaigns, Saganov had received a much larger sum illegally than 
Potapov (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 56–57). This case exemplifies the Potapov–
Saganov struggle for control over the strongest administrative and informa-
tional resources. It showed that either Saganov had exploited his control over 
one major newspaper to fabricate lies about his political contender, or the 
investigations showed Potapov possessed the stronger administrative resour-
ces through his influence over the legal apparatus. 
When it comes to what support the Saganov and Potapov factions 
received from mass media in the subsequent presidential campaign, the for-
ces in 1994 were quite even.20 The Saganov bloc had the support of official 
newspapers in the republic, i.e. Buriatiia and Pravda Buriatii, and also from 
the republican commercial TV channels Azia TV and Arig Us that were 
slandering the other presidential candidates. However, if this ever worked to 
strengthen the Saganov faction (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 60), it could do so 
mainly in the Ulan-Ude region, as in many other parts of the republic the 
reception of these TV channels is weak or non-existing (Budaeva et al. 1998: 
175–176).  
The Buriatiia articles had shown how high-ranking politicians could use 
their position to gather economic resources for their election campaigns. 
Rumours both about this and other election campaigns have suggested that 
federal transfers had been diverted into election campaigns. The non-trans-
parent nature of politics in the region makes it difficult to verify these rum-
ours. It is still possible, though, that the fact that Ivanov’s patron, Saganov, 
was the head of the executive power and thereby controlled the money flows 
in the republic, provides an explanation why observers claim that he, and not 
Potapov, possessed the largest funding for the election campaign (Kislov 
1998a: 2). No doubt the candidates also received funding from the busines-
ses and companies that supported them. For Shapovalov this was even the 
primary way of financing his election campaign since he lacked nomenkla-
tura support.  
Thus, if Potapov seems to have possessed somewhat stronger administra-
tive resources, and the division of informational resources between the two 
main candidates was quite even, Saganov/Ivanov won the battle for econo-
mic resources. All in all, the division of resources between Ivanov and 
Potapov seems to have been quite even. 
4.6. Goals 
I have shown that the support from important interest groups depended much 
upon the politicians’ position in the political hierarchy or on personal friend-
                                                     
20  Interview with political scientist Erdem Dagbaev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, 
January 2001. 
4. Transition in Buryatia: The communist and the pragmatist 
Nupi novembear 02 
41 
ships, as with Potapov and the head of the Union of Industrialists and Entre-
preneurs. It would be wrong, however, to deny ideological motivation any 
role. To my mind, the genetic approach to transition studies over-focuses the 
role of the elites in determining the outcome of the transition. In the follow-
ing analysis I will claim that the candidates’ election programmes and cam-
paigns condition the actual choices of the electorate although these factors 
cannot be isolated from the candidates’ backgrounds and resources. As in 
Buryatia the distribution of resources between the two main candidates was 
quite even, the importance of ideology on the election outcome becomes all 
the more evident. I will now present the election programmes of the three 
main candidates and discuss how they influenced what groups were support-
ing them. 
The basic principles of Leonid Potapov’s election programme had 
already been made public in connection with the election to the Federation 
Council in 1993. His policy was a mixture of socialist principles and a dose 
of market capitalism. Soviet history ought not to be thrown on the garbage 
dump, but be respected. Reforms should move gradually, with careful con-
sideration for their social consequences. Moderation is a suitable word also 
for his programme on governmental reform and cultural revival. The former 
was stated in vague and general terms, suggesting that things were most 
likely to remain the same in the state apparatus. Likewise, in an ethnically 
mixed republic like Buryatia, it was important to step carefully in order not 
to alienate any groups. Therefore Potapov said he was aiming at the national 
revival of all the peoples living in Buryatia (Buriatiia, 3 December 1993 and 
11 June 1994). 
If Potapov seemed to promise no radical changes, Valerii Shapovalov’s 
programme was the most populist of the three. His programme could be 
summed up in a headline in the newspaper Buriatiia (8 June 1994), present-
ing an interview with Shapovalov: “Before the decision is made I am a 
democrat, after the decision a dic-tator”, which implied he was ready to act 
in a resolute and decisive manner. “The people needs a strong power”, he 
said. This was to be achieved by firing half of the state employees and cut-
ting the number of ministries to seven. Another aspect of the strong power 
was that the legal apparatus would be reformed and that ordinary citi-zens 
would obtain the right to own and carry weapons. Shapovalov’s election 
prog-ramme was full of generous promises of tax cuts, freezing prices on 
energy and tran-sport, and support to the poorest groups in society. At the 
same time the goal would be to reduce the dependency on the federal centre 
and to eliminate the budget deficit.  
If Potapov went for stability and Shapovalov for radical change, 
Aleksandr Ivanov’s programme aimed at the pragmatic middle road. In the 
election campaign he promised the voters that he “would not promise what 
he could not keep” and that “I am by principle against populism. I am tired 
of lying” (Buriatiia, 18 May and 16 June 1994). In his plans for state reform 
he emphasised the need for new and fresh forces, but at the same time alli-
ances would be built with the old nomenklatura. Political power had to be 
strengthened from the bottom-up, starting with an active local self-govern-
ment. 
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Above I have mentioned that both Potapov and Saganov were considered 
to be a part of the regime moderates when they arrived in the republic in 
1990. Later Saganov came to be associated with a liberal political stance, 
whereas Potapov in comparison became the regime “hardliner”. This was 
also reflected in the political programmes presented by Potapov and Ivanov 
in 1994, where Ivanov was willing to go further in the direction of encourag-
ing businesses through flexible tax, credit and investment policies and 
through a structural adaptation of enterprises to market economy. No mercy 
would be shown on businesses that ought to be declared bankrupt (Buriatiia, 
28 May, 16 and 25 June 1994). Thus, the Ivanov fraction were the regime 
softliners in Buryatia. 
When holding the election programmes up against each other there is no 
wonder that the moderate opposition, represented by the Communist Party, 
chose to support Potapov at the presidential election. The Communist Party 
and associated organisations, such as the trade unions, the Agricultural 
Union, the Women’s Union, the Council of Veterans and the Youth Union, 
became the dominant partners in Potapov’s election bloc “Social Justice” 
(Mikhailovskaia 1995: 51). The Communist Party was an important ally in 
Buryatia, where this was the only organised party that could boast of a 
strong membership and a party organisation in every district of the republic. 
In 1992 the Communist Party alone had more members than the other 15 
political parties and movements taken together (ibid.: 48–49).  
This could be juxtaposed with Ivanov’s situation. With his background as 
chair of the republican committee of economy and a quite liberal and pro-
gressive election programme he allied with parties of the liberal and demo-
cratic brand. These parties had all only recently been organised. At the fede-
ral elections in 1993 there had been a whole swath of different blocs with a 
more or less democratic agenda. For the presidential election 17 of these par-
ties and organisations joined together in the bloc “For a Worthy Life”. PRES 
and “Unity and Progress” were the main building blocks here and “For a 
Worthy Life” became the election machine for Ivanov (McFaul and Petrov 
1998: 106). 
Among the candidates Shapovalov was the only one not connected to the 
ruling elite. The main organisations and political parties, as described above, 
sooner or later entered an alliance with the regime softliners or hardliners. 
Among these it is quite difficult to make a clear dichotomy between opposi-
tion moderates and radicals. On the one hand, Shapovalov supported drastic 
political reforms, but his economic programme could not be labelled radical. 
In the latter respect the liberal and democratic wing wanted more radical 
economic reforms but went for moderation in political reforms. Then, fin-
ally, the socialist wing supported neither political nor economic radicalism. 
This calls for a trichotomy in the case of Buryatia. It turned out, however, 
that Shapovalov supported Potapov in the second round of the presidential 
election. Therefore I have chosen to call Shapovalov and the socialists the 
moderate opposition and the liberals and democrats the radical opposition.  
My assumption in Chapter 3 was that a coalition between regime mode-
rates and moderates in the opposition is necessary in order to produce a suc-
cessful democratic transition from above. As I have shown, the regime 
reformers, represented by Saganov and Ivanov, instead allied themselves 
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with the radicals in the opposition. These proved too weak against the coali-
tion of regime hardliners, represented by Potapov’s nomenklatura support-
ers, and many of the moderates in the opposition, who feared the market 
economy stance of the radical opposition.  
4.7. Strategy 
In order to win over the parts of the electorate that were not associated with 
any of the political parties, organisations or workers collectives supporting 
one of the candidates, the way the election programmes were conveyed was 
probably even more important than the content of the programmes. Modern 
election campaign technologies did not reach Buryatia in time for the 1994 
election. No Moscow consultants were employed to shape the image of the 
candidates, and the sum of money spent by each of the candidates on the 
campaign was relatively modest. However, smear campaigns against 
political opponents were not unfamiliar to the contenders, as evidenced in 
the case with the newspaper Buriatiia in 1993. Smear campaigns were an 
important part of the election campaign of Ivanov in particular (McFaul and 
Petrov 1998: 108), but Potapov also used dirty tricks. Among others, some 
claim it was no coincidence that also another Ivanov registered as a candi-
date for the election: Vladimir Ivanov, who had been minister of foreign 
trade. This served to confuse the electorate about who was who of the candi-
dates, and perhaps made many people associate the scandals connected with 
V. Ivanov with A. Ivanov.21 
Potapov to a greater extent than the other candidates relied on the more 
traditional way of running the election campaign by travelling to the regional 
centres and villages to meet with the electorate (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 
108). Ivanov also sensed an acute need to travel in the regions, however, 
since he was well aware that people in the countryside did not know him 
well and that Potapov had a long lead on him there. At an equal disadvantage 
in this respect was Shapovalov, who in addition to this entered the election 
campaign much later than the other candidates. With limited time and 
resources, he chose to focus his efforts on the voters in Ulan-Ude and the 
central region (Buriatiia, 25 June 1994). 
The timing of the election campaign was also important in explaining 
why Ivanov lost. In Buryatia people had already gone through the first round 
of republican level privatisation and rapid market reforms at the time of the 
presidential election. The privatisation and reforms had been implemented 
by the Saganov government, and Ivanov got his part in the accusations for 
the failures of these reforms. In this respect Potapov had been luckier when 
ending up as leader of the parliament from 1991. Here he was more protec-
ted against public criticism and could take advantage of the public distrust 
against the government in his presidential campaign.22 In their dis-
                                                     
21  V. Ivanov had been forced to resign from his minister position for his support to the 
Russian Supreme Soviet during the 1993 conflict. He withdrew from the presidential 
election relatively early. Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research 
Centre, Ulan-Ude, February 2001. 
22  Interview with sociologist Seseg Budaeva, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, January 
2001. 
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illusionment with market liberalism people went back to the safe and well 
known: the socialist ideas of the party apparatchik Potapov. 
4.8. The election outcome 
At the presidential election in Buryatia on 16 June 1994 54.1% of the elec-
tors participated, of which 46.2% voted for Potapov, 25.7% for Ivanov, 
15.7% for Shapovalov and 7.9% for Namsaraev (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 
108). In the second ballot on 30 June Potapov won a landslide victory: He 
received 71.71% of the votes, compared to 24.90% for Ivanov. When 
Potapov received support also from Shapovalov’s voters he won all three 
districts in Ulan-Ude clearly, although this was where Ivanov had expected 
to gain most of his support (Buriatiia, 5 July 1994). 
When push came to shove, Potapov’s election programme and strategy 
coupled with his long political experience and strong administrative position 
was what won him the presidency. Potapov and Saganov were no doubt the 
two most famous politicians in Buryatia, and were unrivalled in the competi-
tion for presidency in Buryatia through the access they had both to econo-
mic, political, administrative and informational resources. When Saganov 
decided not to run for election, his replacement, Ivanov, was facing the diffi-
cult task of getting people in the most far-flung corners of Buryatia to know 
who he was. The same was the case for Shapovalov, but when the former 
tried to win votes in the districts through extensive travelling, this may have 
caused him to lose in Ulan-Ude, where Shapovalov won in two of three dis-
tricts. 
According to Gel’man’s typology of regime change, the transition in 
Buryatia corresponded to conservative reform, where the ruling elite domi-
nates the transition but by using a strategy of adaptation to other elite groups. 
Since in Buryatia the regime reformers allied themselves with the opposition 
radicals while the regime hardliners entered a coalition with the opposition 
moderates, transition theory does not leave the republic with much chances 
of a regime transition ending in a democratic regime. The hardliners will not 
be ideologically enticed to support considerable regime reforms, and there-
fore much will remain the same in the political rule of the republic. In 
Buryatia the share of the electorate belonging to the opposition moderates 
was far larger than the share supporting opposition radicals. This partly had 
to do with the timing of the election in Buryatia: People were not impressed 
with what “liberal” politicians and market economy had been able to achieve 
neither at the federal level nor in the republic, and preferred a return to what 
they were used to.  
Important in ensuring the victory of the hardliners was also their support 
among the most powerful and united economic interests in Buryatia. Despite 
the relatively dispersed economic structure of the republic, many of the main 
industries co-operated in the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and 
this organisation entered an alliance with Potapov. The political and econo-
mic actors were, however, not equal partners in this alliance, which also 
helps explaining why the outcome of the transition was a regime close to 
“elite association”.  
5. Transition in Kalmykia: The 
businessman and the general 
5.1. Structures of governance 
In the case of Buryatia I found that the political-economic structure of gov-
ernance there did not quite fit with the theoretical expectations, since 
Buryatia has a mixed but weak economy but nevertheless a quite strong poli-
tical regime. The regime has allied itself with parts of the economic elite, 
although neither Stoner-Weiss nor Gel’man predicts such an alliance under 
these circumstances. 
Kalmykia is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions in the 
Russian Federation. Agriculture traditionally has a dominant position, with 
an emphasis on sheep and cattle farming. Whereas in 1995 33.9% of the 
population of Kalmykia were employed in the agricultural sector, only 9.5% 
worked in industry. The industrial base of Kalmykia is weak (The Territories 
1999: 68), consisting mainly of food industry, supplemented with some 
mechanical engineering, metal processing industry and manufacture of 
building materials. As a matter of fact, compared to the industrial heavy-
weights of the Volga region Kalmykia produces only 0.5% of this region’s 
industrial output, and on a national basis only 0.1%. Until the 1990s the 
region did not even have processing industry for two of its main products: 
wool and hide. Kalmykia has a share in the oil and gas riches of the Caspian 
Sea, but that remains largely untapped. Until 1994 the Kalmyks did not even 
themselves exploit their oil and gas resources, but left this to the neighbour-
ing Astrakhan oblast’ (Kolosov and Streletskii 1996: 27–28). 
Consequently, it seems that Kalmykia possesses an economic structure of 
the kind Gel’man argues facilitates an authoritarian “winner-takes-all” rule. 
The lack of large and powerful industrial enterprises in Kalmykia meant that 
it was not very likely that the leaders of these enterprises would constitute an 
alternative power centre to the political leadership. Instead it was likely that 
these companies would be eager to receive political support in order to sur-
vive in the market economy. Neither would the agrarian sector be able to 
represent a strong and independent economic counterweight to the political 
power: It remained unified under republican controland in a dire state after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
My theory supposes, however, that other factors also may be at play in 
determining the outcome of a regime transition. I will assume that, like in the 
case of Buryatia, the connection between structural conditions and elite stra-
tegies is not completely deterministic, but that there are elements in the latter 
that can make the regime transition change in a different direction than sup-
posed by the structural preconditions. When now delving into these elite 
struggles, it seems reasonable to start out by identifying the main actors in 
the battle for presidency in 1993. 
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5.2. Actors 
There were three candidates participating in the 1993 presidential campaign 
in Kalmykia: one Party employee, one businessman and one general. The 
only member of the local nomenklatura participating was Vladimir 
Bambaev. He was a worker who gradually had risen in the Party hierarchy 
from being a Komsomol and trade union employee to reskom secretary for 
agriculture and, from 1990, president of the Farmers’ Association in 
Kalmykia (Kasimov 1993: 7).  
A very strong counter-candidate proclaimed his ambitions for presidency 
in August 1992 (Tolz 1993: 41). This was Kirsan Iliumzhinov, a 30-year old 
Kalmyk from Elista. He had done a Komsomol career in Elista, but then 
went off to Moscow to study international economy at the elite college 
MGIMO. Upon graduation he embarked on a business career and soon 
became the owner of his own sprawling Moscow-based international corpo-
ration, San. Upon his own words he owned 50 enterprises engaged in every-
thing from computer installation to textile and brick production. In 1993 
these businesses turned over 500 million US dollars (Mark 1998: 14, 
Izvestiia Kalmykii, 16 February 1996). His influence was enhanced when he 
became president of the Russian Chamber of Entrepreneurs, and already in 
1990 he was included in the political elite when he was elected people’s 
deputy from Kalmykia for the Congress of People’s Deputies in RSFSR.  
But Iliumzhinov had to face competition from another proud son of the 
republic in the 1993 election. Valerii Ochirov was a general of the Soviet air 
force with a long and esteemed career: He had served in GDR, fought in 
Afghanistan and was subsequently awarded with the title Hero of the Soviet 
Union. In 1993 he was the First Deputy Commander of the air force of the 
land troops in Russia. His political career started in 1989 when he was elec-
ted to represent Kalmykia at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. 
In Moscow he became deputy chairman of the Committee of Defence and 
National Security in the Supreme Soviet (Izvestiia Kalmykii, 19 February 
1993). Among his friends he counted the two generals in charge of the 
neighbouring republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, Dzhokhar Dudaev and 
Ruslan Aushev, as well as patriotically oriented politicians in Moscow, such 
as the former general Aleksandr Rutskoi.  
Consequently, the three candidates for the 1993 presidential election were 
all already involved in politics: one at the republican level and two at the 
national level. Ochirov and Iliumzhinov would thus seem to be the counter-
elite candidates in this election, whereas Bambaev is the regime candidate. 
This would be the opposite situation of the one in Buryatia, where candidates 
from the ruling elite dominated 2:1.  
5.3. Informal networks 
Stoner-Weiss argues that in regions where the economy is concentrated like 
it is in Kalmykia, the political and economic power will co-operate and pro-
duce high governance efficiency. In the transition period in Kalmykia the 
political power and the largest interest group, the agrarian sector, led by 
Bambaev, were still fused. However, in addition to this, the two above-men-
tioned contenders to this alliance emerged. On the surface they seemed to be 
5. Transition in Kalmykia: The businessman and the general 
Nupi novembear 02 
47 
counter-elite candidates, but below I will argue for reasons to doubt this 
assumption. 
In the period 1989–90 candidates for political positions in Kalmykia were 
still nominated by the Communist Party (Kolosov and Streletskii 1996: 28), 
so in order to be elected to these positions one needed to have a substantial 
support in the local nomenklatura. This was also true for the elections to the 
Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 and 1990, when Iliumzhinov and 
Ochirov had entered politics. The explanation for the support to these candi-
dates is to be found in the events leading up to the 1993 election. 
A presidential election was announced in Kalmykia already in 1991the 
sec-ond in the Russian Federation after Tatarstan. After the 1990 election to 
the Supreme Soviet in Kalmykia, the first signs of an inter-elite division had 
emerged that parallel-ed the development in Buryatia. The division was 
between the Supreme Soviet led by Vladimir Basanov, who was also former 
reskom secretary, and the Council of Minis-ters, chaired by Batyr Mikhailov. 
This executive–legislative conflict played on an ideological confrontation 
between the more pro-reform Mikhailov and the pro-sove-reignty Basanov, 
and their respective groups of supporters in the Council of Ministers and 
Supreme Soviet (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 153). The presidential election 
was initiated in order to put an end to this executive–legislative conflict, but 
most of all it can be explained by a strong urge for sovereignty in the repub-
lican political elite.23 
The candidates in the presidential election in October 1991 were 
Basanov, Mikhailov and a young raion24 leader, Chumudov. The election 
ended in a deadlock: None of the candidates achieved the number of votes 
necessary in order to win even in the second ballot, as more than 50% of the 
voters either stayed home or voted against all the candidates in both rounds. 
According to the law a new election now had to be held, where the candi-
dates from the first election were not allowed to participate (Guchinova and 
Tavanets 1995: 26). 
This paved the way for a different development in Kalmykia than in 
Buryatia. In the period between the first and the second election the execu-
tive–legislative conflict reached such levels that both Basanov and 
Mikhailov were forced to step down due to allegations of illegal commercial 
activities. In late 1992 they were replaced by Ilia Bugdaev and Maksim 
Mukubenov (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 153). Only a couple of months later a 
new election campaign was under way. Two parties (the Communist Party 
and the Slavs of Kalmykia) and several actors did not participate, refusing to 
accept the new presidential election. The latter included Bugdaev and 
Mukubenov, who had not managed to establish their authority in the republic 
since they were appointed and thus feared to lose an election.25 Conse-
quently, the two persons that in theory would be most able to draw upon 
administrative resources were out of the game. The only nomenklatura mem-
ber who was nominated was the head of the agricultural sector, Bambaev. 
But, the strong executive–legislative fight for power in the three preceding 
years had to such an extent discredited the Party elite that it would not take 
                                                     
23  Personal communication with Ivan Ryzhkov, leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, April 2002. 
24  One type of municipalities in the Russian Federation. 
25  Personal communication with Ivan Ryzhkov, leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, April 2002. 
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much competition from outside the elite before they would lose power (Mark 
1998: 14).  
Probably this was a fact realised also by several nomenklatura members, 
and they started looking around for suitable outsider candidates for the 
presidency. One faction chose Iliumzhinov, another Ochirov. Rather than 
speaking of factions it may be more correct to speak of the support from 
influential individuals,26 and the support from such individuals both in the 
republic and at the federal centre turned out far more important than the sup-
port from a weak civil society in the election in Kalmy-kia. Influential 
people in the local nomenklatura, most notably the poet and Politburo candi-
date member David Kugul’tinov, had provided Iliumzhinov with financial 
help already in the 1990 election campaign.27 Such support makes it 
questionable whether Iliumzhinov and Ochirov really can be labelled opposi-
tion candidates.  
5.4. Formal institutions 
The elite alliances were not only reflected through informal and covert 
agreements, but also in the way formal institutions were shaped in the period 
leading up to the presidential election in 1993. Compared to Buryatia, where 
the formal institutions were the main battleground for the elite struggle, the 
informal networks were at the centre of events. The communist era formal 
institutions and constitution remained more or less intact. Moreover, 
Iliumzhinov and Ochirovas they were not participating in politics 
locallydid not have the opportunity directly to use and shape institutions to 
their own advantage. Still, the fact that they relied on powerful supporters in 
the political elite became obvious when the law on the presidency was amen-
ded ahead of the 1993 election. 
According to the 1991 law on the republican presidency neither 
Iliumzhinov nor Ochirov were entitled to stand for election. Firstly, the law 
demanded that the candidates had to live permanently in the republic, which 
neither of them did, secondly that the candidates should be 35 years old or 
older, which Iliumzhinov was not. However, during the months leading up to 
the election their supporters managed to convince the Supreme Soviet into 
changing the law so that they would be able to participate. In the case of the 
first requirement an exemption was made for people’s deputies of the Rus-
sian Federation and people working in the federal Supreme Soviet and in the 
latter case the age limit was lowered to 30 years (Andzhaev 2001). This indi-
cates that the support for Iliumzhinov in the Supreme Soviet must have been 
larger than for Ochirov, since the Ochirov supporters must have been eager 
to prevent the age limit from being lowered. Moreover, the support for these 
two candidates must already at that point have been larger than the support 
of the nomenklatura candidate, Bambaev, since his supporters clearly must 
have been interested in preventing the law from being amended. 
                                                     
26  Interview with former procurator in Kalmykia, Vladimir Shipeev, Moscow, June 2001. 
27  Interview with former deputy in the State Duma, Bembia Khulkhachiev, Moscow, June 
2001.  
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5.5. Resources 
What background the candidates had and who supported them determined 
what resources they possessed in the election campaigna factor shown by 
Gel’man to be of great importance in determining the result of uncertain 
transitions. In the case of Buryatia I showed that the fact that the two main 
candidates were nomenklatura candidates with the most direct access to 
administrative resources in the republic seriously weakened the chances any 
of the other candidates had to become elected. 
In Kalmykia none of the candidates directly possessed administrative 
resources in terms of the right to make political decisions in the republic or 
to control the police and judicial power. Bambaev, though, was head of the 
strongest interest group in Kalmykia, the Farmers’ Association. Stoner-
Weiss does not in her analysis directly mention regions that are so domi-
nated by the agricultural sector as Kalmykia. If assuming, however, that the 
same goes for such regions as for other regions with a strongly concentrated 
economy, then the economic structure in Kalmykia will encourage co-opera-
tion between these agrarian interests and the regime. Such a co-operation 
goes without saying in the 1991–93 political situation in Kalmykia, when 
agriculture was firmly in the hands of the Party elite. The curious fact here, 
however, was that this co-operation did not produce a winning coalition. On 
the contrary, Bambaev was a politician known for already having lost seve-
ral elections, and this was probably an important reason why he failed to 
muster the support of the large part of the nomenklatura (Kasimov 1993: 7). 
In the mass media his campaign received poor coverage in all but one news-
paper (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia), and Bambaev himself complained that the 
mass media boycotted him (Izvestiia Kalmykiia, 19 February 1993). This is a 
proof to the fact that the role of structures should not be over-emphasised: A 
structural explanation would have predicted a stable and winning agrarian-
regime coalition, whereas in order to explain Bambaev’s failure pure elite 
calculations must be considered. Considering the marginal impact Bambaev 
had on the election campaign, I will from now on focus mainly on 
Iliumzhinov and Ochirov. 
Iliumzhinov was already a familiar face to people in Kalmykia when the 
election campaign started in 1993. Ever since he was elected a people’s 
deputy in 1990 local mass media had provided broad reports whenever he 
visited Kalmykia.28 In these reports Iliumzhinov did not show particular 
modesty neither when describing his own wealth, nor his network of impor-
tant contacts in Moscow and abroad. Iliumzhinov has frequently been 
accused of exploiting federal transfers to Kalmykia from the moment he was 
elected a deputy in 1990. Evidence shows that Iliumzhinov’s bank, Step’, 
received a 14 billion roubles credit from the federal authorities that should 
have been—but was not—used for the purchase of wool in the republic. Fur-
thermore, Iliumzhinov’s company San had, thanks to the Chairman of the 
USSR Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov, received a licence in 1990 on 
the export of 40,000 tons of surplus crude oil for Kalmykia. The traces of 
both the oil and the money earned on the sale of itallegedly some 3.8 mil-
lion dollars—disappeared (Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 24 April 1993; Novaia 
                                                     
28  Interview with Valerii Badmaev, deputy chairman of Yabloko in Kalmykia, Elista, May 
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Ezhednevnaia Gazeta, 7 May 1993). His opponents during the election cam-
paign claimed that parts of both the wool credit and this oil money went into 
financing Iliumzhinov’s election campaign.  
Ochirov did not speak openly of his own financial situation in the elec-
tion campaign, but some sources suggest that his economic activities were 
also highly dubious. He was a member of the so-called International Russian 
Club, among others with Aleksandr Rutskoi. The chairman of the club, 
Mikhail Bocharov, was allegedly active in weapon purchases from 
Kaliningrad, and Ochirov himself had for a while been engaged in white-
washing of Communist Party money. Most likely these sources provided him 
with funding for his election campaign (Kasimov 1993: 9).  
Both Iliumzhinov and Ochirov thus hadmainly thanks to their useful 
contacts at the federal levelaccess to considerable financial resources, 
which was crucial in order to finance their election campaign, and in the case 
of Iliumzhinov for his whole image. Consequently, these two “outsider” can-
didates were in a quite different situation from the outsider candidate in 
Buryatia, who economically was dwarfed by the two nomenklatura candi-
dates. In Kalmykia it was the “outsiders” who dwarfed the insider. These 
large sources of external funding further undermine explanations emphasis-
ing the role of the economic structure for the regime outcome.  
Another resource that needs to be considered is the informational 
resource. Mass media is weakly developed in Kalmykia, with only one radio 
channel, two TV channels (one of which broadcasts only in the republican 
capital of Elista and the surrounding areas), and five republic-level news-
papers. The main official newspaper Izvestiia Kalmykiia presented informa-
tion about all three candidates, but significantly more materials and in a 
more enthusiastic vein about Iliumzhinov, and far less about Bambaev than 
about Ochirov. It was said that Iliumzhinov had actively been supporting the 
editor at the last election for the Supreme Soviet, and that this explained why 
the newspaper favoured Iliumzhinov. The only mass medium clearly oppos-
ing Iliumzhinov was the newspaper Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, which was owned 
by the Farmers’ Association and the Federation of Trade Unions in 
Kalmykia. This newspaper gave its preferences to Bambaev but also allowed 
space for Ochirov (Kasimov 1993: 4–5), who apart from this received cover-
age in Moscow newspapers. In addition to this both Iliumzhinov and 
Ochirov distributed their own newspapers during the election campaign. The 
fact that the mass media was clearly favouring Iliumzhinov in the period 
leading up to the election is evidence to his strong finances, but perhaps also 
to his position among parts of the nomenklatura, although the ruling elite in 
reality did not possess more than a de jure mass media control in this 
period.29  
My analysis thus far has shown that the all-Russian transition processes 
created a division in the political elite in Kalmykia that translated into sup-
port for various candidates at the 1993 election. Contrary to the expectations, 
the strongest elite support was given to the “outsider candidates”, 
Iliumzhinov and Ochirov, rather than to the head of the largest interest 
group. This was evidenced both in lawmaking and in the division of infor-
mational resources, and I have argued that the reasoning behind their choice 
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shows that the actors in this electoral battle seem to have been more impor-
tant than the structures. Over the next pages I will show how the large pri-
vate financial resources enabled these “outsiders” to organise extravagant 
election campaigns against which the candidate from the local nomenklatura 
did not stand a chance.  
5.6. Goals 
In terms of election promises Iliumzhinov’s programme was the equivalent 
of Shapovalov’s programme in Buryatia. Both programmes held great pro-
mises and populist statements that sought to satisfy the demands of all parts 
of the population. The main slogan of the economic programme was the one 
of a “capitalist revolution”. If people dared to vote for Iliumzhinov they 
would get a “president–capitalist”a president ready to act instead of just 
talking, think in new ways, and even willing to spend parts of his own for-
tune on improving the people’s lot. Instead of relying on federal transfers 
Kalmykia would create its own industry based on its own raw materials. 
However, what would more than anything improve the economic situation 
was the creation of an offshore zone, offering companies only 5% taxes if 
they registered in the republic. At the same time people could not expect to 
get the new welfare without any sacrifices: a 6-day workweek would be 
introduced. Iliumzhinov’s capitalist image was not coupled with ideas of a 
political system of the democratic Western brand. By naming his plans for 
Kalmykia an “economic dictatorship” he seemed to identify more with the 
modernising dictatorships of South East Asia. A strongly politically mobil-
ised population would only do harm to the economy in this transition period. 
Therefore he would introduce direct presidential rule, with a ban on demon-
strations and strikes in the transition period, and cut the administration down 
to one third of its present size (Iliumzhinov 1993; Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 16 
February 1993). The prime minister position was offered to Egor Gaidar…. 
(Molodezh Kalmykii, 16 February 1993). Finally Iliumzhinov—paying 
tribute to the trend of ethnonational revival—launched the idea of creating a 
“second Vatican” in Kalmykia, this time for the Lamaist Buddhists, and pro-
mised Dalai Lama exile in the republic. But this appeal to the Kalmyk part of 
the population was carefully balanced with a language of inter-ethnic har-
mony and generous promises also to other religious communities (Izvestiia 
Kalmykiia, 16 February 1993).  
Compared to Iliumzhinov’s programme, Ochirov’s programme was the 
modest variant of many of the same suggestions, and in terms of pragmatism 
he resembled Aleksandr Ivanov in Buryatia. Where Iliumzhinov described 
his business successes, Ochirov boasted at his achievements as a Moscow 
politician and contacts at the federal centre. Among other things he had 
made the first draft of the first Soviet–American agreement on a reduction of 
the number of strategic weapons and participated in negotiations between 
Georgia and South Ossetia and Russia and Chechnya. Concerning concrete 
political reforms in the programme, Ochirov also went for a more effective 
and disciplined political administration, but where Iliumzhinov wanted to 
implement these changes over night Ochirov wanted a gradual reform. 
Ochirov’s medicine to cure economic illnesses was to a large extent only a 
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milder prescription of what Iliumzhinov suggested. Among other things he 
suggested creating a stronger industrial sector based on the republic’s own 
resources, and with state control over the use of resources. Like Iliumzhinov 
Ochirov also believed in special economic zones with a high degree of tax 
exemption in order to attract foreign investments. However, unlike 
Iliumzhinov Ochirov emphasised that one could not expect a quick 
improvement of the economy. Ochirov’s programme differed radically from 
Iliumzhinov’s mainly on the issue of republican sovereignty, where he 
wanted to exploit the opportunities the Federation Treaty gave to expand the 
sovereignty. And his military past was evident in his suggestion to build 
military air bases in Kalmykia, to which Russian soldiers could be transfer-
red from Germany (Izvestiia Kalmykiia, 19 and 20 February 1993).  
Ochirov’s programme perhaps sounded more realistic than Iliumzhinov’s. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Iliumzhinov had showed himself to be a clever 
businessman, whereas Ochirov had no economic background himself, meant 
that people’s confidence in Iliumzhinov’s ability to solve their economic 
problems was higher.30 Iliumzhinov was also guaranteed the support of the 
Kalmyk Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, but this organisation was 
far less important than its counterpart in Buryatia. Apart from that, it is diffi-
cult to point to important parties and organisations supporting the main 
candidates, Iliumzhinov and Ochirov, except from some ethnically based 
organisations that I will look at in Chapter 8 (Guchinova and Tavanets 1994: 
8). One reason is that civil society in general was less developed in 
Kalmykia than in Buryatia. Besides, the largest political party, the Commu-
nist Party, boycotted the election. 
5.7. Strategies 
The age factor was probably important when it came to the election cam-
paign strategies chosen by Iliumzhinov and Ochirov. After all, Ochirov was 
a seasoned officer who had preserved much of the Soviet way of thinking, 
whereas Iliumzhinov belonged to the young generation ready to think in new 
directions about ways of getting to power. In Buryatia the situation had been 
quite different: There both the main candidates were products of the same 
Soviet system and none of them thought in strongly unconventional ways, 
neither about election programmes nor campaigns.  
Although Iliumzhinov’s programme was sufficiently bold, it was prob-
ably the way he organised the election campaign that drew him most of his 
votes. The layout of his programme was an invention in itself: a printed 
booklet written in a popularised language. The other candidates did not have 
a printed programme and Bambaev even failed to put up posters in public 
places.31 The other elements of Iliumzhinov’s cam-paign were no less 
colourful. In order to impress people living in the backward Kal-myk 
countryside, Iliumzhinov travelled to every nook and cranny of the republic 
in a black Lincoln, meeting with people in every kolkhoz and village hall 
with promises of a new and brighter future. Famous Russian artists like Oleg 
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31  Interview with Ivan Ryzhkov, leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, Elista, June 2001. 
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Gazmanov and Masha Rasputina, who normally would not consider adding 
Elista to their concert plans, were paid by Iliumzhinov to perform there. 
Further emphasising his own personal wealth he subsidised milk and bread 
for people in Elista for one month during the election campaign, and pro-
mised every citizen 100 US dollars if they voted for him at the election.32 He 
secured the support of the republican police force by giving them two cars, 
and convinced the Buddhist and Orthodox congregations to vote for him by 
presenting them with large donations for khuruls33 and churches. 
Ochirov did not have much to offer in response to this. He caught on 
Iliumzhi-nov’s idea to subsidise milk, and he donated money to Afghanistan 
veterans and vic-tims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, but it was the much 
more generous subsidies and donations of Iliumzhinov that people rememb-
ered (Kasimov 1993: 8). Although Ochirov travelled much around the repub-
lic, he was not able to cover as much of the territory with his military heli-
copter as Iliumzhinov did in his limousine.34 Ochirov was probably the 
candidate with the best election campaign teamall with experi-ence from 
his campaign for the Supreme Soviet elections in 1989 (Kasimov 1993: 8) 
but even this fact did not help. This team and other Iliumzhinov opponents 
in the republic made attempts to slander Iliumzhinov by printing stories 
about him being expelled from MGIMO in his student days for illegal drug 
dealing (Tolz 1993: 42). The reply from the Iliumzhinov camp was articles 
in republican mass media portray-ing Ochirov as a marionette of the federal 
authorities.35 This was an argument people in Kalmykia could buy into as it 
turned out that one of Ochirov’s clearest weaknesses was the fact that he 
showed a poor knowledge of the conditions in his home republic.  
Ochirov’s Achilles’ heel was actually to a great extent the fact that he 
was a general. After all, the 1993 election took place in a period when 
people had just been witnessing the outbreak of war in many parts of the for-
mer Soviet Union. People in Kalmykia, bordering on North Caucasus, 
sensed the precariousness of their own geo-political position. As one reader 
of Elistinskie novosti (3–9 April 1993) pointed out: “Chechnya and 
Ingushetia both have president–generals, which more destabilises than stabil-
ises the situation in those republics. Is there any reason to believe the situa-
tion would be much different in Kalmykia with Ochirov as a president?” 
Therefore Ochirov’s suggestion to create an air base in Kalmykia probably 
did more harm than good to his election campaign. Iliumzhinov, on the other 
hand, spoke of economic co-operation and inter-ethnic harmony, and to the 
electorate this seemed more appealing.  
Here it is important to mention that the time factor did not only work to 
Ochirov’s disadvantage, but also to Iliumzhinov’s clear advantage. This was 
a time when people in Kalmykia still had not completely lost their faith in 
market liberals who would create economic miracles in a short period of 
time. Privatisation had begun a year earlier, and the corrupt ways in which it 
had been conducted so far by the communist nomenklatura was one of the 
major factors discrediting the whole ruling elite and making people ready for 
                                                     
32  Interview with presidential advisor Vladimir Volgin in Elista, May 2001. 
33  Buddhist temples in Kalmykia. 
34  Interview with presidential advisor Vladimir Volgin in Elista, May 2001. 
35  Interview with former deputy of the State Duma, Bembia Khulkhachiev, Moscow, June 
2001. 
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a “new broom”. O’Donnell argues (1994: 65) that a radical worsening of the 
economic situation facilitates the emergence of authoritarian leaders 
believed to provide an effective solution to the crisis. When analysing the 
election programme and campaign of Iliumzhinov it becomes quite obvious 
that such a factor was at play here. Iliumzhinov did not even pretend wanting 
to create a democracy in Kalmykia. What he did seem to want was to 
improve the rapidly worsening economic conditions in a republic that 
already had among the worst living standards in Russia. Rapid improve-
ments were what people yearned forignoring the fact that Ochirov’s pro-
mises perhaps were more realistic.  
5.8. The election outcome 
In the presidential election in Kalmykia 16 June 1993 Kirsan Iliumzhinov 
received 65.37% of the votes and became Kalmykia’s first president. 
Ochirov finished second with 29.22%, whereas only 1.55% voted for 
Bambaev (Kasimov 1993: 9). This showed that Kalmyks and Russians alike 
had been taken in by the story of Iliumzhinov’s wealth and successes and his 
generous election promises, as well as by his skilfully planned election cam-
paign strategy.  
According to Gel’man’s typology, the transition in Kalmykia was either a 
forced transition, i.e. elite initiated and with the use of force, or something 
closer to a revolution, i.e. initiated by counter-elites and with the use of 
force. In my analysis I have argued for perceiving this as a transition that 
started out as a forced transition, since it is doubtful that Iliumzhinov could 
have won without his powerful supporters in the republican nomenklatura. 
They had made it possible for him to get elected as a people’s deputy in 
1990. This paved the way for Iliumzhinov by helping him to build up his 
image in the republican mass media and with opportunities to divert federal 
funds to his election campaign. In the case of Iliumzhinov we then speak of 
regime moderates (e.g. the former chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
Mikhailov) allying with radicals from outside the regime.  
Przeworski has little faith in such an alliance, since it seems unlikely that 
two groups with so different goals will join forces. There is indeed reason to 
question what made the regime moderates support such a radical candidate 
as Iliumzhinov, who even proposed to cut the political administration down 
to a third. It would be safer for them in this respect to ally with the more 
moderate Ochirov. According to Przeworski (1991: 67–79), alliances with 
the opposition must in general be based on a guarantee that the elite will not 
lose all its privileges and most likely this was the case in Kalmykia. 
Probably the elites believed that the young and politically inexperienced 
Iliumzhinov could be used more or less like a marionette, while the elites 
preserved their old power. Here they may have been mistaken. In my discus-
sion of the consolidation phase in Kalmykia in Chapter 7 I will show that it 
is possible to claim that although the transition started out as a forced transi-
tion it ended in a revolution when Iliumzhinov got the upper hand over his 
patrons in the elite. According to my initial assumption such a mode of tran-
sition has the least chances of resulting in a democratic outcome. 
6. Regime consolidation in Buryatia 
6.1. The executive power in Buryat legislation 
According to the Russian Constitution of 1993, one of the rights national 
republics possess that other federal subjects lack is the right to adopt their 
own constitution (Article 5, Paragraph 2). The republics are among other 
things entitled to establish their own political system, under the precondition 
that the system does not contradict the principles of the Federal Constitution 
and laws (Article 77, Paragraph 1). This has opened up for a variety of poli-
tical regimes, and in this chapter I will look into the alternative that has been 
consolidated in the Republic of Buryatia. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Buryatia was adopted 22 February 
1994, prior to the first presidential election in the republic. Together with 
republican laws, decrees and other legal documents that later specified the 
content of the constitution, the constitution is the formal basis for the politi-
cal system in Buryatia. The analysis I will now make of this legal framework 
will provide me with a basis for considering how it has influenced the nature 
of the regime that later has been consolidated. 
The division of power is the basis of the political system in Buryatia 
(Article 5, Paragraph 1) as of the federal system and on the whole there is 
reason to claim that the Republican Constitution preserves the main prin-
ciples outlined in the Federal Constitution for the organisation of the legisla-
tive and executive powers (Ivailovskii 1999: 89). What is interesting for me 
to investigate is whether the three branches of power balance each other, or 
whether the constitution here, as in most other federal subjects, provides a 
basis for a strong executive power. 
Presidential prerogatives 
One feature of the political system in Buryatia that makes it different from 
the one in most other republics and in the federation as a whole is the fact 
that the president has the dual role of being president and head of govern-
ment. There is no separate premier (Article 69, Paragraph 1). This already 
shows that the president in Buryatia is more than a figurehead. As head of 
government the president has great influence over the day-to-day policy-
making by taking initiatives and co-ordinating government activities. He 
does not run the risk of strong premiers emerging as contenders for the 
executive power. The constitution also gives the president the right as head 
of government to appoint and dismiss government members and establish 
ministries and state committees. He is entitled to annul decisions made by 
ministries, committees and other executive organs if they contradict the con-
stitution and laws of the republic or presidential decrees. It is also the presi-
dent who appoints the chairmen of the National Bank of Buryatia, the Con-
stitutional, Supreme and Arbitration Courts and all judges on the raion level 
(Article 74). 
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In my theoretical discussion I showed how Matthew Shugart emphasises 
the reactive and proactive powers of the president as the definition marks of 
strong and weak presidential powers. According to the Buryat Constitution 
the president can make law proposals and exercise a postponing veto on laws 
adopted by the legislative body. After such a veto the original law has to be 
voted for by 2/3 of the elected deputies in the parliament in order to overrule 
the presidential veto (Article 74). Thus, the president possesses reactive 
powers, albeit weak ones as his veto powers are not absolute. In addition to 
the reactive powers, the president of Buryatia has the power to issue decrees, 
but laws adopted by the republican legislature can subsequently overrule 
them (Article 75). It is worth mentioning that the veto and decretal powers 
are exactly the same as for the Russian president (Russian Constitution, 
Articles 90, 107). Finally, the president has the right to declare a state of 
emergency in the republic (Article 74), which contradicts federal law. 
Both according to the Constitution of Buryatia (Article 76) and the Fede-
ral Constitution (Article 98) the president of the republic is with some excep-
tions immune from arrest and investigations during his presidential period. 
Limits on the presidential power 
The factors outlined above show that the president of Buryatia according to 
the 1994 Constitution possesses strong powers. An interesting question is 
then to see to what extent the other branches of power are entitled to check 
the executive power. 
First I will look briefly at what direct limitations there are on the presi-
dent’s power. Article 70 in the Buryat Constitution prohibits the president 
from being president and member of parliament at the same time, as well as 
from being a member of or having a position within political parties and 
NGOs after he has been elected. This article aims at ensuring that the presi-
dent will be independent of the other power branches and of interest groups 
(Burkova et al. 1996: 102). 
The constitution also seeks to prevent authoritarianism. It states that the 
president cannot serve more than two subsequent terms of four years (Article 
71, Paragraph 2). The rules determining who can be elected as president are 
fairly restrictive, as the president has to be a citizen of the republic who has 
been living there for more than 10 years, and for at least three years continu-
ously at the moment of the election. The law violates the Federal Constitu-
tion by demanding that the president commands both official languages in 
the republic, Russian and Buryat36 (Article 71, Paragraph 1). These restricti-
ons limit the number of potential candidates quite drastically but were adop-
ted with the intention of ensuring that the president is someone well familiar 
with the republic’s needs, including its special ethnic make-up. 
                                                     
36  Amended in November 2000. In the first presidential election in 1994 this rule was not 
applied. Interview with Iurii Fedorov, lecturer in law at the Buryat State University, Janu-
ary 2001. 
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The legislative power 
In Buryatia the 65 members of the legislative body, the Narodnyi Khural, 
draw their legitimacy from the same source as the president by being elected 
through secret direct elections according to the majoritarian system 
(Budaeva et al. 1998: 17–18). Like the president the members of parliament 
are also immune from arrest and investigations during the period they are 
elected, except in special cases (Article 85). According to Stepan and Skach 
(1993: 3–4), the fact that both the president and the legislature are directly 
elected is one of the perils of presidentialism, leading to potential executive–
legislative deadlock. In that respect it is interesting to note that the Buryat 
Constitution does not provide any other safety valves than allowing parlia-
ment to overrule presidential vetoes in the case of deadlock: The president 
cannot dissolve parliament and call early elections (Ivailovskii 1999: 90).  
Furthermore, Linz (1996) warns against over-powerful executives where 
the impeachment procedures are complicated at the same time as the presi-
dent easily can overrule the legislature. In Buryatia the president can, despite 
his immunity, be impeached when he violates the constitution or the laws of 
the republic. This is, however, a long and cumbersome process that is initi-
ated by the Khural, then it proceeds to the Supreme and Constitutional 
Courts and finally it must be supported by a 2/3 vote in parliament (Articles 
77, 91) This more or less corresponds with the impeachment procedures 
defined by the Russian Constitution, but at the federal level the two cham-
bers of the legislature both have to vote with a 2/3 majority, which further 
complicates the matter (Article 93). Moreover, in Buryatia the parliament 
can vote no confidence against individual government members (Article 86). 
This makes it far easier to carry out votes of no confidence than at the fede-
ral level where this vote can be used against the government but not against 
individual members of it. 
Concerning the opportunities for the president to overrule the legislature, 
I have already mentioned his veto and decree powers. In addition to this, the 
govern-ment checks the parliament by demanding that all law projects con-
cerning taxes and changes in the republic’s financial obligations need the 
approval of the government (Articles 86, 93)—a right that is not granted to 
the federal government. At the same time, the Buryat Constitution also gives 
the legislature fairly broad rights to check decisions made by the govern-
ment. Their consent is required for the appointment or dismissal of govern-
ment members, the chairman of the national bank and the chairm-en of the 
courts (Article 74). Furthermore, the parliament controls the “day-to-day” 
activities of the government by checking whether the government imple-
ments the parliament’s laws and decisions. The government has to present to 
the parliament a programme of its planned activities and at least once a year 
the government is obliged to report on its budgetary activities at a parliamen-
tary session (Articles 86, 93).  
All in all these powers make the Narodnyi Khural stronger versus the 
president than the Duma is versus the Russian president, since at the federal 
level the president has the right to dissolve parliament, and since the rules 
for impeachment and for voting no confidence against the government are 
very complicated (Russian Constitution, Article 117). 
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The judicial power 
The third power branch, balancing both the power of the executive and legis-
lative powers, is the judicial system. The constitution states that the courts 
possess all judicial power in the republic (Article 97). Furthermore the 
judges are independent, immune and have guarantees against dismissal. This 
guarantees that the two other power branches cannot infringe upon the judi-
cial power and prevent objective decision-making. A consequence of this is 
that the Buryat president has no power over the appointment of the republi-
can procurator (attorney general) and federal judges. The General Procurator 
of the Russian Federation appoints the procurator with the consent of the 
republican parliament, whereas the Russian president appoints federal jud-
ges, again pending the consent of the Narodnyi Khural. In general the courts 
and the procurator, except for the Buryat Constitutional Court, are under 
federal responsibility (Articles 86, 103). The president only has the right, 
with parliament’s consent, to appoint the chairmen of the Supreme, Arbitra-
tion and Constitutional Courts of the republic, whereas the Khural appoints 
the other judges of the Constitutional Court. The president also appoints jud-
ges for all courts on the municipal level (Articles 74, 86).  
In order to defend the constitution and ensure that no republican laws or 
decrees contradict it, the republic has its own Constitutional Court. Further-
more, Chapters 1, 2 and 10 of the Buryat Constitution can only be changed 
by gathering a Constitutional Assembly. Such a decision requires the support 
of at least 3/4 of all parliament representatives, which is less than what is re-
quired on the federal level. Other parts of the constitution, such as the chap-
ters on the division of power between the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers, have a weaker status, but changing them still demands the support 
of 2/3 of the parliament members. The president unlike the Russian 
presidenthas a postponing veto here as well, and in order for parliament to 
overrule his veto at least 3/4 of all members of parliament have to vote in 
favour of the first version (Articles 112–114). This shows that compared to 
the Federal Constitution (Articles 135, 136) the Buryat Constitution provides 
a weaker defence against potential arbitrary constitutional amendments. 
To sum up: according to the Buryat Constitution the executive power 
emerges as the strongest power branch by possessing both proactive and 
weak reactive powers, simultaneously also being head of government and by 
being protected by strong immunity. Nevertheless, the parliament comes out 
favourably compared to the State Duma by possessing the right to vote no 
confidence against members of the government instead of the whole govern-
ment and because the president has no right to dissolve the parliament. On 
balance, the president in Buryatia seems to have somewhat weaker powers 
than does the Russian president. This should imply that the political proces-
ses also are more democratic in Buryatia than at the federal level. The capa-
city of the other power branches to control the executive power, however, 
depends a lot on the degree to which the day-to-day control of the govern-
ment’s activities works. This is the subject I will turn to now. 
6. Regime consolidation in Buryatia 
Nupi novembear 02 
59 
6.2. The president and alternative power centres 
Lack of transparency 
When conducting my field studies in Buryatia in January 2001, I asked a 
Buryat friend his opinion of politics in his home republic. “Nobody engages 
in politics unless they are interested in making private economic gains from 
it. Politics is about dividing the riches between interested parties”, was his 
cynical reply. Indeed, according to O’Donnell, weaknesses in a seemingly 
democratic constitutional system can pave the way for undemocratic practi-
ces, such as corruption and clientelism.  
In the case of Buryatia there are plenty of examples of patron–client rela-
tionships between political and economic actors. One commercial structure 
that has received special protection from the government is “AO Motom”, 
led by the 28-year-old businessman Vitalii Morozov. In 1997 the govern-
ment exempted this business from paying taxes. Republican newspapers 
later discovered that federal transfers were put into the Motom Bank and 
then kept there for several months. Both the bank and the government bene-
fited from this, the latter in terms of a large interest (Tivanenko 1998: 55–
57). To make the ties between new businesses and the government even 
closer, the president at one stage even wanted to appoint Morozov as min-
ister of foreign economic relations (Inform Polis, 30 July 1998). 
Another example of the lack of transparency in public life is the privatisa-
tion process, which in Buryatia started in 1992. This was right when the old 
political system in the republic was falling apart and strong control mechan-
isms thus were lacking. When the new political system was established in 
1993–95 and privatisation continued there were too many interested parties 
around in the state apparatus to allow such mechanisms to be established. 
Instead their focus was on having the right allies in the right places.  
One example to illustrate this is the privatisation struggle in Ulan-Ude. 
Already in 1992 the republican authorities came into conflict with the city 
authorities in Ulan-Ude over transferring the ownership of some municipal 
property to the republican level (Tivanenko 1998: 95). The city soviet was 
dissolved following the crisis in Moscow in 1993. Moreover, only a couple 
of days after the presidential election in 1994 the Ulan-Ude mayor was dis-
missed by the president. The reason seems to have been that the mayor pub-
licly had shown his dislike of Potapov, and as there was no law on local self-
government at that time, no one could prevent Potapov from dismissing 
him.37 The man who replaced him, Aleksandr Lubsanov, was a former col-
league of Potapov at the railway repair factory. After this the republican 
Supreme Soviet and city authorities conducted several dubious transactions 
of city property; sometimes almost for free to commercial structures, other 
times mortgaged to help commercial structures obtain bank loans. One 
example of the latter was Hotel Odon: The company they assisted when the 
hotel was mortgaged received the credit and then disappeared. The fact that 
Potapov quite openly supported Lubsanov at the mayoral election in Ulan-
Ude in 1995although, according to the law, he is not allowed to interfere 
in municipal electionsshows the close ties between the republican and city 
                                                     
37  Personal communication with researcher Liudmila Itigilova, Buryat Research Centre, 
Ulan-Ude, April 2002. 
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executives. When Lubsanov lost the election he was offered the position as 
head of the government administration (Tivanenko 1998: 93–102).  
The practices I have described above show that, despite constitutionally 
guaranteed control mechanisms, money and property in Buryatia have 
indeed been dealt with in ways that seem to confirm my friend’s claim that 
“politics is about dividing the riches between interested parties”. An interest-
ing question is whether the parliament members could not influence what 
was happening, or whether they themselves were one of these interested par-
ties. This will become clearer when I now turn to looking at alternative 
power centres, one of which is the parliament. 
The Narodnyi Khural: Real contender or a “pretty decoration”? 
According to the Buryat Constitution the parliament is supposed to check 
regularly on the activities of the government, assisted by special organs such 
as the Audit Chamber and the legal apparatus. The lack of a proper horizon-
tal accountability, however, has been a recurring complaint from parliament 
members in the relationship to the executive power. In 1995 they were aired 
in a newspaper interview with the Khural member Vladimir Markov. The 
interview was called “Pretty Decoration or Functioning Democratic Mechan-
ism?” (Buriatiia, 19 April 1995). At this stage the frustrations concerned the 
debate around changes in the new Republican Constitution, aiming at 
increasing the parliament’s opportunities to check the president’s powers. 
The president kept delaying the amendment by constantly asking for changes 
in the proposals, and the parliamentarians had to face accusations that the 
proposals were an attempt at power usurpation. 
In the autumn of 1997 a major president–parliament conflict arose when 
among others the old Potapov opponent, Vladimir Saganov, accused the 
government of irresponsibility when it offered to act as a guarantor for weak 
commercial and state structures. This came up when the Khural debated the 
use of the so-called “gold credit”. This was a mortgage on 750 kilos of gold 
received from the federal authorities in 1995. It was supposed to be spent by 
the republican government on lending companies money with the aim to 
increase the output of precious metals in the republic, but most of the credit 
was used for completely different purposes. The outcome of the debate 
showed how vulnerable the Khural is in its relationship to the executive 
power. The Khural voted no confidence against the government but the first 
vote was dismissed for “technical reasons”. When the parliamentarians reas-
sembled for a new ballot the next day the vote had suddenly turned in favour 
of the government (Tivanenko 1998: 44–47, 126–130).  
Allegedly, the reason for this change of minds was that some 30% of the 
mem-bers of the first Khural received their salaries from the government 
administration. Republican law even allowed government members simul-
taneously to serve as Khu-ral deputies (Zverev 1998: 8). An analysis of the 
background of the parliament mem-bers elected in 1994 shows that the 
dominant group was people working within the executive power on the cen-
tral and regional levels in the republic, ten of which were heads of raion 
administrations. Nine were kolkhoz or sovkhoz directors, or worked in small 
and medium-sized agricultural industries and another 13 were directors of 
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large Soviet factories, although only three of these factories remained state 
owned in 1994 (Mikhailovskaia 1995: 62). Despite the fact that private busi-
nesses had existed for some years in Buryatia, the new businessmen were 
virtually non-existent in the first Khural. The raion heads and the deputies 
from the agricultural sector represented sectors that were strongly dependant 
on money transfers, and many of them got their personal salary directly from 
the republican treasury. Furthermore, the president could assert influence 
over private enterprises through his power to distribute cre-dits.38 As the 
“gold credit” case shows, this dependency made the deputies vulnerable to 
pressure during important votes in parliament and seriously reduced the 
chances that the Khural could vote no confidence against the govern-
mentas it reduced the possibility to vote for anything at all that would 
harm the executive power.  
The parliament in Buryatia has nevertheless in some instances overruled 
the president’s decisions. For instance, when Potapov suggested appointing 
Morozov for the minister position he was not accepted by the Khural. The 
Khural also denied the president support in the court cases against the mayor 
of Ulan-Ude Valerii Shapova-lov in 1996–97 that will be described in 6.2.4. 
In December 1997 the Khural stopped the presidential initiative to make 
constitutional amendments that would have created a separate prime minister 
position in the republic (Tivanenko 1998: 179–180). In my legal analysis I 
argued that the fact that the president also is head of government strengthens 
his position, but in many cases it will be convenient for the president to have 
a premier to transfer the blame for political failures on to. In the case of 
Buryatia many parliamentarians claimed the president’s move was an 
attempt to disclaim responsibility for the economic crisis in the republic.  
The conflict level in the Narodnyi Khural in Buryatia is nevertheless low. 
This is, however, not only a result of the dependency described above. The 
fact that a large group among the deputies represent the industry and the 
municipalities gives them rich opportunities to make decisions benefiting 
their own sector. That mutual benefit characterises the executive-legislative 
relationship in Buryatia was indeed my impression when conducting inter-
views in the Khural in January 2001. There was no lack of politicians who 
were critical of the president, but at the same time nobody wanted to criticise 
him openly the way the opposition in Kalmykia does.  
It is also worth noticing that in the new parliament only eight deputies 
had been members of the Supreme Soviet, and another three members of the 
Council of Ministers, but 17 of those elected from the raions had been mem-
bers of the raiispolkom/gorispolkom.39 Thus, altogether nearly half of the 
Khural members had a past from Soviet political organs (Krianev 1997). The 
high degree of continuity from the old Communist elite to the new political 
elite reduces the chances that serious political change will be implemented 
(Hughes 2000: 43).  
The tendency of continuity in the organs of political power was perhaps 
even clearer when one looks at what kind of people Potapov put into the pre-
sidential administration and government. Several of the people who had been 
                                                     
38  Interview with anonymous deputy of the Narodnyi Khural, Ulan-Ude, January 2001. 
39  Executive committee that was the permanently working body of the local or city Supreme 
Soviet. 
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the most active defenders of Potapov in the Supreme Soviet in the dramatic 
October days in 1993 now got paid for their efforts: Lidia Nimaeva was 
appointed vice-president, and Revomir Garmaev became administrator of 
affairs (upravliaiushchii delami). Several other former members of the 
Supreme Soviet soon also found a position in the presidential administration 
(Mikhailovskaia 1995: 61).  
Thus, the political elite in the republic remained profoundly Soviet, 
bringing together mainly old nomenklatura members and people from large 
Soviet enterprises. The latter were represented by the Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs, which under the leadership of Aleksandr Korenev sup-
ported Potapov until late in his first presidential period. Below the personal 
conflicts in the top echelons of power, where some of those who lostlike 
presidential candidate Ivanovleft the republic, the level of turbulence 
remained low. The relatively low level of elite replacement means that the 
Buryat transition does not fulfil the requirements of a “struggle-according-
to-the-rules” solution that draws upon both elites and counter-elites. Instead 
it is closer to being an elite association, where a dominating actorPotapov 
and his entourage sets the conditions, but where there is a high degree of 
consensus and mutual benefits for the actors in the system. The system is 
close to Stoner-Weiss’ model for a political system facilitating high gover-
nance performance also because of the strong role played by Potapov’s old 
colleagues from the railway repair factory. But again, one difference here 
will be that the co-operation is on terms favouring the political actors more 
than the economic actors. 
The judicial power: Inconsistent helper 
The patron–client networks and elite alliances have the potential to extend 
into the judicial power, and the next question is to what extent the legal 
apparatus is able to work as independently as foreseen by the constitution. 
As described by, among others, Vladimir Shalpentokh (1997), an unholy 
alliance of executive power and judicial power is not uncommon in Russian 
federal subjects. Together they prevent opposition and independent mass 
media from illuminating the murky waters of financial transactions in the 
republics and gaining access to power.  
In Buryatia the legal institutions in the republic have shown considerable 
independence, although inconsistently. For instance, against the will of the 
president, the republican tax police started investigations against the com-
pany “Motom”, and managed to conduct a raid against the bank, despite the 
president’s threat to remove the head of the tax police if this happened 
(Tivanenko 1998: 56). In the case of the first court trial against Ulan-Ude 
Mayor Shapovalov in 1996 the municipal court supported Shapovalov, 
despite the fact that the president elects the court members. Subsequently 
Shapovalov was also acquitted in 1997 when new accusations were brought 
against him. This time around the president had been assisted by the republi-
can MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), the procurator, the secret police 
FSB, and even the Procurator General of the Russian Federation, Iurii 
Skuratov (who is Potapov’s childhood friend) (ibid.: 110–111).  
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In other cases the legal apparatus has seemed to give in to government 
pressure too easily. One example is the case of the “gold credit” in 1995. 
The scandal around the use of this credit led one parliament member to 
demand the dismissal of vice-premier Zhil’tsov. This was prevented by the 
republican procurator who conducted purely “formal” investigations against 
Zhil’tsov that did not succeed in finding strong evidence against him (ibid.: 
128). The republican procurator and police forces have been siding with 
Potapov particularly often. According to federal and republican law the 
Buryat president has no formal influence over the appointment of the procu-
rator. The case of the Buryat procurator is, however, a good example of how 
patron–client networks also influence the legal apparatus. What determined 
the outcome here was the personal bond between the Russian Procurator 
General at that time, Skuratov, and Potapov. Via this contact Potapov was 
able to ensure that a loyal procurator was elected. The Khural did at first not 
want to support this candidate, but finally gave in to pressure from Potapov 
and Skuratov (Zverev 1998: 9). 
The republic versus the municipalities: The battle over Ulan-Ude 
As mentioned, Potapov actively attempted to exploit his support in parts of 
the legal apparatus in the battle against the Ulan-Ude mayor, Shapovalov, 
and I find it useful for the purpose of my analysis to take a closer look at this 
battle.  
By being directly elected the mayor and municipal organs have a legiti-
macy and basis for independence vis-à-vis the republican level. Gel’man 
(2000: 105–106) has pointed out that in particular where the regional capital 
plays an important role for the region’s economy, the municipal authorities 
may turn into a strong alternative power centre. As Ulan-Ude is housing the 
bulk of Buryatia’s large enterprises, this could give the municipality con-
siderable leverage in the case of a republic–municipality conflict, provided 
that the enterprises would side with the municipality. For a while, though, as 
described in 6.2.1, patron–client ties rather than conflict characterised the 
relationship between Ulan-Ude and the republican executive power. 
Conflict started only when Ulan-Ude Mayor Lubsanov lost the election in 
December 1995. The new mayor, Shapovalov, had, as described above, lost 
against Potapov in the presidential election the year before. He was never-
theless dangerous to Potapov not least because he managed to draw votes 
from potential Potapov voters in Ulan-Ude. Shapovalov was elected on a 
programme that defined himthrough comparisons with the existing 
eliteas a new and energetic broom, unspoiled by nomenklatura privileges, 
and thus a person truly interested in improving people’s well being (Pravda 
Buriatii, 9 December 1995). There were resilient rumours of a criminal past 
and illegal business activities, though, and plenty of unpopular policy mea-
sures such as when Shapovalov started paying doctors and teachers their 
salaries through credit cards at a time when the bank system was still poorly 
developed.40 Besides, Shapovalov’s campaign to weaken the government’s 
legitimacy was hardly appreciated by Potapov. The two sides in the struggle 
                                                     
40  Personal communication with researcher Liudmila Itigilova, Buryat Research Centre, 
Ulan-Ude, April 2002. 
Jorunn Brandvall 
nupi november 02 
64 
started constantly blaming the other for everything that went wrong in the 
republic, like wage arrears. 
Potapov, thus, decided to use the legal apparatus to oust Shapovalov. In 
October 1996 Potapov issued a decree to remove Shapovalov for having 
failed to prepare the city properly for the winter. Shapovalov won the 
following court trial in January, but was not allowed back into office. Instead 
the president issued a new decree. The deputy chair of the State Duma Com-
mittee on Local Self-Government, Sergei Mitrokhin, arrived in Ulan-Ude to 
look into the conflict, and declared that the dismissal of Shapovalov was ille-
gal (Tivanenko 1998: 102–109). Shapovalov was nevertheless removed from 
power. Still, he continued his propaganda against the president, which pro-
voked Potapov to put him in jail for “public offence against the president”. 
This argument was also turned down by the courts (ibid.: 9). 
The long-winded conflict between Potapov and Shapovalov made it clear 
what parts of the legal apparatus sided with Potapov. When Potapov eventu-
ally managed to dismiss Shapovalov the strongest alternative power centre 
had been neutralised. 
Party life: Dealing with the “traitor” 
The Potapov–Shapovalov conflict showed the importance of strong perso-
nalities in republican politics. One further factor that needs to be evaluated is 
the role of political parties as alternative power centres. Democracy theory 
emphasises the importance of a strong civil society and party pluralism as a 
counterweight to the executive power (e.g. Dahl 1971). However, despite 
some regional variations, civil society and political parties in Russian federal 
subjects were nowhere particularly strong after decades of “atomisation” of 
the Soviet society. In addition to this, many regional leaders acted to restrain 
organisational freedoms. 
In Buryatia civil society and parties have been allowed to develop quite 
freely in the post-Soviet period. A local political scientist boasts that 
Buryatia has no less than 26 registered political parties, which, in his opi-
nion, is proof to significant political pluralism.41 When taking a closer look 
at these parties, however, one discovers that only a dozen of them have more 
than a handful of active members. Almost without exceptions they have all 
merely been mayflies in the political life of the republic, with minimal politi-
cal leverage. Party life in Buryatia mirrors the broader federal party develop-
ment, where parties have a tendency to emerge around strong political 
leaders, and then disappear when the political conjuncture changes.42 
The only exception to this is the Communist Party, which can be 
explained by its strong point of departure compared to all other political 
movements. Furthermore, the Communist Party turned into the “party of 
power” in Buryatia when Potapov was elected in 1994. This turned out to 
both good and bad for the Party, however, due to Potapov’s own ambiva-
lence concerning where to position himself politically. First he realised that 
                                                     
41  Interview with political scientist Boris Krianev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, Janu-
ary 2001. 
42  Interview with political scientist Erdem Dagbaev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, 
January 2001. 
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too strong connections with the political left wing would harm his relation-
ship with the federal authorities, and encouraged people to vote for Boris 
Yeltsin at the 1996 presidential election. This alienated a large part of the 
Communist Party members in Buryatiawho in general thought Potapov’s 
policies betrayed socialist principlesand split the party into three fractions 
(McFaul and Petrov 1998: 106). What really divided the ranks of the Com-
munist Party, however, was when Potapov again switched sides at the begin-
ning of 1997 and asked for a renewed membership in the Party. One third of 
the members left the Party after this. The peak of the conflict came when a 
special meeting of the council of the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia 
(NPSR—a party bloc including the Communist Party) voted for impeach-
ment of the president and the speaker of the parliament, Nikolai Semionov, 
for having voted for selling and buying land at a meeting in the Federation 
Council in February 1998. The NPSR proposal did not, however, achieve the 
required support in the parliament for an impeachment process to be 
launched (Tivanenko 1998: 76–91). 
The conflict showed that Potapov was treading a fine line when attempt-
ing not to alienate the federal centre and at the same time preserving his legi-
timacy among the people who had voted for him. One can ask why the presi-
dent did not use more force to make the political parties serve his interests, 
when this was done in many other regions. The answer may be that when 
observing the proliferation of weak parties in the republic, this did not really 
seem to have been necessary. Instead, he opted for curbing mass media. 
Mass media: Putting the lid back on the jar 
Since elected president, Potapov has not been quite able to resist the tempta-
tion to put his hands on the freedom of speech. The conflicts between the 
republican authorities and mass media are always stronger in the period lead-
ing up to elections, and this is a common phenomenon virtually in all Rus-
sian federal subjects.43 This was probably a major reason why the state-run 
TV company BGTRK was forced to change its leadership in 1998. The 
chairman of the board of the company was replaced with the former press 
secretary of the president. 
Mary Mc Auley has pointed out that mass media is a particular threat to 
the executive power if it is based on a strong resource base (1997: 312) and 
in Buryatia it has proved particularly vital to control mass media in impor-
tant battles with alternative power centres in the republics. Most crucial here 
was again the conflict between the city authorities of Ulan-Ude and the gov-
ernment in 1995–97. The mouthpiece of the city authorities was the radio 
channel Ulan-Ude-tsentr. A TV channel, Tivikom, and two newspapers, Vse 
dlia Vas and Ulan-Ude-fakt, were also threatened with closure in the 
Shapovalov–Potapov struggle. The peak of grievances against Ulan-Ude-
tsentr was, however, reached in the battle with another alternative power 
centre, the legislature. In the autumn of 1997 the radio channel reported from 
the Khural session where the use of the “gold credit” was debated, and was 
forced to close down soon afterwards (Tivanenko 1998: 165–173).  
                                                     
43  Interview with Boris Timoshenko, monitoring network supervisor at the Glasnost Defence 
Foundation, Moscow, May 2001. 
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This shows that the republican authorities indeed fear the potential power 
of the “fourth state power”. Where the discrepancy between formal and 
informal politics is large, the authorities are also as a consequence more 
interested in controlling or strangling mass media. This focus on media con-
trol is strongest in periods when the regime’s legitimacy is particularly at 
stake: in battles with other potential power centres such as parties, legislature 
or municipalities. The case of Buryatia shows that when choosing between 
curbing press freedoms and organisational freedoms, the former is more 
effective at least when civil society is weak and the republic is quite rural. 
What further made it unnecessary to curb organisational freedoms in 
Buryatia was the fact that the only major party was the Communist Party, 
and this party was already siding with the president.  
6.3. 1998: Regime consolidated 
I have now shown the interrelationship between different power centres in 
Buryatia in the period from the first presidential election in 1994 to the 
second in 1998. At the time of the second election, the alternative power 
centres that existed were the half-autonomous legislative and judicial pow-
ers, whereas the mayor of Ulan-Ude was again loyal to the president. The 
free mass media had been more and more silenced. The only party worth 
mentioning was the Communist Party, but also this party was seriously 
weakened. The next question will be how this influenced the election that 
was scheduled for 1998.  
In the presidential campaign Potapov this time had nine opponents. His 
most serious opponent was his former colleague and leader of the Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Korenev, but Potapov was also contested by 
some candidates who had challenged him earlier, such as Shapovalov and 
Saganov. The competition was from the outset restricted by the Republican 
Constitution, which limits the range of candidates to citizens of the republic 
who can speak both Buryat and Russian. Not long ahead of the election this 
paragraph was contested by the leader of the Buryat electoral commission, 
who got the Khural’s support in asserting that the Russian Constitution ought 
to be followed. As a consequence, she was replaced by another old colleague 
of Potapov from the railway repair factory (Pak 1998: 37).  
A major difference between this campaign and the previous one was the 
size of the resources used by the candidates and the campaign technology 
taken into use. As described in Chapter 4, in the first campaign the two main 
candidates had had quite equal resources at hand, and employed no spectacu-
lar election campaign technology. This time the campaign was a different 
story: Potapov allegedly put 2.5–3 million dollars into his campaign, 
whereas Korenev was said to have spent around 10 million dollars on his. 
These figures may be as much a part of the campaign propaganda as real 
figures, but the candidates must nevertheless have spent considerably larger 
sums on their campaigns than before. The money went among other things to 
Moscow-based image-makers (Inform Polis, 25 June 1998).  
Concerning Potapov’s campaign, the information he spread partly aimed 
at slandering his opponents, partly at painting a rosy picture of himself as the 
protector of socialist ideals and inter-ethnic harmony. Special newspapers 
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were sent out to every household in the republic slandering Saganov and 
Korenev (this tactic was popularly called “Saganovshchina”).44 The image-
maker companies, in explaining why Potapov won, emphasised that a great 
advantage for Potapov was the fact that he was an experienced politician, 
possessing an election campaign team where many had experience from the 
previous campaign. Compared to this, the two other candidates who 
employed image-makers, Ochirov and Korenev, had to rely much more on 
Moscow image-makers, who lacked a thorough knowledge of Buryatia 
(ibid.). 
Above I have shown that local mass media gradually ended up in the 
government’s pocket, and as the elections drew closer, the more evident this 
became. Of the three republican TV channels, one was closed before the 
election, Arig Us changed leadership, and BGTRK was already pro-presi-
dent. Analyses of republican newspapers during ten days of the election 
campaign show that for each publication that was against Potapov, there 
were five supporting him (Pak 1998: 39). In addition to this Potapov took 
measures to push some of his opponents to withdraw from the campaign. 
Right before the end of the campaign even Korenev withdrew, without mak-
ing his motives for withdrawing public. Rumours went that the Potapov fac-
tion was ready to publicise facts about Korenev’s business activities that 
would give them a reason to start investigations against him in the same way 
as they did with Shapova-lov at the last elections (Kislov 1998b: 3). This 
time Shapovalov was allowed to run, but wicked tongues suggested that this 
was because he was not considered a dange-rous contender to Potapov any 
more, but could rather help drawing votes away from more serious contend-
ers. The former chairman of the Council of Ministers, Vladimir Saganov, 
refused to accept the position as speaker of the parliament as a compensation 
for withdrawing. For him as for many other candidates, however, lack of 
finances and a good election team offered him no real chances this time, not 
even in his home region of Tunkinsk (Inform Polis, 2 July 1998). 
This shows that Potapov, by possessing the highest political power in the 
republic, held resources that made it impossible for the other candidates to 
compete with him. Korenev was his only serious contender, since only he, 
through his contact with the economic elite in Buryatia, could put sufficient 
economic resources into the campaign. This did not suffice, however, against 
Potapov’s administrative resources. I have shown how Potapov barred an 
amendment of the constitution and thereby prevented strong Moscow candi-
dates from participating. Furthermore he exploited his influence over the 
republican procurator and the police to threaten Korenev with court trials.  
6.4. Conclusion 
The fact that Potapov was able to win the election again in 1998this time 
with 68%shows to what extent he had managed to consolidate his power 
during his four years of presidency. The 1998 election made it clear that the 
                                                     
44  Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, Febru-
ary 2001. Adding -schchina to someone’s surname is a way of alluding to terror and per-
secution. To my knowledge it refers to the so-called Ezhovshchina, which was the 
Stalinist terror 1937–38. 
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regime now was consolidated: At the election no candidate had been able to 
put up serious competition, and the political opposition seemed weaker and 
more dispersed than ever. Although a degree of pluralism existed in 1998, 
this in no way seemed threatening to the regime. 
The development after 1998 further underscores this fact. The composi-
tion of the new parliament elected in 1998 shows that the idea of a Buryat 
elite association does seem like a very appropriate description of the rela-
tionship between political and economic elites in Buryatia. While the new 
business elite had hardly been represented in the first Khural, they got 13 
deputies elected to the second. Of the 65 old deputies only 16 were re-elec-
ted. Seven of these were heads of raion administrations, and this group have 
altogether 11 representatives in the new Khural. Another ten deputies are 
directors of enterprises, and it is interesting to note that with only a couple of 
exceptions the directors in the old Khural were replaced with other directors 
(Pravitel’stvo Respubliki Buriatiia 2000). Thus, although the degree of 
replacement from the first to the second Khural was very high, the process of 
co-optation of economic elites into the political regime only accelerated. 17 
of the deputies belong to the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Still, 
the Communists have the strongest faction (38 deputies are loyal to NPSR) 
(Molodezh Buriatii, 29 July 1998), but some of the staunchest government 
critics disappeared. Saganov withdrew from politics altogether (Inform 
Polis, 29 October 1998).  
The authorities in Buryatiamembers of the government and parliament 
alikeprefer to talk about the harmonic and peaceful co-operation between 
the power branches in the republic. But, such a “struggle-according-to-the-
rules” image is deceptive. My analysis above has shown that relations have 
not been that peaceful in Buryatia and the discrepancy between formal and 
informal politics shows that it can hardly be said that the regime works 
“according to the rules”. In order to consolidate his administration, Potapov 
has found it necessary to rely on force as well as on compromise, where the 
confrontation between Potapov and the mayor of Ulan-Ude was the fiercest 
power battle. Also the presidential election in 1998 was fought with fierce 
measures. 
Potapov thus acts as the dominant actor in Buryatia, setting the terms of 
co-operation, and therefore the regime he has created suits the description of 
an “elite association” regime. The fact that co-operation is an option has pre-
vented Buryatia from turning into a “winner-takes-all” regime with the 
potential of alienating large groups in society. My assumption in Chapter 1 
was that a difference in the strength of non-governmental structures has con-
tributed to the regime differences between Buryatia and Kalmykia. Above I 
suggested that not so much the strength of the non-governmental structures 
as the opportunity to co-opt them into the regime is important, and this will 
become even clearer when I now shall contrast the situation in Buryatia with 
the regime consolidation in Kalmykia. 
7. Regime Consolidation in 
Kalmykia“The State–that is I” 
7.1. The executive power in Kalmyk legislation 
Kalmykia differs from the other republics in the Russian Federation by hav-
ing renounced its right, defined by the Russian Constitution, to have its own 
constitution. The republic thereby also gave up its sovereignty. This hap-
pened on 5 April 1994, when, on the initiative of the republic’s President 
Kirsan Iliumzhinov, the so-called Steppe Code, or Basic Law, replaced the 
Soviet Constitution from 1978. It does seem, however, that the Kalmyk 
Steppe Code nevertheless has the same legal status as a constitution, since it 
is the highest set of Kalmyk laws, subordinated only to the Federal Constitu-
tion and laws. 
Presidential prerogatives 
If assuming that there is a relationship between formal laws and the ways in 
which politics are conducted, one would expect that since Kalmykia has a 
less democratic regime than Buryatia, this would be reflected in a constitu-
tion and laws that provide the executive branch with stronger powers. This 
is, indeed, the case with the Kalmyk Steppe Code. It proclaims it as the pre-
sident’s duty to establish the whole structure of the executive power in the 
republic but without transgressing the federal legal framework (Article 25). 
Following from this the president decides when ministries and committees 
are to be established or abolished. In Buryatia such a decision requires the 
Khural’s consent (Article 28).  
The Kalmyk president appoints the government members, and the gov-
ernment is subordinated to the president. One of Iliumzhinov’s election 
promises in 1993 had been to introduce direct presidential rule, and, conse-
quently, no separate articles in the Steppe Code are devoted to the govern-
ment. Thus, its rights and duties are left unspecified, although the parliament 
is mentioned several places alongside with other institutions. Until October 
1995, the government did not even possess the right to initiate laws 
(Maksimov 1998: 89). We have seen that the president in Buryatia simul-
taneously also is head of government. In Kalmykia the Steppe Code leaves it 
open to the president whether he wants to head the government himself or to 
appoint a prime minister with the Khural’s consent (Article 28)—making 
arbitrary government appointments and dismissals possible.  
Concerning reactive and proactive powers, I showed in my analysis of the 
Buryat Constitution that the president there has the right to issue decrees and 
use a postponing veto. In Kalmykia, according to the law defining how laws 
are being adopted, the president has the right to veto a law but for some rea-
son this is not mentioned in the Steppe Code (Maksimov 1998: 70). The 
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president does have an explicit right to issue decrees but they must not con-
tradict federal law (Article 25).  
One difference between the Buryat and the Kalmyk presidential preroga-
tives is that the president in Kalmykia possesses the right to dissolve the par-
liament, but only in the case when one of the president’s law projects has 
been revoked three times by the parliament (Article 28). In this situation the 
right to dissolve parliament functions as a way out in case of an executive–
legislative deadlock, thereby providing a solution against one of the perils of 
presidentialism. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two constitutions is 
that the president’s power to appoint and dismiss people is a lot more wide-
ranging in Kalmykia than in Buryatia. They include even the heads of state-
owned businesses, organisations and institutions. He also has the right to 
participate in decisions on the make-up of federal organs in the republic and 
to give his consent to the appointment of their heads (Article 28). Another 
prerogative of the president is—with the Khural’s consent—to declare a 
state of emergency (Article 28). Finally, the Kalmyk president enjoys legal 
immunity and can only be arrested or put under investigation if the procu-
rator demands it (Maksimov 1998: 63). 
Limits on the presidential power 
With such strong presidential prerogatives the checks and balances on the 
Kalmyk president’s power are weak. He is, for instance, elected for seven 
years (Article 25),45 but this contravenes federal law. A president cannot, 
however, serve more than two subsequent terms. Getting elected in the first 
place is about as difficult here as in Buryatia. According to the 1991 law “On 
the election of the President of the Republic of Kalmykia”, a presidential 
candidate must be between 30 and 60 years old, he must have been living in 
the republic for at least ten years, and he must speak both state languages 
(Article 3). But, as mentioned in Chapter 5, an exception was made for pro-
fessional politicians at the federal level, diplomats and officers. This enabled 
outsider candidates like Iliumzhinov and Ochirov to participate.  
Further suiting Iliumzhinov’s personal interests is the fact that, while the 
Buryat president is obliged to renounce his membership of political parties 
and NGOs once elected president, the Steppe Code does not require this of 
the Kalmyk president. This made it possible for Iliumzhinov to get elected 
president of the World Chess Federation, FIDE, in 1995.  
The legislative power 
The legislative bodies in Buryatia and Kalmykia share the same name, 
Narodnyi Khural, but here the similarities end. The Narodnyi Khural in 
Kalmykia consists of 27 representatives elected for four years46 (Article 29). 
According to the 1994 law “On the election of deputies to the Narodnyi 
                                                     
45  According to the first version of the Steppe Code, the presidential period was five years 
but in 1995 the Code was amended, extending the period to seven years. In 1998 it was 
amended again, this time back to a five-year periodbringing the law in tune with federal 
law. This latter amendment did not affect the current term. 
46  Their term was extended to five years in 1998. 
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Khural (Parliament) of the Republic of Kalmykia in the first session”, 18 of 
the representatives are elected from single member districts according to the 
majoritarian system. The last 1/3 of the members are elected on proportional 
lists with the whole republic as one election district and these candidates are 
nominated by the president (Article 4). This means that at least 1/3 of the 
representatives are under the president’s direct patronage. 
The opportunities for the president to appoint people loyal to him are 
further increased by the fact that the Kalmyk Khural has a considerably 
weaker right to control appointments and dismissals than in Buryatia. This 
particularly concerns appointments to republican courts, which I will return 
to in 7.1.4. Furthermore, the appointment of a head of government requires 
the consent of the Khural (Article 30), whereas the right to suggest candi-
dates for the position as chairman of the Khural belongs to the president 
alone (Article 32). As in Buryatia the Kalmyk Khural has the right to appoint 
members to the republican Election Commission but this right is not con-
firmed in the Steppe Code (Maksimov 1998: 77).  
As for the Kalmyk Khural’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives, these 
more or less correspond to the prerogatives of the Khural in Buryatia. The 
main exception is the right the Kalmyk Khural has to interpret laws and 
ensure that they are consistent with the Russian Constitution and Russian 
laws. This is because the republic does not have a Constitutional Court, as it 
lacks a constitution (Article 30). 
According to the Steppe Code, the Khural lacks the check against over-
powerful executives provided through a right to carry out a vote of no confi-
dence against the government or individual members of it. This right is, 
however, enshrined in the law “On the Narodnyi Khural (Parliament) of the 
Republic of Kalmykia” of 1994 (Article 11, Paragraph 4). Furthermore, if 
the Kalmyk president breaks the Steppe Code and his inaugural oath the 
parliament has the right to start an impeachment process against him. In 
order to start this process at least 2/3 of the parliament members must vote 
for it, which is a much stricter threshold than in Buryatia. If the republican 
Supreme Court agrees with the parliament’s conclusions a referendum is 
required for the president to be impeached (Article 26). In other words, the 
chances to dismiss a president are minimal. The president, on the other hand, 
is entitled by the Steppe Code to dissolve the Khural (Article 29).47  
The judicial power 
As in Buryatia the courts are independent and all judges immune and 
endowed with guarantees against dismissal. Their scope of activity can only 
be determined by federal law (Article 34). However, their independence 
from the republican executive is severely restrained by the fact that it is the 
republican president who presents the Khural with candidates for judges to 
federal courts and the Arbitration Court in Kalmykia. The Khural can only 
“express its opinion” on these appointments. The president also selects the 
candidates for judges to local courts but here the Khural’s consent to the pre-
sident’s proposals is at least required for the positions of chairman and vice 
                                                     
47  The right does not apply the first 12 months after the Khural is elected nor the last six 
months before new elections are to take place.  
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chairmen (Maksimov 1998: 71).48 Furthermore, the president must give his 
consent to the appointment by the Procurator General of the Russian Federa-
tion of a procurator in the republic (Article 40), whereas both in Buryatia 
and according to federal law this right belongs to the Khural (Article 103).  
The requirements for how the constitution can be amended are quite simi-
lar in Buryatia (Articles 112, 114) and Kalmykia. Certain parts of the Steppe 
Code require that a Legislative Assembly must convene following a 2/3 vote 
in the parliament. It is, however, worth noting that in Buryatia a 3/4 vote is 
required for such an assembly to be convened (Article 44). A Legislative 
Assembly or a referendum is also required if the Steppe Code is to be abol-
ished in its entirety and a new one adopted.  
According to the law “On the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of 
Kal-mykia” of 1995, the members of the Assembly consist of the president, 
the prime minister, the chairmen of the Supreme and Arbitration Courts, all 
the members of the Khural, 27 members of the executive organs—selected 
by the president, and seven representatives from each raion and 20 from 
Elista that are selected by the raion and city councils (Article 2). In practice 
this means that the president with his extensive appointment prerogatives 
more or less controls the Legislative Assembly, even more so as decisions 
are made through both secret and open votes (Article 10). 
To sum up, the Kalmyk and Buryat presidents possess the same proactive 
and reactive powers to issue decrees and to use a postponing veto. However, 
the other elements I have discussed show that there is far more to a strong 
executive power than this criterion defined by Matthew Shugart. The formal 
power of the Kalmyk president is considerably strengthened by the fact that 
once he has been elected both the rules for his term in office and impeach-
ment procedures make it more difficult to get rid of him. What makes the 
president in Kalmykia particularly strong, though, are his wide-ranging 
powers to establish and abolish political organs such as the government, and 
to appoint and dismiss people. In my further discussion I will show how 
these formal powers work in practice when combined with informal ones.  
7.2. The president and alternative power centres 
Lack of transparency 
As the Steppe Code was adopted only after Iliumzhinov was elected, the 
executive power was highly visible in the constitution-making process in 
Kalmykia. According to my assumption in Chapter 1, this would ensure far 
stronger presidential powers than in Buryatia, which I have also shown it 
did. However, Iliumzhinov ab-stained from including an absolute veto in the 
Steppe Code. He even omitted refer-ences to the president’s veto powers 
altogether. One can easily find arguments to sup-port the case that when the 
Steppe Code was adopted Iliumzhinov had every reason to believe he would 
get on well without such powers. The fact that the evidence of non-transpar-
ent political practices and clientelism abound in Kalmykia is proof of this.  
                                                     
48  This contravenes federal law by excluding the federal level in decisions on appointments 
of judges to federal courts, and the law had to be amended in 1998. 
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During the election campaign in 1993 two of Iliumzhinov’s most remark-
able ideas were the “Corporation Kalmykia” and the plan to turn Kalmykia 
into an offshore zone. These ideas are the best examples of the non-existing 
boundary between public and private in Kalmyk politics. The investment 
corporation “Kalmykia” was registered in July 1993, with the aim to tempor-
arily renationalise large industries that had been privatised. The oil and gas 
resources, some of the largest companies and the largest sovkhozes were 
brought into the corporation, where people were encouraged to invest their 
privatisation vouchers (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 June 1993; Pravda, 1 Septem-
ber 1993). Business people who refused to co-operate with the government 
got into trouble with the tax authorities and other controlling agencies, and 
were eventually forced to leave Kalmykia. By the end of 1993 the republican 
authorities therefore controlled a higher percentage (96%) of the economic 
assets in Kalmykia than in any other federal subject49 (Shlapentokh et al. 
1997: 171).  
The ease with which Iliumzhinov could gather the major resources and 
companies in Kalmykia under his control, indicates how weak these struc-
tures were. There was a Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in 
Kalmykia, as well, that had supported Iliumzhinov at the presidential elec-
tion, but this organisation must have been a far weaker partner to the presi-
dent than the corresponding Buryat organisation. Furthermore, privatisation 
had only just started in Kalmykia. It started for real only in the latter half of 
1992 (Guchinova 1997: 38–39) and the actors involved were either given a 
share in the new economic regime or too weak to resist the renationalisation.  
Nowhere is business in Kalmykia as non-transparent as in the dealings 
concerning the offshore zone. It was established in January 1995, when the 
Narodnyi Khural adopted laws that exempted businesses from outside the 
republic from paying most taxes, as long as they paid at least 1250 ecu per 
quarter to be registered in Kalmykia. In this way the companies avoided pay-
ing taxes both in their home region and to a large extent in Kalmykia.50 In 
the following years, several companies were established to administer the 
Kalmyk offshore zone. The registration fee businesses paid for using these 
companies’ services did not go through the republican budget. Consequently, 
it was kept out of control for federal controlling institutions. The size of the 
incomes from the offshore zone was kept secret until 1998. The same was 
the case with the extra-budgetary funds that kept the revenues from the off-
shore zone to be used by Iliumzhinov and his entourage, such as the “Fund 
for the Programmes of the President of RK” (Ryzhkov 1998a: 2; 1998b: 1, 
1998e: 1–2).  
With his close to complete control over the Kalmyk economy and the 
large revenues that are never taxed, Iliumzhinov is quite right when he 
immodestly proclaims: “Kalmykia—that is I” (Persona, October 1997). I 
will now investigate to what extent the emergence of this sultanistic regime 
in Kalmykia can be explained through the relationship between the executive 
power and alternative power centres. 
                                                     
49  The federal subjects on average possessed 22% of all privatised property in their region. 
50  Interview with Valerii Badmaev, deputy leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, Elista, May 
2001. 
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The Narodnyi Khural: Hostage or beneficiary? 
Considering the weak formal powers the Narodnyi Khural in Kalmykia is 
en-dowed with, has it been allowed to play any independent role at all, and 
has it been a hostage to or a beneficiary of the political processes in the 
republic? In the previous chapter I described how the Khural in Buryatia on 
some occasions has served to check the policies of the executive power. The 
same cannot be said about the Kalmyk Khural, which by many has been 
characterised as a pure rubber stamp institution. Du-ring the first years of its 
existence the parliament never voted against any of the presi-dent’s law ini-
tiatives, including the highly controversial Steppe Code (Komsomol’-skaia 
pravda, 24 March 1994). Further illustrating the general political atmosphere 
is the fact that during the debates on amendments to the Steppe Code in 
1995, there were serious debates in the Legislative Assembly about extend-
ing Iliumzhinov’s presidency to lifetime, and some representatives even 
wanted to make it hereditary (Vedomosti 1997: 35).  
A subservient parliament can be a logical consequence of the fact that 1/3 
of the parliament is elected from a list put together by the president. How-
ever, a parlia-mentary vote needs only a simple majority, implying that it 
still would be possible for the parliament to “rebel” against the president. A 
newspaper interview with the Khural deputy German Borlikov in 1995 sheds 
some light on what motivates the Khural’s loyalty. In the interview he com-
plains that the deputies do not get sufficient time for preparation ahead of 
important votes, that new issues often are added to the agenda during the 
Khural session and then almost unanimously voted for, and that votes often 
are preceded by strong pressure from the executive power to vote in a certain 
direction (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 7 February 1995). In other words, the rub-
ber stamp description does indeed seem quite suitable for the Khural in 
Kalmykia. 
I believe that another explanation can be found in the elaborate patron–
client network stretching from the president down to the bottom level of the 
Kalmyk socie-ty. As mentioned, the Steppe Code allows the president even 
to appoint all heads of state institutions and businesses, including the 
sovkhoz and kolkhoz directors. Further-more, one of Iliumzhinov’s first 
actions as president was to dissolve the local soviets and dismiss the local 
heads of government. Instead of these he appointed his own representatives 
as raion heads (Senatova 1995: 2). These ruled alone in the regions until the 
law “On local self-government in the Republic of Kalmykia” was adopted in 
1996, and remained powerful even after that. The law defined a very weak 
local self-government. The regional political assemblies were only to have 
consultative powers, and were elected at so-called skhody, that is, village 
gatherings voting over issues and electing their leaders through open major-
ity vote and without preceding election cam-paigns. As a result, those who 
were elected were almost without exception the very same kolkhoz, sovkhoz 
and business directors who had been appointed by Iliumzhi-nov. Secret 
elections of the city council and mayor were allowed to take place only in 
Elista, but the winner of the mayoral election in 1997 was nevertheless the 
presiden-tial representative in Elista, Viashcheslav Shamaev (Ryzhkov 
1996a: 2; 1997a: 2).  
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These Iliumzhinov clients at the local level have had considerable influ-
ence over election results. According to the 1994 law “On the election of 
deputies to the Narodnyi Khural” the presidential representatives confirm the 
composition of the local election commission, and the president himself 
appoints the republican election commissions (Section IV). The commissi-
ons can in practice use the detailed election rules to make highly political 
decisions as to which candidates shall be allowed to run for election 
(Kasimov 1994: 3–4; Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 24 October 1995). Further-
more, the presidential representatives could put pressure on the employers to 
make them agitate in favour of certain candidates among their employees. A 
quite substantial element of fear was also at play here. Jobs are scarce in 
Kalmykia, and in order to keep people employed in the state apparatus loyal 
decrees from time to time order “attestations”51 of all employees (Ryzhkov 
1996a: 2).  
As a result of these and other factors, such as the lack of free mass media, 
only two opposition members were elected in the first parliamentary elec-
tions in 1994. One of them, Vladimir Kolesnik, was subsequently simply 
denied access to the parliamentary sessions by the other Khural members,52 
and the second, German Borlikov, gradually stopped being critical of the 
government.  
Who were the people representing the new political elite in Kalmykia? In 
Buryatia the elite actors were a mixture of old nomenklatura members and 
big industry, gradually also co-opting members of the young business com-
munity. In Kalmykia, on the other hand, Iliumzhinov acted quickly on his 
promise to abolish the Supreme Soviet and cut the bureaucracy, but the fact 
that the old Supreme Soviet voluntarily signed its letter of resignation after 
the presidential election surprised many. It has been said that Iliumzhinov 
used both the carrot and the stick to make this happen. Every member of the 
Supreme Soviet was invited to a private conversation with Iliumzhinov. 
Some of them chose to join his team, whereas the large majority were 
enticed or threatened to leave (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 23 September 1993).  
Some of those who chose to join Iliumzhinov became his most loyal and 
faith-ful helpers. These were first and foremost Konstantin Maksimov, who 
became speak-er of the Khural, Valerii Bogdanov, who was appointed vice-
president and for a peri-od also acted as prime minister, and David 
Kugul’tinov, who had known Iliumzhinov since his childhood. He was 
appointed head of the “Council of the Elders”a council with consultative 
powers attached to the presidential administration. These three have surroun-
ded Iliumzhinov ever since he was elected, and only Maksimov has (in 
1999) lost his position since then.53  
Another group of people in Iliumzhinov’s closest entourage is people 
from his own family. His brother Vyacheslav is his closest advisor, and has 
been put in charge of Kalmykia’s oil interests in Western Siberia.54 Then 
                                                     
51  The so-called Attestation Commission makes an evaluation about whether the state em-
ployees perform their jobs in a satisfactory way. 
52  Interview with Vladimir Kolesnik, leading member of Yabloko in Kalmykia, Elista, May 
2001. 
53  Interview with presidential advisor Vladimir Volgin, Elista, May 2001. 
54  Interview with ethnologist Natalia Zhukovskaia, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, 
Moscow, May 2001. 
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there are his friends, old classmates, and business colleaguesfrom Elista 
and from Moscow. Occasionally quite influential people were appointed to 
important positions, such as the Moscow mayor Jurii Luzhkov’s brother-in-
law, Viktor Baturin, who served as Prime Minister for some months in 1999. 
Most observers seem to agree that Iliumzhinov takes care not to let any of 
his helpers become too powerful: Once that happens, the person is soon 
replaced by someone else.55 The reorganisations of government have been 
frequent: By January 1999 the government had been dissolved and recon-
vened five times, and twice it had even been abolished as an institution 
(Ryzhkov 1999a: 3).  
This elaborate patron–client system embracing the entire power apparatus 
in Kalmykia indicates that the parliament members had vested interests in 
the regime. The reason for their loyalty was not only fear of the consequen-
ces of losing their positions, but also an interest in keeping the riches within 
a small group of people. This was reflected in the fact that here, as in 
Buryatia, the parliament was interested in extending their term from four to 
five years, and they succeeded in this in July 1998 (Ryzhkov 1998d: 5). At 
the same time, however, the patron–client system worked to exclude large 
parts of the population from any power and influence, and thus stimulated an 
ever more disgruntled “movement of the deprived”. The rest of the chapter 
will look at the ways in which this “movement” was kept quiet.  
The judicial power: Persecuting the law-abiding 
As I showed in the case of Buryatia, control over the judicial apparatus is an 
effective way of preventing alternative power centres from emerging and 
hindering openness around the ways in which the political system works. 
Thus, in Kalmykia the election of Iliumzhinov was followed by a fierce 
struggle for the control of the judici-al power in the republic. The republican 
interior ministry, including the police, soon came under the president’s con-
trol as Iliumzhinov’s brother was appointed deputy minister (Kolosov and 
Streletskii 1996: 31). More difficult to control were the legal institutions that 
are formally under federal control. The Steppe Code gave the presi-dent a 
say in the appointment of federal judges and the republican procurator, but 
first he had to struggle with those who had been appointed before he came to 
power. 
The first battle was over the Supreme Court and the procurator. The 
leader of the Supreme Court, Aleksandr Belogortsev, proved to be indepen-
dent minded and concerned with following federal law, and so was the pro-
curator, Vladimir Shipeev. Iliumzhinov’s people repeatedly went to Moscow 
to ask permission to replace Shipe-ev, but without any success. Apparently, 
Iliumzhinov lacked the good relations with the Procurator General that 
Potapov had with Skuratov. According to federal law the federal level shall 
also have a say in the dismissal of the head of the republican Sup-reme 
Court. But as Kalmyk law ignored this stipulation, the president couldwith 
parliament’s consentopt for a simple replacement of Belogortsev. The 
justification was that Belogortsev had been serving as a judge for more than 
the two five-year per-iods republican law permitted him to serve (Izvestiia, 2 
                                                     
55  Interview with presidential advisor Vladimir Volgin, Elista, May 2001. 
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September 1994). As for Shi-peev, when his term ended in 1996, the republi-
can authorities did not agree to appoint him for another term, and a candidate 
more to Iliumzhinov’s liking was elected.56 
Another federal organ that for some years was a threat to the unhindered 
redistribution of assets among regime-loyal people was the republican 
branch of the federal secret police, FSB. The head of FSB in Kalmykia, 
Vladimir Timofeev, on several occasions gave newspaper interviews that 
were highly critical of the executive power and its economic affairs 
(Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 22 August and 16 December 1997). The conflict 
between FSB and the Kalmyk authorities reached its climax in the summer 
of 1997, with the so-called “telephone war”. The story of an FSB employee 
who by mistake tapped the wrong telephone and the subsequent conflict 
between FSB and the telephone company were used for all that they were 
worth by the authorities, in order to discredit FSB (Makarov 1999: 16). 
Timofeev eventually gave in and left the republic. 
Thus, in Kalmykia the formal powers granted to the president in appoint-
ing judges to federal courts turned out to be crucial in the case of removing 
the head of the Supreme Court and the procurator. Strong political control 
over mass media and the police was used to crush the resistance of the secret 
police. Finally, in both the latter case and the case of the procurator, active 
lobbying on the federal level assisted the removal of “unpopular” heads of 
legal institutions. 
Political parties and organisations: United in disunity 
In his 1993 election programme Iliumzhinov had promised to dissolve all 
political parties and he had only just been elected when he started actively 
co-opting existing political parties and organisations. He succeeded in win-
ning the support among others from the Agrarian Party, whose candidate 
won the Duma seat for Kalmykia at the 1995 federal election (McFaul and 
Petrov 1998: 157). 
The parties that refused to support Iliumzhinov faced strong attempts to 
curb and subvert their activities. The fact that both the legislative and the 
judicial powers were more or less completely dependent on the executive 
power inevitably made this easier. The former could be used to provide legal 
means of curbing organisational freedoms, such as the law “On political par-
ties” from 1994, and the latter to implement the laws. For instance, the law 
“On political parties” requires that in order to get registered as a political 
party the party needs to have at least 1% of the republic’s population among 
its membersa number even the Communist Party would find it hard to 
mobilise. Upon registration the party has to submit complete registers of all 
its members, including their private addresses. The Ministry of Justice has 
the right subsequently to question any of the party members. They in prac-
tice used this to threaten people for instance with losing their jobs unless 
they left the party (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 23 May 1995).  
Concerning the use of non-legal methods I can mention the example of 
the Farmers’ Association of Kalmykia that was led by Bambaev, 
Iliumzhinov’s opponent at the 1993 election. As Kalmykia is a predomi-
                                                     
56  Interview with former procurator in Kalmykia, Vladimir Shipeev, Moscow, June 2001. 
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nantly agrarian republic, this was the most powerful interest organisation in 
Kalmykia. After the election it soon faced subversion: At an extraordinary 
convention Bambaev was dismissed, a new leadership appointed, and after 
that the organisation became a loyal supporter of Iliumzhinov’s policies 
(Senatova and Kasimov 1994: 4). The trade unions faced a similar subver-
sion (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 18 July 1995).  
The Communist Party, on the other hand, refused to give in and remained 
in opposition. This party has, despite the fact that it possessed the strongest 
organisational resources after 1993, failed to become the strong focus of the 
opposition it could have been, considering Iliumzhinov’s market capitalism. 
Internal rivalry and disag-reements seems to have been an important reason 
for this. Furthermore, the Commu-nists have vacillated between a purely 
oppositional position and occasional support for the president’s candidates at 
the elections. For instance, at the 1995 Duma elec-tion they supported 
Iliumzhinov’s candidate, Kulik (Ryzhkov 1999b: 2). He represented the 
Agrarian Party, which co-operated with the Communists at the federal level 
during this election.  
The strong authoritarian tendencies of the Iliumzhinov administration 
versus a weak opposition forced the latter after some time to join forces and 
constitute a broad political front against the government. This development 
reminds of the development in other authoritarian regimes in Europe over 
the past 10 years, notably Yugoslavia and Belarus. The pivotal event that 
mobilised and united the opposition was the deci-sion to abolish the old con-
stitution and adopt the Steppe Code in 1994. The Public Committee for the 
Defence of the Constitution, Citizenship and Human Rights was established, 
embracing all political forces from anarchists and Kalmyk and Russian 
nationalists to liberals (Izvestiia Kalmykii, 15 March 1994). In February 
1995 this union was transformed into a political party called the People’s 
Party that tried to get its leader, the Duma representative Bembia 
Khulkhachiev, nominated as a candidate at the presidential election in 1995. 
This failed, and with the disillusionment follow-ing this event and the defeat 
at the Duma election in 1995 (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 8 March, 26 September 
and 27 December 1995), followed by an intensified suppres-sion of the 
opposition, the party gradually disintegrated. Still, the opposition has 
remained relatively united, although it failed to agree on nominating a single 
candidate for the mayoral election in Elista in 1997 (Ryzhkov 1996b: 5–6) 
and the Duma elections in 1998 (Ryzhkov 1999b: 2).  
After 1995 the strongest and most vocal opposition party has been 
Yabloko, and generally parties that are republican branches of strong federal 
parties are the only significant parties to have survived throughout the 
period. It has been crucial for these parties that they, in an atmosphere of 
constant physical and psychological harassment and unemployment for 
active opposition members, could draw on support and funding from the 
federal party.  
Since the opportunities to express political protest through elections and 
mass media are so weak in Kalmykia, protest has to a large extent been ex-
pressed through demonstrations on the main square in Elistanormally with 
up to 200 participants. The protest that received most publicity because of 
police brutality was when a state-sponsored charity organisation called 
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“From heart to heart” in the spring of 1998 staged demonstrations and hun-
ger strikes against the social policies and economic and political conditions 
in the republic. The protest culminated with the chair of the organisation, 
Lidia Dordzhieva, fleeing the republic and eventually obtaining political 
asylum in the US (Sovetskaia Kalmykiia, 4 February, 30 April and18 August 
1998).  
In the case of Buryatia I showed that the government has left civil society 
more or less in peace, since it could rely on the support of the most impor-
tant interest organisations and parties and did not feel threatened by the rest. 
In Kalmykia the situation was different and therefore the government’s atti-
tude to organisational freedoms was also different. The basis of the regime in 
civil society was far narrower than it was in Buryatia. The largest interest 
organisation, the Farmers’ Association, initially opposed Iliumzhinov and 
the largest political party, the Communist Party, was also in opposition. In 
order to control the republic it was important for Iliumzhinov to gain control 
over the former and subvert the latter. The harsh measures that were used to 
curb civil society created strong polarisation, where the opposition is weak 
but strongly disgruntled.  
Mass media: Curiosity kills… 
The political polarisation also became reflected in the mass media situation 
in Kalmykia: There is no such thing as politically independent mass media in 
the republic. Already before Iliumzhinov was elected in 1993, the main 
newspaper, Izvestiia Kalmykii, had proved to be clearly on his side. How-
ever, in the conflict around the Steppe Code it published some articles criti-
cal of the government, and the editora long-time friend of 
IliumzhinovMenki Koneev, also turned more critical of the president’s 
policies. Thus he was sacked, and the president’s press secretary became 
new editor (Saratovskoe obozrenie, 16 April 1994). Since then Izvestiia 
Kalmykii has solely been publishing pro-Iliumzhinov materials.  
The only serious opposition newspaper in Kalmykia was and is 
Sovetskaia Kalmykiia segodniaperhaps the most famous anti-regime 
newspaper in all Russian regions. It has survived through eight years of seri-
ous harassment. During the 1993 election campaign, Sovetskaia Kalmykiia57 
actively supported Bambaev, since it was owned by among others the Farm-
ers’ Association and funded through the agrarian bank Bain. The campaign 
to suppress the Farmers’ Association was also intended to weaken the news-
paper, and this was further achieved by declaring Bain bankrupt (Senatova 
and Kasimov 1994: 4–5). Attempts to dismiss the editor and establish a 
parallel Sovetskaia Kalmykiia loyal to the president forced the old newspaper 
collective to move its production to the neighbouring Stavropol krai 
(Simonov 1997). Since then the newspaper has been brought into the repub-
lic by car and sold in the streets in Elista. Subscribing to the newspaper or 
selling it from newspaper stands and shops is prohibited by law.58 The same 
                                                     
57  Sovetskaia Kalmykiia was forced to change its name to Sovetskaia Kalmykiia segodnia in 
1995. 
58  Interview with the editor of Sovetskaia Kalmykiia segodnia, Gennadii Iudin, Elista, May 
2001. 
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is also the case with two smaller anti-government newspapers: Leninskii 
put’, published by the Communist Party in Kalmykia, and Elistinskie 
novosti. 
Sovetskaia Kalmykiia segodnia gained its fame not least because of its 
editor, Larisa Iudina. After 1995 the newspaper became associated with 
Yabloko, and served to propagate the ills of the Iliumzhinov administration, 
public protests and alternative election candidates. Iudina specialised in dig-
ging down into the alleged embezzlement of federal subsidies committed by 
the government, and soon got interested in ARiSa company administering 
the offshore zone (Pamiati Larisy Iudinoi 1998). This sealed her fate. In 
1998 Kalmykia was to organise the World Chess Olympiad in Elista, and the 
government’s image became more important than ever. Iudina threatened to 
stain this image, and, consequently, in June 1998 she was found slain in a 
pond in Elista. The opposition is convinced that someone in Iliumzhinov’s 
circle ordered the killing but the trial in 1999 convicted two young men with 
a criminal record (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 November 1999). 
The independent mass media received its energy from the political polari-
sation in the republic, and their eagerness to attack the government in its turn 
brought harsher measures to curb them. The fact that Iudina was killed 
because of her journalism is—if the opposition is right in its suspicions 
about who committed the murder—an indicator of how far the presidential 
administration was willing to go. 
7.3. 1998 and thereafter 
In the case of Buryatia I showed how the new presidential election in 1998 
marked the consolidation of the regime. In the case of Kalmykia the second 
presidential election had taken place already in 1995, and one could argue 
that the new regime was consolidated already then, since the potential for 
alternative power centres had been seriously weakened with the introduction 
of the Steppe Code in 1994. The struggle against parts of the judicial appa-
ratus, however, continued also after this and so did the battle against the last 
remnants of independent party life and mass media. Consolidation was pro-
bably reached with the murder on Iudina in 1998.  
At the same time, 1998 was something of a turning point in the political 
life in Kalmykia. That year so much negative publicity was drawn to 
Kalmykia that the government from then on faced stronger external pres-
sures. The Iudina case achieved wide publicity both in Russia and abroad. 
Later the same year the World Chess Olympic Games were organised in 
Elista, and scandals around the construction of amenities and the illegal 
appropriation of federal transfers to finance the event drew more negative 
attention to the Iliumzhinov administration (Segodnia, 24 September 1998). 
Another factor was the fact that with the resignation of the Chernomyrdin 
administration in Moscow some important allies disappeared from the power 
centre. The new Minister of Finance, Mikhail Zadornov, started a campaign 
against the republican authorities, which culminated in an economic boycott 
of Kalmykia imposed by the Federal Treasury in November 1998. The 
centre denied the republic any money transfers until it had paid back mis-
appropriated funds. Iliumzhinov responded by threatening to leave the Fede-
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ration, but was eventually forced to back down (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 
November 1998). Finally, power struggles at the federal centre in 1999 also 
made federal actors interested in winning the State Duma election in 
Kalmykia. The Duma seat in 1999 was won by the candidate from the new 
party of power, Edinstvo, Aleksandra Burataeva—a young and beautiful 
Kalmyk TV presenter on the state channel ORT. Second came the Yabloko 
candidate, Kolesnik, who had gained more popularity after the murder on 
Iudina. Iliumzhinov supported neither of these candidates but the candidates 
who ended up third and fourth in the election (Ryzhkov 1999c).  
The first cracks in the regime had actually started occurring with a stron-
ger pressure to overturn republican laws and articles in the Steppe Code that 
contradicted the Federal Constitution and laws. Real changes took place only 
from the latter half of 1997, when the republican law “On local self-govern-
ment” was amended, followed by among others the law “On elections to the 
Narodnyi Khural” in July 1998 and the law “On the president”. This made 
practices such as parliament representatives appointed by the president and 
seven-year presidential terms unlawful. The Steppe Code was also amended 
in 1998, making judges in Kalmykia appointed by the Russian, not the 
Kalmyk president, and denying the president the right to declare a state of 
emergency (Ryzhkov 1998c: 2, 1998d: 5; Izvestiia, 15 October 1998).  
Despite all this the degree of control and regime consolidation must not 
be underestimated. Iliumzhinov keeps the control over his entourage by rul-
ing by the “law of divide and rule”, the government is dismissed and reap-
pointed almost every year and all alternative power centres are weak, 
although vocal.  
7.4. Conclusion 
The Iliumzhinov administration fits neatly into the “winner-takes-all” mode 
in Gel’man’s model of regime outcomes. When Iliumzhinov took control 
over Kalmykia in 1993 the Supreme Soviet was voluntarily dissolved and 
the industry “renationalised”. Power and wealth were concentrated in the 
hands of a small group of peoplefew of whom had belonged to the old 
nomenklaturawhile the group of potential alternative power centres was 
gradually diminished. A fact that distinguis-hes Kalmykia from most other 
regions in Russia, including Buryatia, is the amazing degree of patron–client 
control Iliumzhinov has been able to assert. The incentives and fears that are 
built into this system are combined with active propaganda aiming at justify-
ing the fact that people live in poverty and lack political and civil rightsin 
other words what Weber would have called a charismatic leadership style. 
The formal legal framework allowed Iliumzhinov to establish such sul-
tanistic powers. It is, however, necessary to turn the causal relationship on its 
head in this case: The legal framework does in itself mirror the special politi-
cal situation in the republic. In Chapter 5 I described the fractionalisation of 
the political elite in Kalmykia, and how two of the strongest parties had 
refused to participate in the 1993 election. After the election the opposition 
was too divided and weak to pose a real counterforce against Iliumzhinov’s 
power usurpation, thus supporting my assumption about the role of non-
government institutions as buffers against a strong executive power. At the 
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same time, though, the fact that the administration was based on only a small 
part of the interest groups and civil society urged the president to use hard 
countermeasures to crush the opposition. Thus, it would seem that, although 
the non-governmental structures in Kalmykia were weaker than in Buryatia 
the perceived threat from them provoked the emergence of the “khanate”. 
8. “Bridging the ethnic gap” or 
“divide and rule”? 
Above I have examined the applicability of transition and consolidation 
theory to the regime developments in Buryatia and Kalmykia. Now it is time 
to investigate whether the fact that my analytical units are ethnically defined 
federal subjects adds something to this explanation. More specifically, I will 
look at the role of intra- and inter-ethnic competition and polarisation in the 
regime developments in Buryatia and Kalmykia.  
8.1. Buryatia: A president for all the peoples? 
Role of ethnicity in society 
As I mentioned in the introduction, Buryatia has a complex ethnic structure 
by being a society with three levels of ethnic cleavages. The first level is the 
cleavage between the Russian majority and the Buryat minority, the second 
between the ethnic subgroups of East and West Buryats and the third 
between different clans and zemliachestva59 among the Buryats. I will now 
try to assess the level of competition and polarisation among these groups in 
society in general, before turning to the impact of ethnicity on political 
regime development, in particular. 
According to Horowitz, the level of ethnic polarisation in society depends 
on the level of competition among ethnic groups for the same jobs. In 
Buryatia a tendency may be observed over the last few years of employing 
people belonging to one’s own ethnic group. Boris Bazarov suggests that 
this is a natural mechanism in times of uncertainty, such as those the Buryat 
society has been going through in the 1990s: You need to trust the people 
you employ, and you put more trust in people from your own ethnic group.60 
But, as pointed out by Horowitz, such practices will only have a negative 
impact on the inter-ethnic relations in the republic if the ethnic groups are 
unranked, i.e. they have similar structures of employment. This is not the 
case with the Buryats and the Russians. For instance, the Buryats are 
overrepresented in the agricultural sector, whereas the Russians are 
particularly overrepresented among industrial workers. Buryats also 
dominate higher education and research in the republic: 74% of the people 
                                                     
59  A zemliachestvo is an organisation taking care of the cultural and social needs of migrants 
from a Buryat populated region when they move to the city. At the same time this 
becomes an important place to tie bonds with people from your home region that later can 
be useful for instance in order to get a job, and the zemliachestvas also support certain 
politicians and are active lobbyers. Interviews with Igor’ Pron’kinov, former leader of the 
Buryat-Mongol People’s Party and Irina Elaeva, sociologist at the Buryat Research 
Centre. Both interviews were conducted in Ulan-Ude, January 2001. 
60  Interview with Boris Bazarov, Director of the Buryat Research Centre and member of the 
Committee in the Narodnyi Khural on International and Regional Contacts, National 
Questions and the Activities of Public Organisations and Religious Associations, Ulan-
Ude, January 2001. 
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employed in higher education and secondary vocational education are 
Buryats, and in the Buryat branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences they 
make up 65 to 85% in all but one institute (Abaeva and Tsyrenov 1999: 45). 
The Russians, however, dominate the technical intelligentsia. Thus, in these 
sectors of the economy the Buryats and Russians do not compete much for 
employment, and this fact reduces the potential for inter-ethnic tension. 
More worrisome is the fact that the Buryats also predominate in business. 
Data from 1994 show that they were better represented among owners and 
directors of all kinds of private businesses than they were in the population 
as a whole (Randalov 1996: 16). The Russians are leaving Buryatia in far 
greater numbers than the Buryats, whereas the Buryats actually arrive in the 
republic in larger number than those leaving. This is due to migration from 
the two other Buryat populated federal entities, the Aga-Buryat and the Ust-
Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrugs. Many have also arrived from former 
Soviet republics (Abaeva and Tsyrenov 1999: 19). Some argue that one 
explanation for the Russians leaving Buryatia is the disadvantages Russians 
face when they want to start their own business.61 The main reason, 
however, may be that Buryatia is a region of economic depression. The 
Buryats choose to stay behind out of the expectation that it will be harder for 
them as Asians to get employed in other regions, and because of a strong 
attachment to the home soil and the Buryat family. Even so, preferential 
employment opportunities for Buryats in Buryatia are an important motive 
for Buryats arriving in the republic, an issue I will return to when looking at 
the impact of ethnicity on politics. 
Not only is there a tendency to employ people from your own ethnic 
group; for the same reason it has also become more common to give family 
bonds and “zemliacheskie” connections a high priority when employing 
people. This takes place at the expense of merit and seems to be more 
common among the Buryats than among the local Russians (Humphrey 
1998: 144–145). These phenomena are invisible to the outsider, and receive 
little publicity. This particularly concerns the cleavage between East and 
West Buryats, but I believe it to be far more important than the lack of 
public attention should indicate. Writing about this topic seems to be a taboo 
in the republic. As a matter of fact, the very first scholar I approached with a 
question about the East–West cleavage laughed and said: “No one is ever 
going to talk to you about that issue”. Therefore I can only rely on anecdotal 
evidence in this case that, however, was agreed to by so many of my 
respondents that I find it plausible.  
The division between East and West Buryats goes far back in history. 
The traditionally shamanist West Buryats living west of Lake Baikal came 
first in touch with Russians and were subject to assimilation to a higher 
extent than the semi-nomad East Buryats. The latter were more in contact 
with missionaries from Tibet and Mongolia and thus became predominantly 
Buddhist, although this is Buddhism mixed with shamanism. In the 
Communist period Russified West Buryats from Irkutsk oblast’ were sent to 
                                                     
61  Interview with ethnologist Nataliia Zhukovskaia, Insitutute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, May 2001. 
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Ulan-Ude to occupy central positions in the power hierarchy. This fact was 
much resented by the East Buryats.62 
The division remains today and I find it useful to apply Horowitz’s 
categories of backward and advanced groups to these relations and consider 
the East Buryats as the backward ethnic group struggling for equality and 
recognition, whereas the West Buryats are the advanced group clinging to its 
privileges. On the colloquial level it is quite easy to recognise a certain 
discontent among the West Buryats, who now are in the process of losing 
their former positions in the republic. Many West Buryats are disgruntled by 
the fact that East Buryats tend to display a certain attitude of superiority, 
claiming to possess a higher degree of ethnic purity since they have 
preserved the Buryat language, names, the Buddhist religion, and cultural 
traditions. These identity markers have to a larger extent disappeared in the 
west. The East–West cleavage and also the zemliachestvo identity are 
reflected in the intellectual nation-building debate in Buryatia. Among other 
things there is a strong debate around the ethnogenesis of the Buryat people, 
concerning where the earliest signs of Buryat settlements were discovered: 
west or east of Lake Baikal and in what region within these areas (Bulag 
1994: 461–462; Nimaev 1988)? 
Consequently, there is only limited reason to expect strong inter-ethnic 
polarisation in Buryatia when looking at the ethnic division of labour in the 
republic. To Horowitz, though, the most dangerous competition for jobs is 
the scramble for administrative positions. The strengthened East–West 
cleavage among the Buryats appears to result from such a changing balance 
in the distribution of administrative positions, and seems to have increased 
the intra-ethnic polarisation among the Buryats. This will be elaborated on 
when I now turn to looking at ethnicity in politics.  
Role of ethnicity in politics 
The highest and lowest levels of ethnic cleavages both had an impact on the 
first presidential election in Buryatia. First of all, there were two Russian 
candidates; Leonid Potapov and Valerii Shapovalov, and two Buryats; 
Aleksandr Ivanov and Sergei Namsaraev. The Russian–Buryat dividing line 
is, however, not quite as clear-cut in this case. Potapov is a Russian who 
spent eight years of his childhood in a Buryat village in Northern Buryatia, 
where he learnt to speak Buryat. Ivanov, on the other hand, is what the 
Buryats call a metishalf-Russian, half-Buryat. In one of the newspaper 
articles promoting Ivanov’s candidacy, a lady said she would support Ivanov 
because he as a metis would be able to soften potential inter-ethnic conflict 
(Buriatiia, 28 May 1994). Not everyone felt that way: Metises have a 
tendency to end up between two chairs and never be fully accepted by either 
national group. In the case of Ivanov there were accusations during the 
election campaign that he tried to hide the fact that he was a Buryat 
(Buriatiia, 25 June 1994). It is nevertheless justified to consider Ivanov more 
as a Buryat candidate since it was well known to everyone that behind 
                                                     
62  Interviews with various Buryat politicians and scholars in Ulan-Ude, January 2001. 
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Ivanov’s back Saganov was the one pulling the strings. Saganov was a 
Buryat, and, actually, Ivanov was the nephew of Saganov’s wife.63 
As only 24% of the population of the republic were Buryats it is 
impossible for a Buryat to be elected if the other candidate is a Russian and 
the voting strictly follows ethnic dividing lines. In Buryatia people did not 
allow ethnicity alone to determine their vote, although it had been clear 
already at the federal elections in 1993 that Buryats showed a greater 
tendency to vote for the Party of Russian Unity and Concord and that 
Russians were more numerous among those who voted for the Liberal 
Democratic Party (Abaeva and Krianev 1994: 8). Among the supporters for 
Potapov there were also many Buryats. As mentioned, Potapov was quite 
acceptable to the Buryats because he had grown up in a Buryat village and 
showed knowledge of and tolerance towards their national culture. Besides, 
Potapov’s closest ally in the election campaign was Lidia Nimaeva,64 an 
East Buryat who was known to promote Buryat interests.  
Saganov, on the other hand, came from the isolated Tunkinsk region in 
Western Buryatia. His power base rested much upon people from this region 
and, as mentioned, even people from his own family. The ethnic issue was 
exploited by Potapov during the election campaign: Saganov had enraged 
the Russian part of the population by demanding that the president of the 
republic be Buryat and that the Buryats be overrepresented in political 
organs. Many Buryats had also been incensed by his preferential policy 
towards his own clan (Kislov 1998a: 6). As a result, his opportunities for 
building an alliance with important groups were more restricted compared to 
Potapov, who would be acceptable both to the Russians and to a large part of 
the Buryats. It is interesting to note that the only four regions where Ivanov 
received a majority were the three westernmost regions (Saganov’s power 
base) and the northernmost region, the Muiskii raion (Buriatiia, 5 July 
1994).65  
Consequently, one of the factors assisting Potapov’s victory in 1994 was 
the fact that he on ethnic issues was a compromiser acceptable across ethnic 
divides. The inter-ethnic polarisation was at the outset neither so strong as to 
result in people voting strictly along ethnic lines, nor did it prevent alliances 
across the ethnic dividing lines. During Potapov’s period as president he 
apparently has allowed an increasing number of East Buryats into 
administrative and political positions. At the same time, my respondents 
among politicians in the Khural mostly agreed that Potapov uses divide-and-
rule tactics among the Buryats in parliament in order to gain support from 
either of the groups for various political initiatives, although they were 
unable to mention concrete examples of this. If this is true, it would seem 
that Potapov takes advantage of the internal division among the Buryats in 
order to strengthen his own position, but as a result the intra-ethnic East–
West divide among the Buryat increases.  
                                                     
63  Interview with sociologist Galina Manzanova, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, 
February 2001. 
64  Interview with Sergei Panarin, professor in sociology, Institute of Oriental Studies, 
Moscow, May 2001.  
65  This region has throughout the 1990s distinguished itself from other northern regions by 
having a strongly anti-Potapov electorate. See Kislov 1998c: 8. 
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Buryatia therefore seems to be a case of a republic where non-titulars 
possess the most important political positions although the titular nation is 
overrepresented on the whole. This bodes for a certain balance between the 
Russians and the Buryats but not completely free from tensions. A 1997 
survey also reflected this fact: 25.7% of the respondents characterised the 
inter-ethnic relations as “good”, 47.5% as “satisfactory”, and 16.5% 
preferred characterising them as “unsatisfactory”.66 
Gorenburg (1999) has pointed out that the titular group in cases like 
Buryatia tends to compensate for its lack of real power by launching a strong 
public campaign of ethnic revival. This seems very much to be the case in 
Buryatia, where the Buryat intellectuals are obsessed with issues concerning 
Buryat history and culture. The inter-ethnic competition in Buryatia has not 
been translated into support for the nationalist parties established mainly by 
these intellectuals. The Buryat-Mongol People’s Party and Negedel received 
much attention around 1991–94, but even then these parties were marginal, 
and they have later been further marginalised. Among Russian nationalist 
parties LDPR in 1993 and 1995 performed poorer than the average for the 
Russian Federation in the State Duma elections (McFaul and Petrov 1998: 
107). Kuras and Bazarov (1999: 26) point to the fact that since party life in 
the republic is weak, organisations in civil society have become politicised 
instead. However, also the nationalist demands of these organisations have a 
low support among the population in the republic (Krianev 1999: 32–33).  
The only major incident in the 1990s where inter-ethnic tension erupted 
on the surface of society was the episode with the Atlas of Tibetan Medicine 
on the eve of the second presidential election in 1998. In the spring of that 
year there were plans to send an atlas of Tibetan medicine abroad to a 
temporary exhibition in the United States. The Buddhist clergy, fearing they 
would never get the Atlas back, started picketing outside the government 
building to prevent the Atlas from being sent off, and were soon joined by a 
number of other Buryats, including Saganov. The local police responded by 
beating up the crowd with batons, and this received broad publicity all over 
Russia (Pak 1998: 36). Potapov’s strongest contender in the 1998 election, 
Aleksander Korenev, quickly took advantage of the situation and accused 
Potapov of having ordered the attack on the peaceful crowd. Potapov 
nevertheless managed to turn this conflict to his advantage by exploiting 
Russian fears of Buryat nationalism.67  
The incident with the Atlas showed how politicians could take advantage 
of hidden inter-ethnic disgruntlement in order to win the support of their 
own ethnic group at elections. Potapov could win the support of the Russians 
by showing a tough stance against Buryat “nationalism”. At the same time 
his image among the Buryats as a compromiser, being on good terms with 
all ethnic groups, was strong enough to rescue his political career.  
                                                     
66  The data was provided by Seseg Budaeva and has been compiled by the Siberian Branch 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Buryat Research Centre), Institute of Mongolian, 
Buddhological and Tibetan Studies, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Ulan-
Ude. 
67  Interview with political scientist Boris Krianev, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude, 
January 2001. Some even believe the demonstrations were organised by Korenev, in co-
operation with Saganov and Buddhist leaders, as a part of the election campaign. 
Interview with sociologist Seseg Budaeva, Buryat Research Centre, Ulan-Ude, January 
2001. 
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From the outset inter-ethnic polarisation has not been strong in Buryatia, 
and it does not seem much stronger after eight years with Potapov as 
president. Potapov’s ability to build inter-ethnic alliances has strengthened 
him further in the consolidation of his regime and the Potapov administration 
seems to employ a policy of balancing between the various groups. It neither 
wants to give too many concessions on language and employment policies to 
the Buryats nor to alienate them by abolishing their disproportionate 
representation. At the same time, the Atlas story shows that the ruling elite 
occasionally also takes advantage of inter-ethnic cleavages to strengthen its 
position, and the same goes for the internal divisions among the Buryats. 
The West Buryats are disgruntled over having lost some of their former 
political standing in the elite, but as the West Buryats are in minority among 
the Buryats this does not threaten the ruling elite. 
8.2. Kalmykia: “He is a Scoundrel, but our Scoundrel”. 
Role of Ethnicity in Society 
Like in Buryatia, ethnic relations in Kalmykia are multi-layered. First, there 
are the inter-ethnic relations between not only the Russians and the 
Kalmyks, but also a third group of various Caucasian peoplesmainly 
Dargins and Chechensthat make up approximately 10.1% of the 
population (Guzenkova 1992: 2). Second, the Kalmyks are internally divided 
in three major ethnical subgroups called uluses that have a role similar to the 
Buryat zemliachestva. In Kalmykia the Western Buzavs were the group 
traditionally most in touch with the Russians and in this respect they 
correspond to the West Buryats. Many Buzavs were baptised and joined the 
Cossacks. The largest group is the Diervuds, who live in the central and 
northern parts of Kalmykia. Finally, Kalmyks living in Eastern Kalmykia 
along Volga are called Torguts. Traditionally their region was somewhat 
richer than the north and west (Guchinova and Tavanets 1994: 12).  
Throughout the Soviet period there does not seem to have been a political 
preference in Moscow for one subgroup at the expense of other groups as 
was the case in Buryatia. On the contrary, there seems to have been an 
attempt to balance the three groups in the political administration.68 Another 
important difference between the Buryats and the Kalmyks is the numerical 
difference: While the Buryats constitute a minority in Buryatia, the Kalmyks 
are the largest ethnic group in Kalmykia, comprising 45.4% of the 
population in 1989—compared to 37.7% for the Russians (Guchinova 1997: 
16).  
When examining the level of inter-ethnic polarisation in Kalmykia, the 
immediate impression is that the polarisation is somewhat stronger here than 
in Buryatia. This impression is confirmed by Gorenburg’s analysis of 
indicators of cultural and civic nationalism among the titular population of 
16 Russian republics, based on survey data from 1993. On all six 
indicators69 Kalmykia scores higher than Buryatia. The Buryat respondents 
                                                     
68 Interview with Ivan Ryzhkov, leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, Elista, May 2001. 
69 The indicators are: “Should titular language be the sole official language in the ethnic 
republics?”, “Should all inhabitants of an ethnic republic be required to know the titular 
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rank as number seven or eight among the republics on all indicators, whereas 
the Kalmyks rank from two to six. The latter score particularly high on the 
indicators of ethnic nationalism. For instance, 83% (compared to 71% in 
Buryatia) considered that the titular language should be compulsory in all 
schools in ethnic republics. 66% even agreed to make the titular language the 
sole official language in ethnic republics, compared to 35% of the Buryat 
respondents (Gorenburg 2001: 80–86). 
The picture of inter-ethnic relations in Kalmykia is still mixed. Already in 
1992 Guzenkova described Kalmyk–Russian relations as “segregated but 
friendly”. On the one hand she pointed to a very low rate of mixed marriages 
between Russians and Kalmyks: 5.6% in the cities and only 2.4% in the 
countryside. On the other hand, a low rate (10%) of urban Russians stated 
that they would prefer to work only with other Russians, and 12.5% of urban 
Kalmyks stated they would rather work only with other Kalmyks 
(Guzenkova 1992: 14–15). Like in Buryatia, the ranked structure of the 
ethnic division of labour among Russians and Kalmyks prevents the 
competition for jobs from turning into a major issue of conflict. The 
educational level is lower among the Russians and they tend to work in 
industry and are overrepresented among the technical intelligentsia, whereas 
Kalmyks are overrepresented in agriculture, arts and culture, and as teachers 
and doctors (ibid.: 9–11). 
This ranked social stratification among Russians and Kalmyks can be 
contrasted with the relations between these two groups—particularly the 
Kalmyks—and North Caucasians. Kalmyks are dissatisfied with the fact that 
particularly Dargins and Chechens, who on invitation from the republican 
authorities started migrating to Kalmykia in the 1950s, have intruded into the 
traditionally Kalmyk occupation of cattle farmingmainly as highly 
efficient herders. Approximately 50% of the people employed in cattle 
farming in Kalmykia in 1992 were North Caucasians and nationalist 
politicians exploited fears that they would start buying up farmland. 
Tensions ran high particularly in the period leading up to the presidential 
election in 1993 (Ochirova 2000: 53–54). Armed confrontations between 
Kalmyks or Russians and Caucasians in some rural districts have become 
almost a yearly phenomenon in Kalmykia (Guzenkova 1992: 20–21; 
Rossiiskii regional’nyi biulleten’, 2 June 2001).  
There is an additional concern about the increasing influx of Caucasians, 
in particular Chechens, to Kalmykia over the last few years. 45% of the 
respondents in a 2000 survey were negatively inclined towards Caucasian 
migration to Kalmykia (Katushov et al. 2000: 163). This factor has probably 
contributed to the fact that growing numbers of people in Kalmykia would 
prefer to live in ethnically homogeneous surroundings. While 10–12.5% of 
the respondents in 1992 preferred an ethnically homogeneous workplace, in 
a 2000 survey 33.4% of the respondents believed their lives would have 
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improved if they had been living in an ethnically homogeneous community 
(ibid.: 160).  
The relationship to the Caucasians does not, however, have repercussions 
on the regime development in Kalmykia, which is the case with Russian–
Kalmyk relations. Here, like in Buryatia, the rate of ethnic Russians leaving 
the republic has consistently been higher than the titular rate. This can to a 
large extent be explained by the fact that Kalmykia is one of the poorest 
regions in Russia but an important reason is probably also the political 
situation in the republic.70 Since research in Kalmykia is subject to political 
censorship, this cannot be confirmed by any surveys. Nevertheless, in the 
further analysis I will try to estimate how ethnic polarisation in Kalmykia 
has influenced the regime development, and vice versa.  
Role of Ethnicity in Politics 
At the first partly democratic elections to the republican Supreme Soviet in 
1990 more than 100 of the 130 deputies elected were Kalmyks,71 and 
consequently the Kalmyks more or less monopolised political life in the 
early 1990s. At the 1991 presidential election there were no Russian 
candidates. Instead the election was dominated by the leading Kalmyk 
nomenklatura members.  
In the 1920s the “Declaration of the Rights of the Working Kalmyk 
People” had aimed at a “unification of all scattered parts of the Kalmyk 
people in one administrative–economic unit”. During the Soviet period, 
however, ulusizm was rather allowed to gain a gradually increasing 
importance as a factor in nomenklatura appointments and distribution of 
scarce commodities (Sengleev 1990). Consequently, in the 1991 election the 
ulus factor was frequently exploited by the candidates. They could count on 
support from the members of their own ulus72 at the same time as they 
would use accusations of ulusizm to discredit their contenders. The 
importance of ulusizm became obvious when the election results showed that 
the Torgut Batyr Mikhailov received the votes from the eastern districts and 
the Diervud Vladimir Basanov from the central and western regions 
(Guchinova and Tavanets 1994: 8). As described in Chapter 5, though, the 
results of these elections were annulled and new elections postponed.  
When the next attempt to get a president elected was made in 1993 the 
contenders for presidency were again all Kalmyks but once more 
representing different uluses: Iliumzhinov represents the Western Buzavs, 
whereas Ochirov is a Torgut. According to the former Popular Front leader, 
Boris Andzhaev, the Buzavs and the Diervuds (the latter make up 60% of all 
Kalmyks) formed a tactical alliance in the period leading up to the election. 
This allowed Iliumzhinov to win all but two election districts, both in 
Torgut-dominated districts in the west (Andzhaev 2001).  
A propensity among the Buzavs to vote for Diervuds rather than for 
Torguts had been noted already at the 1991 election (Guchinova and 
                                                     
70  Interview with Gennadii Iudin, editor of the opposition newspaper Sovetskaia Kalmykiia 
segodnia, Elista, May 2001. 
71  Personal communication with Ivan Ryzhkov, leader of Yabloko in Kalmykia, April 2002. 
72  Kalmyks jokingly describe these relations as “khot’ i merzavets, no svoi merzavets”—He 
may be a scoundrel, but he is our scoundrel. 
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Tavanets 1994: 8). This factor does not provide a sufficient explanation as to 
why Iliumzhinov won over Ochirov (e.g. why the former chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, Mikhailov—a Torgut—would support the Buzav 
Iliumzhinov), but is nevertheless important to bear in mind. For instance, the 
sub-ethnic factor partly explains which civil society movements supported 
Iliumzhinov and Ochirov. Since the former is a Buzav with Cossack 
ancestors it was quite natural for the Union of Cossacks to support him, 
whereas the “Dolbano–Privolzhskoe zemliachestvo”, defending the rights of 
Torguts, supported Ochirov.  
The political situation in Kalmykia since 1993 has been characterised by 
a small group of actors using incentives, threats and ideology to hold on to 
its all-dominant political and economic power. Here ethnicity has played a 
double role: partly in appointments to public positions, and partly through a 
use of ideology to justify the dominance of a narrow elite. The nationalist 
movements that had blossomed up to 1993 vanished together with the rest of 
civil society, apart from a handful of political parties and organisations. It 
was quite telling of the support the nationalist parties and organisations had 
in the population that a 1993 survey discovered that approximately 2/3 of the 
respondents did not know of the activities of the Kalmyk and Russian 
nationalist movements (Guchinova and Tavanets 1995: 41). Thus, here, like 
in Buryatia, the nationalist sentiments of the population were to a limited 
extent translated into support for nationalist parties. 
Whereas one has to be good at reading between the lines in Buryatia in 
order to gain any information on sub-ethnic divisions, ulusizm is a recurrent 
topic in the public debate in Kalmykia. Among the top leaders, Iliumzhinov 
has tried to keep a balance between the different ethnic and sub-ethnic 
groups. For instance, he took care to emphasise that among the nine Khural 
members he was entitled to nominate, there were five Kalmyks representing 
the various clans, and the other four represented the Russians, Dargins, 
Kazakhs and Koreans73 (ibid.: 43). Still, even regime supporters will admit 
that a certain “Buzavisation” of the power apparatus has taken place since 
Iliumzhinov gained power (Guchinova and Tavanets 1994: 12). Most 
attention has been drawn to the evidences of nepotism mentioned in Chapter 
7. Furthermore, some regime critics claim that the result of the Buzav–
Diervud alliance in the 1993 election was that Diervuds, such as the 
prominent nomenklatura member and poet David Kugul’tinov, were allowed 
to retain their positions in the power apparatus (Andzhaev 2001).  
When the opposition People’s Party was established in 1994, one of its 
proclaimed aims was to “overcome the traditions of ulusizm and 
rodovizm”.74 But, it took them some time to find someone belonging to 
Iliumzhinov’s Buzav clan to join in among the most active members of the 
party. Among the dissatisfied Kalmyks there are particularly many Torguts, 
who have lost most of their former political power, and these gathered in the 
                                                     
73 The Chechens, that are the fourth largest ethnic group in Kalmykia, were for some reason 
not represented, whereas the small Korean minority did have their deputy in the Khural, 
which shows that ensuring the representation of the largest ethnic groups was not the sole 
aim. 
74  The difference between the two is that rodovizm is based on direct kinship, whereas 
ulusizm is based both on kinship and regional identity. 
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People’s Party in such numbers that it by some was nicknamed the “Torgut 
Party” (Senatova 1995: 4).  
The “Buzavisation” of the political administration has not only alienated 
many Torguts but also the Slavic population in Kalmykia. This exclusion of 
Russians from public administration is far worse than in Buryatia: For 
example, in the Narodnyi Khural elected in 1994, 19 were Kalmyks, and 
only 5 Russians (Maksimov 1996). In 1996 only 4 of 27 members of the 
presidential administration were Russians and 4 of the 20 members of 
government. The Kalmyks also have an almost complete control over the 
highest positions in the Kalmyk economy, for instance, 17 of 19 bank 
directors were Kalmyk (Guchinova 1997: 27–28). The few Russians in 
Iliumzhinov’s entourage tend either to be married to Kalmyks or to be old 
classmates and business partners of Iliumzhinov.75 Consequently, in 
Kalmykia, compared to Buryatia, far larger sections of the population are 
kept outside the orbit of power. In Buryatia the regime represents an alliance 
between the dominating ethnic group, the Russians, and the larger part of the 
Buryats. In Kalmykia the largest ethnic group, the Kalmyks, are in power, 
but has mainly representatives only from one ulus out of three, and the 
Russians are excluded.  
Furthermore, since the Kalmyks both are the largest ethnic group and 
they are in power, the public debate in Kalmykia has a different character 
from the one in Buryatia. The issue of ethnic revival is important among 
Kalmyk intellectuals, as well, but does not play such an all-important role as 
it does in Buryatia. Official ideology rather emphasises the president’s role 
as a moderator of inter-ethnic dissonance in the troubled North Caucasian 
region, and as a true cosmopolitan contributing to peace also in other places 
through his extensive network. This role is even enshrined in the Steppe 
Code, where Article 11 states that “the Republic of Kalmykia shares the 
responsibility for existing global and universal problems, and undertakes to 
make an effort to solve them in a spirit of love, compassion, charity and 
progress, thereby contributing to peace on Earth”. As a symbol of this, huge 
portraits of Iliumzhinov together with religious leaders like the Russian 
Patriarch, Dalai Lama and even the Pope line the streets of the capital Elista, 
and his biography contains pictures of Iliumzhinov in friendly conversation 
with Saddam Hussein and Daniel Arap Moi (Iliumzhinov 1995).  
In the Kalmyk Steppe Code a separate article guarantees the preservation 
and development of Kalmyk culture (Article 16) and the Kalmyk language is 
also singled out as in special need of protection (Article 18). On the whole, 
however, republican law defines only weak prerogatives to the Kalmyks, but 
the strong de facto position of the Kalmyks has still led the political 
opposition to focus on the evidence of anti-Russian discrimination, rather 
than on the need of a Kalmyk cultural renaissance. 
On some occasions the Iliumzhinov administration has turned to the use 
of pro-Kalmyk rhetoric in order to discredit the opposition and the federal 
centre and to justify and legitimise Iliumzhinov’s rule. The regime’s base in 
the largest ethnic group allows it to use such arguments. Sometimes this 
rhetoric even pops up in Moscow newspapers. For instance, the article “The 
                                                     
75  Interview with Gennadii Iudin, editor of Sovetskaia Kalmykiia segodnia, Elista, May 
2001. 
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War of the Uluses”, published in Nezavisimaia gazeta in 1999, claimed that 
it was only the Torguts who supported the Germans during World War 
IIthereby provoking the Kalmyk deportation in 1943and contrasts them 
with the loyal and Russified Buzavs.76 The article links the Torguts to the 
opposition in Kalmykia and emphasises the danger connected to the aim 
some of them have to reunite with Kalmykia the territories lost to Astrakhan 
Oblast’ in 1943. The only person able to prevent the republic from falling 
apart due to intra-ethnic tensions and conflict with the neighbouring oblast’ 
is allegedly the unifying and strong power of President Iliumzhinov—“the 
cosmopolite, who aims at unifying all the Kalmyks” (Serenko 1999). 
This use of an “us–them” ideology by the government has been quite 
frequent since Iliumzhinov came to power, and indirectly contrasts the 
Kalmyks and the Russians. This ideology exploits and nurtures Kalmyk 
memories of the deportation of the Kalmyk people in the 1943 and their 
sense of being exploited and ignored by the federal centre. An example is a 
letter printed by the Kalmyk language newspaper Khal’mg Unn in June 1997 
as a response to a letter signed by 13 opposition parties and organisations. 
The newspaper letter drew comparisons between the opposition today and 
the “traitors” in World War II that informed Stalin about disloyal elements 
among the Kalmyk population. Then the result was the deportation of the 
Kalmyk people; today, something similar to the situation in Nagorno-
Karabakh or Chechnya may be the result of such activities, the author claims 
(Piureeva 1997). 
One of the first instances in the 1990s in which the aversion against the 
federal centre was displayed was when the presidential candidate Ochirov on 
the eve of the election in 1993 invited two of his influential supporters at the 
federal centre to Elista to participate in his election campaign. These were 
the president of the International Russian Club, Mikhail Bocharov, and the 
editor of the journal Buddhism in St Petersburg, Dondokov. At a meeting 
that was broadcast on republican TV, Bocharov accused Iliumzhinov of a 
series of economic crimes. Many Kalmyks strongly disliked the fact that 
people from Moscow came to tell them how to run their own affairs, and at 
the end of the meeting 40–50 angry Iliumzhinov supporters had gathered 
outside the building (Kasimov 1993: 9). This episode is indicative not only 
of a traditional centre–periphery complex; the national factor also to a 
certain extent plays a role here. This is reflected in acute sensitivity against 
all attempts at degrading the position of the Kalmyks. The episode surely did 
not strengthen Ochirov’s chances of winning the election.  
On later occasions the “us–them” complex has been used by the 
republican authorities in conflicts with the federal centre. One example of 
this was the aggressive protests following an article in the Moscow 
newspaper Komsomol’skaia Pravda 13 November 1997 with the ironical 
title “Kirsan-khan, or why all people in Kalmykia are happy”. People set 
newspapers on fire in the central square in Elista, and some participants drew 
parallels between the article and “Goebbels’s propaganda” (Ryzhkov 1997b: 
                                                     
76  The Kalmyks were deported to Siberia in 1943 and their territory incorporated into the 
neighbouring regions. They were allowed to return in 1956 and the autonomous republic 
was re-established in 1958. The Kalmyk opposition has accused the author of the article 
of being paid by the Iliumzhinov administration to write such an article (Kolesnik et al. 
1999). 
Jorunn Brandvall 
nupi november 02 
94 
2–3). The word “genocide” is also frequently used as an accusation against 
the centre whenever a conflict arises, even when the question is about 
something as far removed from genocide as the closure of the National Bank 
of Kalmykia for lack of financial discipline in 1998. The vice-president and 
the speaker of the Narodnyi Khural made an appearance on republican TV, 
where they drew direct parallels between the closure of the bank now and 
when the bank was closed ahead of the Kalmyk deportation in 1943 
(Ryzhkov 1998f: 1).  
Finally, an ethnic element is also blended into Iliumzhinov’s elaborate 
attempts to build a personality cult. For instance, the main research institute 
in Kalmykia was for many years preoccupied with proving that Iliumzhinov 
descended from Chinghiz Khan. The fact that he, like Chinghiz Khan, was 
born in the year of the Tiger is also thought to have a positive influence on 
his leadership qualities. The personality cult otherwise draws upon the 
heritage from the Soviet leaders and includes elements such as compulsory 
portraits of Iliumzhinov in public places (one headmaster lost her job for 
neglecting this), a public holiday to celebrate the president’s birthday, and a 
state ideology called “ethnoplanetary thinking”—allegedly heavily 
influenced by Moonism (The Economist, 20 December 1997; ORT 2001).  
Gorenburg predicts that the numerically dominant position of the 
Kalmyks will enable this public display of pro-Kalmyk rhetoric. He does, 
however, not explain why this dominant position and the strong ethnic 
nationalism among the Kalmyks is combined with a Steppe Code that, like 
the Buryat Constitution, promotes mainly a civic national identity. One 
reason for this may be the fact that one of the purposes behind the Steppe 
Code was to prove Kalmykia’s loyalty to the federal centre after 
Illiumzhinov’s unpopular attempt to mediate between Yeltsin and the 
Supreme Soviet in the 1993 conflict in Moscow.  
Consequently, the politically dominant status of the Kalmyks is a result 
of informal politics rather than of positive legal discrimination. I have shown 
how the rhetoric has a Janus face: When directed against the surrounding 
world it emphasises the peaceful and harmonious state of inter-ethnic 
relations in Kalmykia. On the other hand, attacks against the opposition and 
the federal centre that exploit the Kalmyk deportation trauma have mainly 
occurred in the republican mass media. 
9. The relevance of transition and 
consolidation theory for my cases—a 
comparison 
My analysis started with a criticism of some scholars of Russian regionalism 
for shying away from building theories about regime change in ethnically 
defined federal subjects. I asked whether it would be possible to apply the 
existing theories on regime transition and consolidation also in these cases, 
or whether a full understanding only can be obtained through a scrutiny of 
the factor that distinguishes them from other, territorially defined entities: 
ethnicity.  
In my choice of case studies I aimed at finding two cases that had deve-
loped relatively different regime types, but that in many other respects were 
similar. Therefore I went for the two Mongol republics Buryatia and 
Kalmykia, the first of which I initially labelled as a “guided democracy”, the 
second a “sultanistic” regime. Despite the fact that the two republics have 
quite similar scores on a number of socio-economic indicators, a quite simi-
lar relationship with the federal centre and closely related titular populations, 
these regimes have evolved in different directions. My task has been to 
explain why.  
My analysis has shown that regime transitions and consolidations are 
complex processes influenced by multiple factors. I started out with five 
assumptions about which factors influenced the regime transitions and con-
solidations in my republics but could not find that any of them had to be 
rejected as irrelevant, although most of them had to be modified.  
I) Political-economic structures of governance 
According to my assumption about the relationship between political-econo-
mic structures and regime change, the compromises and alliance building 
that characterise Buryatia’s regime will emerge in regions where the eco-
nomy is concentrated in heavy industry and other industrial sectors that used 
to be a federal responsibility in the Soviet period. Kalmykia’s “winner-takes-
it-all” regime, on the other hand, would emerge from structures where the 
economy is concentrated in agriculture and light industry. 
In the case of Buryatia’s transition, the political-economic structures 
seemed to be so mixed between heavy industry, light industry and agricul-
ture that a fierce competition between these interests and a weak political 
power would be a more likely outcome than the “elite association” regime 
that has emerged. I argued that the results of the collapse of the Soviet eco-
nomy probably had much to say for co-operation to evolve. As a result of the 
crisis, the once quite strong Soviet enterprises became heavily dependent on 
financial support from the republican political administration, and this facili-
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tated their co-operation in the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The 
Union entered a strategic partnership with the political elite, not on terms of 
equality, like in the mutually beneficial partnership foreseen by Stoner-
Weiss, but rather as a partnership where the political actors are the stronger 
part. This example shows that in addition to looking at the structural compo-
sition of the economy per se it is necessary also to evaluate factors such as 
what capacity the largest enterprises have to survive in the transition eco-
nomy: How dependent they are on government subsidies and credits. 
In Kalmykia, on the other hand, the economic structure did indeed seem 
to facilitate the emergence of a strong executive power, as the economy is 
largely dependent on agriculture and the industrial sector is weak. The agri-
cultural sector did not, however, act according to the expectations when 
Iliumzhinov was elected. It would have been natural to expect that the leader 
of the strongest interest organisation in the region, the Farmers’ Association, 
who also was part of the ruling elite, would have the best chances of winning 
the election. Instead the candidate that allied with the weak industrial sector 
won.  
II) Elite struggles in the regime transition 
The example with the Kalmyk Farmers’ Association suggests that economic-
political structures are not all important in determining the outcome of 
regime transitions, but that also elite calculations need to be taken into 
account. In my analysis I showed that when the elite groups in Kalmykia 
made calculations about whom to support they were based among other 
things on their personal opinions of Bambaev as a politician and his chances 
of winning the election. The groups supporting Iliumzhinov correctly inter-
preted the mood of the electorate in Kalmykia at the time and realised that it 
was tired of corrupt and inefficient nomenklatura leaders. When the “boy 
from next door” returned to the republic as a seemingly rich and successful 
businessman, this seemed like the incarnation of the dream many people had 
of a better life, and they believed his promises to bring welfare and glory to 
the republic. The strongest counter-candidate, Ochirov, made a less success-
ful analysis of the people’s preferences by relying too much on his image as 
a general and on his connections in Moscow. Thus, this example shows that 
elite strategies and resources do not alone determine the transition outcome: 
In order to get elected the presidential candidates also need to present the 
electorate with an attractive election programme and campaign strategy.  
As both Iliumzhinov and Ochirov depended strongly on support among 
the local elite in the election campaign, it would be wrong to perceive them 
as real counter-elite candidates. Hence, the transition can hardly have been a 
“revolution”. Still, it deserves being labelled as a forced transition, because 
of the strongly polarised elite struggle. If the ruling elite had been more uni-
fied behind Bambaev or a different nomenklatura candidate, this could easily 
have prevented any counter-elite candidate from being elected, because the 
latter would have lacked administrative resources and would not have had 
equal access to mass media.  
This was what happened in Buryatia. The counter-elite candidate here 
was Shapovalov, whose image quite resembled Iliumzhinov’s image as a 
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populist politician with shady business connections. The crucial difference 
between the two was that Shapovalov was a real counter-elite candidate. 
Where the other main candidates participated directly in shaping the new 
formal institutions in Buryatia to their own advantage, Shapovalov had no 
influence over these processes. The fact that he was a counter-elite candidate 
also implied that he had less access to mass media and he could not divert 
federal transfers or benefit from a strong administrative position to receive 
economic support from important interest groups. Because of this, 
Shapovalov did not stand a chance in the election.  
In the choice between Potapov and Ivanov/Saganov, however, image and 
campaign strategy were again important, although the latter was not as 
important in Buryatia as in Kalmykia. The time factor in Buryatia worked to 
the advantage of the politicians who wanted to turn back the clock and return 
to the social safety of the Soviet period. In 1994, one year after the presiden-
tial election in Kalmykia, the Buryat population was already tired of politici-
ans promising a rapid economic transformation. Furthermore, the program-
mes of the candidates influenced what interest groups they were supported 
by, such as when the Communist Party went for Potapov and the more libe-
ral parties supported Ivanov, but informal networks were also important. The 
latter, for instance, partly explained why the Union of Industria-lists and 
Entrepreneurs would go for the socialist Potapov instead of the more market-
oriented economist Ivanov. On the whole, Potapov was elected after entering 
an alliance with the most important parts of the civil society, such as the 
socialist move-ments, but these alliances were mainly on Potapov’s pre-
mises. It is therefore fair to speak of conservative reform as the mode of 
transition in Buryatia, rather than a pact.  
According to my initial assumption, such a pact would normally emerge 
when the regime reformers and moderates in the opposition enter an alliance. 
In Buryatia, the winning coalition was between the regime hardliners and the 
opposition moderates, which reduces the chances that the hardliners will be 
enticed to start democratic reform, especially when the coalition enjoys the 
backing of the majority of the population. In Kalmykia, on the other hand, it 
was the regime moderates that entered an alliance with the opposition radi-
cals, which is possible if the moderates are left with promises that they will 
preserve some of their privileges. Quite logically, such an alliance would 
stand a better chance of resulting in a democratic outcome than the hardliner 
–moderate alliance in Buryatia, but the opposite was the result in my cases. 
One reason for this is the problem of fitting reality neatly into models: The 
political actors in the Russian context may couple radical market-liberal 
ideas with authoritarianism, as in the case of Iliumzhinov. Ideologically, 
then, it was the market liberalism of Iliumzhinov that made the regime 
moderates support him, whereas politically Iliumzhinov was closer to the 
hardliners. 
III) Formal political institutions 
Was it so that the formal institutions, more specifically the republican consti-
tutions and laws, per se contributed extensively to the diverging regime con-
solidations in Kalmykia and Buryatia? My analyses of these legal frame-
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works showed that the Kalmyk laws and the Steppe Code defined a con-
siderably stronger executive power than in Buryatia. In particular the execu-
tive in Kalmykia had much stronger powers when it comes to appointing and 
dismissing state employees, including federal judges. Thus, there are 
grounds to claim that the nature of the regimes has a solid basis in the legal 
frameworks in Buryatia and Kalmykia. 
As formal institutions do not emerge out of nowhere, the fact that they 
provide the presidents with so different prerogatives begs an explanation. 
My assumption was that whether the constitution was adopted before or after 
the first presidential election makes for a crucial difference in the formal 
powers of the executive. The results of the analysis showed that this claim 
can be justified. In Buryatia the constitution emerged out of a strong power 
struggle between the two major factions in the elite where the outcome was 
uncertain. Therefore the actors did not dare to risk putting too much power 
into the hands of the executive, in case they would lose the presidential elec-
tion. In Kalmykia, on the other hand, the Steppe Code was adopted one year 
after Iliumzhinov had been elected president and at a point when he already 
enjoyed a very dominant position in the republic, including over legislation. 
Thus, he could more or less decide how much power should be granted to 
him in the Steppe Code.  
IV) Political processes in the regime consolidation 
The formal institutions in their turn to various degrees put constraints on and 
open up opportunities for the political actors in the regime consolidation. My 
initial assumption was that formal institutions work together with informal 
political practices in this process, but that a force that may potentially coun-
teract the consolidation of a strong executive power is non-governmental 
structures, such as civil society and mass media, and formally independent 
state structures, such as the legislature, the judicial power and the munici-
palities.  
In my analysis of the formal institutions I pointed out that it is almost 
paradoxical that Iliumzhinov did not ensure the executive even stronger con-
stitutional powers, when considering his degree of control over Kalmyk soci-
ety when the Steppe Code was adopted. I argued, however, that perhaps 
exactly his level of control provides us with the explanation for this. Right 
after his election Iliumzhinov had dissolved the Supreme Soviet and “natio-
nalised” the republican economy. Furthermore, local self-government organs 
had been replaced with presidential representatives. As I mentioned, the 
major difference between the Kalmyk and Buryat constitutions is the presi-
dent’s powers to appoint and dismiss state employees and federal judges. 
When this is added to the strong control the president already had over soci-
ety, the president did not really need to add any extra formal powers in order 
to achieve full control over society. The powers to appoint and dismiss 
people are particularly important in a society where patron–client relation-
ships and personal loyalties play an essential role.  
In comparison, the role of informal networks seems somewhat less pre-
dominant and the formal institutions more important in Buryatia. Among 
other things, the legislature and the judicial power to a certain extent act 
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independently, and so did the mayor of Ulan-Ude in 1995–97. The “elite 
association” regime here has allowed Potapov to consolidate his regime 
more through compromise than by use of force. Force has nevertheless been 
used to shut down or streamline a large part of the mass media in the repub-
lic, and it was also used to remove the troublesome mayor of Ulan-Ude, 
Shapovalov. The measures used against the free news media in Buryatia 
have, however, not reached the level of brutality and conformism of 
Kalmykia. Furthermore, civil society has been left in peace. 
The reason for this, I argued, seems to be the fact that the regime in 
Buryatia rests on an alliance with many of the most significant civil society 
movements and the largest political party, the Communist Party. In 
Kalmykia, on the other hand, the Communist Party has most of the time been 
one of the most ardent opponents of the Iliumzhinov regime. So were initi-
ally also the most important interest groups: the Farmers’ Association and 
Trade Unions and their associated newspapers. Although civil society from 
the outset was weaker and more fragmented than in Buryatia, this threat 
from parts of civil society has made it more imperative for Iliumzhinov to 
quell their resistance by restricting the organisational freedoms.  
The size of the ruling elites seems to determine the approach to these 
alternative power centres. In Buryatia, the regime rests on a quite broad alli-
ance between political and economic actors—gradually also co-opting the 
emerging business elite. This is radically different from the narrow and con-
frontational elite in Kalmykia, based on a small group of Iliumzhinov’s 
family, business partners, school friends and a few loyal nomenklatura mem-
bers. This narrow basis and confrontational nature breed polarisation with 
the groups that are excluded from the regime. Polarisation in its turn creates 
a need of stronger measures against alternative power centres and a regime 
ideology justifying these measures. Iliumzhinov has actively been trying to 
create such an ideology and build up a personality cult around his presi-
dency, and this does seem to be something that many people in the republic 
buy into.  
Indeed, personality seems to be another factor influencing the nature of 
the regime that is consolidated, and not only in this obvious case with 
Iliumzhinov’s rather eccentric personality cult. To explain the fact that so 
strong measures were employed against the weak and fragmented civil soci-
ety in Kalmykia and not against the more vibrant civil society in Buryatia, 
the fact that larger parts of the Kalmyk civil society opposed Iliumzhinov 
does not seem like a sufficient explanation. Perhaps was it just as important 
that Iliumzhinov was more “paranoid” about political opposition than 
Potapov, or felt a stronger need for a total control over society? Such 
assumptions about the psyche of political leaders easily turn into speculati-
ons. Thus, I will limit myself to suggesting that the president’s perception of 
the strength of and threat from the opposition may be more important than 
reality in determining his relationship to alternative power centres. 
V) Intra- and inter-ethnic polarisation 
This fifth and final variable is the one that I think has the potential to make 
the regime transition and consolidation in the republics in the Russian Fede-
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ration different from the transition and consolidation in territorially defined 
federal subjects. 
I believe that my analysis of inter- and intra-ethnic competition and 
polarisation in Kalmykia and Buryatia has shown that these factors do not 
function as independent variables influencing the regime developments in 
Kalmykia and Buryatia. Rather they work to strengthen already existent ten-
dencies produced by the variables mentioned above, more particularly the 
elite struggles and political processes, i.e. the dynamic variables in my 
theory.  
My initial assumption was that numerical weight and different levels of 
polarisation between and within ethnic groups would influence which alli-
ances are concluded in the transition period and that the ethnic balance in 
these alliances again influences the level of polarisation in the consolidation 
period. The latter will have an impact on what kind of regime is consoli-
dated. Russian–titular segregation and inter-ethnic polarisation do seem to 
have been somewhat stronger in Kalmykia than in Buryatia. This fact and 
the even more important factor of Kalmyk numerical plurality in the republic 
contributed to the fact that all the candidates at the presidential elections in 
1991 and 1993 were Kalmyks. Furthermore, the infighting among the uluses 
that became particularly tough from 1990 also created quite strong intra-eth-
nic polarisation, reflected in a tendency to vote for representatives from 
one’s own ulus. 
The strategy subsequently chosen by Iliumzhinov to strengthen his power 
base in Kalmykia has in many ways been the opposite of Potapov’s strategy 
in Buryatia: to keep the power within a small group that is much based on 
Iliumzhinov’s own Buzav clan. In Buryatia, on the other hand, the only 
group that seems to be excluded from administrative positions today, com-
pared to the Soviet days, is the sub-ethnic group of West Buryats. The fact 
that the divide between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is based on such 
permanent lines as intra- and inter-ethnic divisions has further increased the 
polarisation in society, and then particularly in Kalmykia. Here the strong 
power base of the regime, combined with the polarisation, has enabled the 
regime also to use “us–them” arguments to legitimise their rule—arguments 
that in more open societies could have put the regime in jeopardy. 
9.1. Lessons to be learned 
Although the regime in Kalmykia in particular has many features that make 
it unique, I believe that there are lessons to be learnt from my case study of 
two Mongol republics that can also be generalised to the study of other repu-
blics in the Russian Federation. Inter-ethnic competition is an issue in all of 
these republics and many of them also have similar sub-ethnic cleavages.77  
The main conclusion to be drawn from my analysis seems to be that on 
the whole the same factors influence the regime transition and consolidation 
in ethnically defined federal subjects as in territorially defined subjects. 
First, already existing political-economic structures influence which resour-
ces actors possess and what kinds of alliances they will conclude. One needs 
                                                     
77  See, for instance, a recent study by Matsuzato (2002) of inter- and intra-ethnic cleavages 
in the republics of Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Udmurtia and Mari-El. 
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to bear in mind, though, that the economic crisis that followed in the wake of 
the regime transition in Russia acts as an intervening variable between the 
Soviet era political-economic structures and elite struggles. The crisis can 
make weakened economic actors more ready to co-operate with the political 
actors than they would otherwise have been, and more ready to accept co-
operation on unequal terms, facilitating elite association. 
Second, elite struggles can change the direction of the regime transition 
by being based on calculations about whom to ally with that are not only 
based on what resources and positions the other actors possess. When the 
transition is culminating in elections these calculations will also take into 
account the potential various candidates have of getting elected; i.e. how 
well their programmes and strategies fit with the preferences of the elector-
ate. Indeed, the genetic perspective of transition theory is often so focused 
on elite preferences that it overlooks the role of the electorate. 
Third, formal political institutions provide the fundament for the new 
political regime, but they themselves are only a reflection of the context they 
were adopted in. A crucial factor here is the level of competition and uncer-
tainty in the elite struggle surrounding the emergence of these institutions.  
Fourth, formal institutions restrain and provide opportunities to the politi-
cal actors, but the political process during the regime consolidation is shaped 
through a blend between the framework provided by these formal instituti-
ons and informal practices. This determines the nature of the relationship 
between the executive power and formally independent state and non-gov-
ernmental structures. The extent to which these structures manage to assert 
their independence further influences the degree of transparency in public 
life. The perceived threat from the independent actors actually seems more 
important than their actual strength in provoking the executive power to 
employ harsh power measures. Thus, the personality of the president pro-
bably also has a role to play in determining the nature of the regime. 
Fifth, to the extent ethnicity does play a role in regime transition and con-
solidation in Russian republics, it seems that its role is mainly instrumental: 
a useful tool for elite actors in order to achieve the goal of gaining and con-
solidating their power. If the ethnic cleavages in society are exploited, this 
has the potential to create other political alliances and thereby also different 
outcomes than if other cleavages get to dominate. At the same time, the use 
of ethnicity for this purpose will have repercussions on the level of ethnic 
polarisation, bringing the polarisation in society to much higher levels than 
what otherwise would have been the case. The examples of Kalmykia and 
Buryatia are quite telling in this respect, as they both to different extents ex-
clude parts of the population from representation in the power apparatus.  
One of the few things the election programmes of the apparatchik 
Potapov and the businessman Iliumzhinov had in common when they got 
elected was their promises to promote peaceful inter- and intra-ethnic rela-
tions. Nearly ten years later it seems that Potapov has been somewhat more 
successful than his colleague in Kalmykia in fulfilling this promise. Where a 
conscious strategy is adopted of balanced co-optation and consensus across 
the ethnic dividing lines, the role of ethnicity will be diminished. Where on 
the other hand a strategy of exclusive, ethnically based sultanism is applied, 
the fact that the dividing lines are ethnic may prove particularly dangerous 
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for the stability of the regime. These examples suggest that ethnicity indeed 
should be included in the explanation of regime developments in Russia’a 
republics, and not only for the sake of understanding a regime’s sources and 
paths of development, but also its potential for survival. 
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From Apparatchik to President – 
From Businessman to Khan 
 
Regime Transition and Consolidation in 
the Russian Republics of Buryatia and 
Kalmykia 
During the 1990s the Russian federal system moved ever closer to a 
confederation. The 89 federal subjects developed political regimes ranging 
from democratic systems to strongly authoritarian one-man rule. Through 
case studies of the republics of Kalmykia and Buryatia, Jorunn Brandvoll 
here investigates which factors determine why some federal subjects turn 
democratic, while others turn authoritarian. The starting-point for the 
analysis is the assumption scholars seem to make that traditional transition 
and consolidation theory is ill-suited when applied on ethnically divided 
societies. Brandvoll shows that traditional transition and consolidation 
theory does provide a useful framework for explaining the political 
development in the ethnically defined republics of Buryatia and Kalmykia. 
However, the ethnic factor makes the political processes in ethnically 
defined regions somewhat different from those in other federal subjects. 
Ethnicity here works as an instrument to be used by political actors to gain 
and strengthen their power. Ethnic polarisation increases the chances that a 
narrowly defined, ethnically based regime will emerge, like it has in 
Kalmykia. Furthermore, the fact that the division between the haves and the 
have-nots follows ethnic dividing lines increases the polarisation in society 
to higher levels, which in its turn encourages the regime to adopt even 
harsher measures against its opponents. This can be contrasted with the 
situation in Buryatia, where the regime draws upon members of the largest 
ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. By co-opting various elite groups into the 
regime, Buryatia has developed a stable consensus regime, whereas the 
confrontational and narrowly based regime in Kalmykia rests on force and 
fear.    
 
 
 
